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1. ETHICAL NATURALISM
1.1. What ethical naturalism is
Human beings are a species of social animal for whom there is a 
characteristic form of life. An individual human being may be evaluated as a good 
or bad specimen according to how well that individual realizes the human form of 
life. To be a good human being, one must possess those traits of character that 
reliably enable one to achieve the ends of creatures like us. The foregoing is a 
brief statement of the ethical theory I will be presenting and defending in the 
following pages. I call this theory "naturalized virtue ethics," hereafter NVE. 
Many defenders of such an Aristotelian ethical theory maintain explicitly that they
are to be understood as carrying out the prefect of ethical naturalism J I believe 
ethical naturalism to be a worthy project. Furthermore, I believe that NVE 
represents the best available naturalistic ethical theory. In the reminder of this 
section I explain what ethical naturalism is. In § 1.2 I present reasons for why we 
should prefer ethical naturalism. In §1.3 I outline the structure of what is to 
follow.
The term 'naturalism' is contentious and subject to equivocation, 
misunderstanding, and abuse. 'Ethical naturalism' suffers almost as badly. Any 
deSnition we provide will be in some sense stipulative, but if we are careful it 
should capture some of the historical meaning of 'ethical naturalism', in addition 
to separating off an important class of ethical theories. I propose that by 'ethical 
naturalism' we understand the following.
E/Aica/ nuturo/üm: Cognitivist ethical theories in which important
ethical norms and evaluations are grounded in natural facts.
Two of the m ^or ideas in this definition are that of grounding ethics in nature and 
ethical cognitivism. We shall look at each of these in turn.
1. VofwaZiym. A popular and influential understanding of ethical 
naturalism is that ethical naturalism stresses the rejection of supematuralism.^
 ̂E.g., Hursthouse 1999, MacIntyre 1999, Foot 2001. More specifically, such 
versions of Aristotle fall into the general category of "human nature ethical theories" 
(cf. McShea 1979).
Bernard Williams writes: "A naturalistic view of ethics was previously contrasted 
with a supematuralistic view, and it meant a view according to which ethics was to be
That is not the main issue involved in discussions of ethical naturalism today, 
though we should admit the historical importance of this supposed dichotomy. For 
example, 'naturalism' has been held by many to be synonymous with 'atheism'. It 
need not be, of course. But what it actually means to reject supematuralism is not 
so clear. If by 'nature' we mean 'everything that is', then of course there is 
nothing outside nature. But there is no need to make an ontological commitment 
of this sort. We can bracket the supernatural, as it were, and see how far we get in 
explaining ethics in terms of nature. What needs to be said more clearly, then, is 
what is to count as such an explanation.
Nature is, more or less, what our latest and best science tells us it is. This is 
a commitment that we should make explicit. Our latest and best science 
comprises physics as well as the biological, psychological, and social sciences. 
Certainly, research is of varying quality. But our explanation of ethics should 
make use of those entities countenanced by our latest and best science. What those 
entities are would require a treatise on naturalistic ontology, which I am not 
prepared to do. But I think we all have a rough and ready idea of what counts as 
nature in these terms. And that is the idea of nature I have in mind.
What does it mean to explain ethics in such terms? To explicate that 
notion, we need to be clear what the explanandum is. If the explanandum is how 
any particular individual comes to have the ethical beliefs and make the ethical 
judgments he or she in fact does, then we probably ought to look to psychology
understood in worldly terms, without reference to God or any transcendental 
authority" (Williams 1985: 121).
and the idiosyncratic history of that person. If the explanandum is how we as a 
group come to have the norms that we do, then we might will look to the social 
sciences. For example, we might utilize the tools of game theory to develop our 
explanation. That is, we might be able to explain how it is that given our specific 
sorts of coordination problems and capabilities we end up with the norms that we 
do. But these are scientific answers to scientific questions. These questions may 
be answerable by the scientihc method, and we may call what we have done 
"explaining ethics," but it does not seem that there is anything specifically 
philosophical about our accomplishment.
A philosophical explanation of ethics will explain the moral facts. A 
naturalistic explanation will explain the moral facts in terms of nature. To make 
things clear, let us consider what is to be explained. John says, "Mary is a good 
human being." What makes that claim true, if it is true, is that Mary is a good 
human being. The question then is: What is it about Mary that makes her a good 
human being? The answer to be developed here is that she is a good human being 
because of her traits of character, manifested in her habitual actions. And those 
traits of character are the ones that make a human being good because they 




7. zf couraggowj', cAanYa6/e, Zoj/a/, AonejA
wüe. [observation]
2. 7%o^e^or^cw/ar traiVj are tAe o/ze  ̂tAat re//a6(y e»a6/g 
7Ae reaZizah'oM q/"tAe aatwra/ Aa/Ma/z eadl;. [observation] 
j. f  oj êŝ s'zo» q/"rAo^e traztj tAar re/zaATy ezzaAZe rea/zzah'oa 
q/̂  tAe cAarac/eriytzc Aamaa ewù maAsf a Aaz?zaa Aezag 
gao(7. [the naturalistic ethical theory, NVE]
In subsequent chapters I will argue in support of this schema.
A fundamental tenet of naturalism is that human beings are continuous 
with nature.^ If this is so, then an account of ethics in terms of nature ought to be 
possible. One way this idea may be put is that we can "base" or "ground" ethics, 
somehow, on nature.'* To ground ethics on nature, then, is to give an account of 
ethics in natural terms. That is, in grounding ethics we are justifying an ethical 
theoiy. In a naturalistic ethical theory we do so in terms of natural categories. 
Ethical naturalism comprises those theories of ethics that maintain that ethics is 
grounded, somehow, in natural facts. Providing the 'somehow' in that definition is
 ̂"[Ethical naturalism] stems from the general attitude that man is part of nature. 
Aristotle's outlook is naturalistic in this sense, so is Mill's utilitarianism, and so are 
most modern ethical works ..." (Williams 1985: 121). Rosalind Hursthouse echoes 
this central tenet of naturalism: "[The] standard first premise [of ethical naturalism] is 
that what human beings are is a species of rational, social animals and thereby a 
species of living things—which, unlike persons' or 'rational beings,' have a particular 
biological make-up and a natural life cycle" (Hursthouse 1999: 206). Cf. Romanell 
1958.
to provide a theory. This theory, along with the relevant facts, should entail 
conclusions that at the very least coAere with our reasoned moral judgments. 
Ideally, those conclusions will our reasoned moral judgments, for the simple 
reason that the theory in question is our ethical theory.
The above definition of ethical naturalism may lead some to fear that the 
view amounts to a form of reductionism, with the latter term understood to imply 
something undesirable. NVE is not a reductionistic theory. Bernard Williams 
rightly contends: "Questions about naturalism ... are questions not about 
reduction but about explanation.... The questions concerp what we are prepared to 
regard, at each level, as an explanation."^ Explanations must fit in with whatever it 
is that we regard as nature. Williams illustrates his point with the view known as 
vitalism, which held that living things differ in a deep way &om the rest of nature 
because they possess nonphysical inner forces that give them the property of life. ̂  
It was thought by believers in vitalism that, therefore, living things could not be 
explained in terms of the rest of nature. Vitalism has, of course, been rejected by 
modem biology. Previously, however, biologists who contended that living things 
could be explained in terms of the rest of nature were generally labeled 
mechanistic reductionists, the phrase uttered with a pejorative connotation. A 
similar charge is also leveled at ethical naturalism, that it seeks to "reduce" ethics
 ̂"[Ejthical naturalism is usually thought of as not only basing ethics is some way on 
considerations of human nature, but also as taking human beings to be part of the 
natural, biological order of living things" (Hursthouse 1999: 206).
= Williams 2002: 23.
 ̂H. S. Jennings notes two understandings of vitalism. It is a view either (1 ) "that 
there is a deep-lying distinction ... between what occurs in the living, and what
to something else, perhaps biology, perhaps to something even more 
"fundamental" like physics. That is a mistake. As Williams puts the point: "The 
question for naturalism is always: can we explain, by some appropriate and 
relevant criteria of explanation, the phenomenon in question in terms of the of 
nature?"^ However, the "rest of nature" when it comes to human beings includes 
more than just nonhuman stufT The rest of nature includes the rest of human 
nature besides ethics, which includes psychology as well as culture, or, in 
Williams's terms, "non-genetic learning."
Someone might at this point suggest an amendment, that a dehnition of 
ethical naturalism should stress that the grounding is to be done purely by 
nonethical or nonnormative facts. However, this would unduly limit the theory at 
the outset. It could turn out that nature is, as it were, "normative all the way 
down," or even "ethical all the way down."^ As Aristotle noticed over two 
millennia ago, nature is teleological. I realize this is a controversial claim, and I 
will be explicating and defending natural teleology throughout the next chapter. 
But suppose for now that nature is, in some sense, teleological. Teleology allows
occurs in the non-living" or (2) "that mechanistic formulation is not adequate for 
giving an account of nature" (Jennings 1913: 386). Cf. Singer 1946.
 ̂Williams 2002: 23, his italics.
® In a general discussion of ethical naturalism among the ancient Greeks, Julia 
Annas writes: "If we reject the demand to be reductive, and to appeal to wholly 'non- 
evaluative' facts, we can still be left with something that can fairly be called ethical 
naturalism, namely a position which insists on grounding ethical claims in facts about 
nature that support those claims. This is general enough to form a spectrum of 
positions, of which reductive versions would merely form one extreme, united by 
opposition to the thesis that ethical claims are ultimately self-justifying. This weaker 
position of course leaves it open for the supporting facts about nature to be 
themselves evaluative or even ethical" (Annas 1993: 136). NVE, it will turn out, is
us to infer normative conclusions. For example, if we know what an organ or 
artifact is supposed to do, we can deduce whether it is working well or badly. To 
speak rather loosely, if nature is teleological, then nature itself implies norms. 
These norms at least allow us to make evaluations. They also, I argue, allow us to 
make ethical evaluations.
2. Cogmïzvü/M. Stressing that the ethical naturalism is cognitivist not only 
separates off such theories &om those of Kant, Kantians, and noncognitivists, but 
is also in keeping with the historical use of the term, at least since Moore.^ 
Defining ethical naturalism as a kind of cognitivism is meant to make explicit that 
the position entails that there are ethical facts. The cognitivist holds that ethical 
discourse is not systematically misleading, that some of its fact-stating features are 
in order. More precisely, a cognitivist holds at least the following:
1. There are some ethical truths.
2. Some of these ethical truths are cognitively accessible to normal 
human beings.
Cognitivist ethical naturalism preserves certain commonsense features of our 
ethical language. When we say, for example, "Mary is a good person," we tend to 
think that that evaluation is based upon certain objective features of Mary, her 
traits, her behavior, her actions. It is desirable if possible to preserve those aspects
one of those "weaker" positions Annas contends was held by some of the ancient 
naturalists.
 ̂Cf. Sturgeon 1998: 713.
of ethical discourse. A certain sort of ethical naturalism holds out the promise of 
doing just that.
Noncognitivists argue that, on the contrary, the "surface grammar" of 
evaluative language is systematically misleading. Pronouncements like "This is 
bad" or "That is good," though they seem to attribute properties to things and 
therefore admit of being true or false, in fact do not attribute properties and thus 
cannot be true or false. Noncognitivism fails at least this test of descriptive 
adequacy. Pretheoretically we tend to think that there are ethical properties of acts, 
outcomes, and persons. If it should turn out that our ethical discourse attributes 
properties where it should not, then certainly we should abandon the cognitivist 
project. But there is not, as far as I can tell, an a reason to suppose that 
noncognitivism is true. Moreover, consistency with our best pretheoretic ideas 
about ethics is one of the ways that we test our ethical theories. They are, as it 
were, part of the data o f ethical philosophy. It we want to dismiss part of the 
phenomena to be explained, then we had better have a good reason to do so and, 
moreover, explain the mass hallucination. Ethical naturalism, on the other hand, 
must specify only that upon which the discourse is grounded, the truth conditions 
of a certain kind of evaluative language.
1.2. Why ethical naturalism?
Surveying contemporary philosophical ethics we see that, despite its 
diversity, ethical theories may be divided into a few exhaustive categories. First, 
there are naturalists and nonnaturalists. Nonnaturalists include supematuralists, for
example, divine command theorists, as well as intuitionists like G. E. Moore. 
Second, there are cognitivists and noncognitivists. There are at least five reasons 
to prefer ethical naturalism to the alternatives.^'^
1. O/im/ogicu/ ecoMomj;. Many might be pleased by certain kinds of uses of 
Occam's razor. Ethical naturalism would allow us to give an account of ethics in 
terms of the rest of nature and a ybrtzon in terms of nature. We will thus have to 
evoke nothing "nonnatural" in our account. However, it should be stressed that an 
ontologically economical theory is not for that reason alone to be preferred to one 
less economical. We should posit only and no more than those entities needed for 
the explanation. Yet there may be more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt 
of in some versions of naturalism. The most nearly correct naturalistic ethical 
theory may be far more complex ontologically than any given nonnaturalistic 
rival. Nevertheless, there is the sense that explaining ethics only in terms of one 
kind of "stuff'—namely, natural stuff—is a good thing, if it can be done.
2. DüeTzcAu/zfmenr q/"etAicj. A good theory should help to dispel some 
mystery about the phenomena to be explained. That is itself a reason to prefer 
good theories. Many perceive the categories of the nonnatural as inherently 
mysterious. In some contexts that may be to their credit, of course. But if ethics is 
a mystery, as it often seems to be, then to explain it with more mystery is really
Of reasons to prefer ethical naturalism, Robert Audi writes: "The appeal of ethical 
naturalism, in any of its plausible forms, is strong: it promises ontological economy 
by construing normative phenomena as in some way natural; it provides for 
objectivity in ethics, at least assuming that there are objective methods for the study 
of natural phenomena; it sustains the hope that the rationality of scientific procedures 
can help in resolving moral issues; and it dispels the sense of mystery which, for
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only to becloud the issue. If we can ground an ethics on nature, however, then 
insofar as we understand nature we can understand ethics.' ' Ethical naturalism can 
make ethics more easily understood. As the natural sciences have shown us, 
nature is in many respects intelligible to us. Ethics, if natural, should be no less 
intelligible. Given what is at stake, it is highly desirable that we understand ethics.
3. Æ'rAfca/ oZyecAwry. The quest for ethical naturalism has its roots in what 
we might term a metaethical desire for an objective ethical theoiy. An ethics 
somehow grounded in nature exists independently of historical, cultural, and 
personal idiosyncrasies. Moreover, on one popular construal, if something exists 
objectively, then it exists independently of what anyone thinks about it. The 
'about' is obviously important. If one's criterion for objectivity in ethics is that 
ethical truths must obtain even if no one has a mind, then of course ethical 
objectivity will be impossible. It is not that an objective ethical fact must obtain 
no matter what anyone thinks. Thought probably is an ineliminable feature of 
morality. Luckily, we need not be so absurdly strict about what counts as 
objective truth. Objectivity entails that there are ethical facts. Noncognitivisms 
seem to have trouble with ethical objectivity.
4 . raA'oMa/iYy. Ethical naturalism holds out the promise of helping 
us to resolve ethical issues using scientific means. A significant factor influencing 
philosophers in the direction of ethical naturalism is the deep impression made by
many, beclouds other accounts of the ontology and epistemology of ethics" (Audi 
1993:95).
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the natural sciences' success in explaining and manipulating nature. Nowadays, a 
theory's being correctly labeled "scientific" is taken to be a mark of its rationality. 
Thus many philosophers of ethics would prefer that their ethical theories have a 
status on a par with the theories of natural science. The hope is that such 
naturalistic ethical theories would be not only better at explaining ethical 
phenomena than their nonnaturalistic alternatives, but would also enable us to 
better guide human behavior, our own as well as that of others.
Most philosophers will desire an ethical theory that is at least consistent 
with what our best science tells us the world, including human beings, is like. This 
seems to be a minimal requirement of naturalism. It appeals to one version of the 
principle of "ought implies can."^^ Of course, it is part of the very nature of 
science, as currently understood, that scientific inquiry is fallible. That is, what we 
tAznA we know about human nature, using scientific procedures, could be wrong. 
Moreover, at any given point in time there will be conflicting theories of human 
nature. It will be unclear, then, with which scientific theory our ethical theory 
should be consistent. What this should tell us is that, as ethical theorists, we 
should take into account only those scientific theories of human nature that are 
relatively well supported by the evidence and accepted by the scientihc
John McDowell sees the disenchantment of nature as a way of understanding an 
important kind of naturalism, which he understands as "Humean" as opposed to 
"Aristotelian" (McDowell 1995).
See, e.g.. Brown 1950, Montefiore, 1958, Brown 1977, Kekes 1984.
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community/^ Again, of course, which theories these are may change. A 
commitment to some form of methodological naturalism would entail that we do 
not commit to our ethical theories dogmatically, that is, without leaving room for 
change when there is further evidence and theoretical innovation.
However, it is not sufficient for ethical naturalism that the ethical theory be 
merely consistent with other naturalistic discourse, for many of them are. The 
theory will be by certain facts of nature, deduced or induced in the
usual scientific way. In NVE certain evaluative and normative claims are 
grounded by certain facts about human nature, that is, our form of life.
5. nhZzVy. Aristotle says that the end of politics or political science is 
the human good.^^ The originates "in the bare needs of life, ... continuing in 
existence for the sake of a good life."^^ The goal of politics is to promote the 
common good, or, in the words of the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, the 
general welfare. Of course, we may be among certain cynics who think that 
politics is all about power, in some sense of the term, a struggle among elites to 
actualize their ends. But at the least we can state a goal for politics: it is to 
promote the human good.
Ours is a "land of many churches," founded on the promise of pluralism. 
Increasingly, moreover, the world is becoming more and more a global 
community. But pluralism and globalism present mixed blessings. The recent past
Besides the virtue ethics literature, there are several recent works, not all by 
philosophers, seeking to ground ethics (somehow) in human nature. See e.g., 
Barkow ef a/. 1992, Clark 2002, Hinde 2002.
A/E 1094b5ff.
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and current afïairs make this fact all too plain. From the vantage point of history, 
one need only to recall the various brutal and costly purges and wars brought on 
by the Protestant Reformation, a state of affairs historian Jacques Barzun 
describes as "the West tom apar t , " to  envision the potential negative 
consequences of pluralism. On the other hand, from the vantage point of history 
Luther's posting of the Ninety-five Theses and subsequent revolutionary events 
seem to be good things. Increasingly, global pluralism appears all but inevitable. 
We can face the products of that inevitability the way that people often have in the 
past: with war. Or, we can choose to face pluralism honestly, as something with 
which we must leam to live. A naturalistic ethical theory, if it be correct, can help 
to promote the common good by providing us with ethical methods of dealing 
with conflicts between divergent belief systems.
Consider that many people believe, in the strongest sense of the word 
'believe', that religion and morality are inseparable. In some circles 'atheist' is 
still synonymous with 'degenerate', 'wicked', and 'immoral'. And we should all 
recall with a shudder the uses to which the charge of "Infidel!" has been put.
There are two sorts of ways that we may understand the claim that religion and 
morality are inseparable. The claim may be understood as contending that 
morality is impossible unless people believe in .yo/ne religion. The more usual way 
of understanding the claim, however, is as contending that morality is impossible
"  PoW/cs 1252b25ff.
Barzun 2000: 42.
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unless you and everyone else believes in my religion.^^ These are, I respectfully 
submit, dangerous ideas. Certainly, true ideas may be dangerous, but it is 
especially pernicious when false ideas are held, ideas that also have negative 
consequences for human welfare.
Above I advocated the promise of objectivity as a good reason to prefer 
ethical naturalism. The fact that ethics is grounded in truths about our nature, 
some of which are epistemically accessible through scientific means, entails 
another important claim: ethics is wnfverja/. Many have felt the need for an ethical 
theory that is universal in some way, a theory that transcends culture, religion, and 
personal idiosyncrasy. Such a need has its roots in a political desire for a liberty 
that includes &eedom q/"religion as well as & e e d o m r e l i g i o n .
Although that desire may be part of the historical or psychological cause of 
the tendency towards ethical naturalism, there is a deeper, ethical reason to prefer 
a naturalistic ethics. If  culture is not merely a repository of truth but its sowce, 
then we need look no further than our culture to find out what the truth is. By the 
same token, if any particular religion is a source of truth, then there we may find 
our truths. In an age where we ^ e  thoroughly saturated with the knowledge that 
there are other cultures and other religions besides our own, traditions of "truth" 
that often conflict, we may well ask where lies the possibility of a universal ethic.
An adequate naturalistic ethical theory plus an historical analysis of the relevant 
cases can show us which norms are worth following, which are neutral, and which 
should be jettisoned. It may also be the case that, for morality to do its job, so to 
speak, it must be held to be objectively grounded—even if it is not (cf. Ruse 1986). A 
transcendent sort of grounding might seem to provide a deeper grounding than one
15
one that will unite humankind rather than divide us further. Where are we to find 
this source of truth if not in our nature—an explication of which includes the facts 
that we are all human beings who share the same planet, that we must get along 
and help each other get along, that resources are sometimes scarce, that we are all 
bom and die and suffer, that we have desires and hopes and values? Ethical 
naturalism holds out this promise.
The development of an adequate naturalistic ethical theory would serve 
two desirable social goals. First, it would show that it is false that morality and 
religion are inseparable in either of the above two ways. This could alleviate 
tensions between groups, allowing them a neutral way of resolving disputes. 
Second, it would allow for the possibility of a morality independent of any and all 
religions, regional creeds, and ideologies. From a purely ethical perspective, I find 
these political reasons most compelling. However, it would not serve the laudable 
goal of a flourishing pluralistic global community if our naturalistic ethical theory 
did not have the support of evidence and reason. Thus, it must be a plausible 
ethical theory.
1.3. What must be done
The inspiration for NVE comes principally from Aristotle. The view has its 
roots in one of his deepest insights about the nature of evaluation. The idea is 
simple enough to state. It is, roughly, that the logical structure of our ethical
immanent in transitory and contingent human affairs. This may help explain why it is 
difficult in practice for people to dissociate morality and (their) religion.
16
evaluations of human beings is identical to the logical structure of our nonethical 
evaluations of nonhuman living organisms. In what follows I will defend this 
theory, showing that it is metaphysically and metaethically sound. I believe it is 
the best version of ethical naturalism currently being discussed by philosophers. I 
will not, of course, judge it relative to all other possible ethical naturalisms. The 
primary opponents of NVE I take to be those of ethical naturalism usually: 
nonnaturalisms and noncognitivisms of all sorts. I hope to demonstrate NVE's 
overall plausibility as a kind of ethical naturalism as well as its descriptive and 
explanatory adequacy. The burden, then, will be on the noncognitivists and 
nonnaturalists to show where the theory goes wrong in a way that makes their 
views more likely to be true.
By descriptive adequacy I mean that the account accords with our 
pretheoretic ideas and intuitions about the ethical phenomena in question. These 
ideas and intuitions are about what makes a human being a good human being and 
which human traits are virtues. By explanatory adequacy I mean that the theory 
explains the ethical phenomena. This is a stronger constraint than mere descriptive 
adequacy. Explanatory adequacy requires that the theory say why certain ethical 
phenomena are the case. What needs to be explained is why certain human beings 
are good and why some traits are virtues and others vices.
Although his subject matter is welfare, L. W. Sumner provides a succinct account 
of descriptive adequacy: "The basic test is easy enough to state: the best theory ... is 
the one which is most faithful to our ordinary concept and our ordinary experience.... 
The data which a candidate theory must fit... consist of the prodigious variety of our 
preanalytic convictions" (Sumner 1993: 10-11).
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In developing NVE I must lay some metaphysical groundwork. In Chapter
2 ,1 discuss what to many is still a contentious issue: natural teleology. NVE is 
teleological. Teleology, both in ethics and in science, has oAen been looked upon 
with suspicion. I argue that the teleology operative in NVE is natural, or 
naturalizable. NVE is on a metaphysically sound foundation.
In Chapter 3 ,1 further explicate NVE and show how several of the 
standard virtues are justified by the lights of NVE. I also show the further 
applications of the theory to issues of distributive justice and law. These examples 
provide tests of the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of NVE, a test the 
theory passes.
In Chapter 4 ,1 consider the charge, often raised by noncognitivists and 
nonnaturalists, that ethical naturalism commits some one or other egregious 
metaethical mistake. This sort of mistake has been associated variously with the 
fact/value gap, the is/ought gap, and the naturalistic fallacy. I discuss these issues 
in their general form and relative to NVE, showing that there are no problems here 
for the theory.
In Chapter 5 ,1 place NVE is the space of contemporary virtue theories and 
also contrast it with eudaimonistic or welfare-based ethics and with evolutionary 
ethics. NVE is a good-based virtue theory, but it is neither a kind of eudaimonism 
nor an evolutionary ethics. Considerations of evolution lead us to certain 
criticisms of ethical theories like NVE that arise hom those considerations. Contra 




2.1. Living things and artifacts
Natural teleology is an issue that, for the most part, has not been adequately 
addressed by advocates of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. The index of Rosalind 
Hursthouse's On Tzrtwe EtAicL; does not have a listing for 'teleology', though the 
author is obviously comfortable talking of ends and of members of various species 
being directed towards those ends. Although Philippa Foot is not shy about using 
the word, her critical discussion of the topic is brief and mostly relegated to a 
footnote. ' Given the importance of a proper understanding of teleology for NYE, I 
spend some time on the issue.^ In the remainder of this section I discuss natural 
teleology in a rather commonplace way. §2.2 moves us into more theoretical
 ̂ Foot 2001: 30-33, 40-41, and pass/m.
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territory with critical discussion of Aristotle's ergo/i argument, the centerpiece of 
NVE. We explore the nature of functions and in §2.3 see what is correct in 
Aristotle's biological and ethical thought. In §2.4,1 present what I take to be the 
best arguments in favor of teleology in nature.
Philosophers have worried about teleology at least since Aristotle's time. 
Many have also been worried about teleological elements in ethical theories. There 
has been particular worry about teleological concepts in Aristotle's ethics, 
especially the notion of ergo», often translated 'function'. I hope to assuage those 
worries. True, a teleological ethical theory is only as plausible as the account of 
teleology upon which it depends. I argue that a neo-Aristotelian account of 
teleology is plausible both &om the view of commonsense and from a more 
scientific vantage point. As a way of laying the groundwork for the sort of natural 
teleology operative in NVE, I begin in much the way that Foot and Hursthouse do, 
by providing some mundane examples. These examples should demonstrate how 
easily we make teleologically-based evaluations of certain kinds of things and, 
moreover, how "natural" such evaluations are to us human beings. This particular 
phenomenon, the making of certain kinds of evaluations, is part of the form of life 
of human beings. Of course, that fact alone does not provide an argument for 
realism about teleology. That we make such judgments is itself something that 
needs to be explained. The facts explain the judgments. NVE explains the facts.
 ̂William Fitzpatrick has written a lucid and tightly argued book on natural teleology 
and its relation to metaethical issues (Fitzpatrick 2000).
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Although the primary concern here is with human beings, I agree with Foot 
and Hursthouse that it may be more productive pedagogically if we not begin with 
human beings when trying to understand theories like NVE. There are a couple of 
good reasons for pursuing this strategy. One is that it gets us going in a way that is 
uncontroversial, so that we may lay the groundwork before there arises in us the 
urge to start arguing. Suggesting that there is a teleological structure to the 
evaluation of tomato plants and haircuts will perhaps not disturb too many 
philosophers. A second reason for this strategy has to do with a deeper theoretical 
concern. Some proponents of nonnaturalism in ethics subscribe to an "autonomy 
principle," by which I mean roughly the claim that the Ethical occupies a different 
cognitive realm from the Nonethical. It would take some spelling out to get to the 
real meaning of that claim. One possible implication of it, however, is that the way 
we reason about ethics is different from the way we reason about other, nonethical 
matters. Now, if we can show that a certain way of evaluating living things is 
consistent across domains—that is, whether the organisms being evaluated are 
human or nonhuman and whether the evaluations are ethical or nonethical—then 
we have, in this particular case at least, shown one implication of the autonomy 
principle to be false. We may understand NVE as bridging this "epistemological 
gap." As Aristotle recognized, there is a parity of logical structure in certain sorts 
of nonethical evaluations we make of plants and animals and certain sorts of 
ethical evaluations we make of human beings. However, if our judgments are 
correct, or if they have predictive power, then that there is teleology in nature
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might be a plausible explanation for that fact. The utility, moreover, of such 
judgments might also help to explain why we tend to make them.
I have invited over to my house one of my friends who has a "green 
thumb." I am a novice at getting things to grow well, and my hope is that she can 
help me with certain problems I am having. Here's the cactus garden, here's the 
cucumbers, and so on. Then we come upon my tomatoes. "These look a little sad, 
don't they," I say. My 6iend agrees. "It looks like they're getting too much 
water," she suggests. "And they also appear to have a bit of a fungus problem. 
There are a few things you can do about that." My ûiend then proceeds to lay out 
for me in detail what I need to do to get those tomatoes back on the right track. 
Over the course of the next several days I try out her suggestions and, sure 
enough, the tomato plants begin to develop as tomato plants should. This story is 
so mundane as to be familiar to all of us. What might be unfamiliar is the 
importance of such a story and others like it to our understanding of what we 
commonly call "morality" or "ethics." Such stories are important because they 
help us, among other things, to put morality in its place. What I mean is that we 
thereby situate human morality in the same sort of context in which we situate the 
growth, development, and behavior of nonhuman organisms. That context is 
nature. The principal idea is that there are some important facts about human 
beings, facts that taken together we could call human nature. These facts, like 
many others, have implications. Some of these implications we will want to call 
normative or even ethical.
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Important to note in the story is my Mend's in giving those plants 
what they ought to have to be healthy specimens of their kind. She had some 
knowledge that was applied, knowledge of facts about the form of hfe of tomato 
plants. We seem to feel warranted in calling tomato plants with certain features 
tomato plants. We can and do make evaluations of particular plants and 6om 
these evaluations we often derive conclusions about what ought to be done. 1 see 
the tomato plant is not doing well, so I do what I think needs to be done in order to
get it well. With a little luck, it gets well. When treated as it should be treated, it
does what tomatoes plants are supposed to do. More generally, there are facts 
about all species of plants and animals and the rest, what it takes to make them 
healthy specimens of their kind, what it means in a given context to call one good 
and another not. Since human beings are a kind of animal, we can tell a similar 
story about ourselves. It is in relation to the W oj of the kind of thing in question 
that we make the evaluation. In fact, the logic of the evaluation essentially 
involves the object's fg/oj. Hence our justification for calling the evaluative 
structure teleo-logical.
2.2. The argument
2.2.1. Ergon and function
The 'ergon' of something is its function. This is an all too common way to 
understand Aristotle. It is, however, problematic, and, 1 argue, not exactly correct. 
In this and subsequent sections we will examine Aristotle's e/gon argument. We
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will see where he got things right, an insight that provides the naturalistic 
foundations for NVE. A proper understanding of ergoM will prove to be our key to 
making good sense of the theory. But first let us look at what Aristotle says, where 
he goes wrong and how noi to understand him.
In Chapter 7 of Book 1 of Mco/nacAea» fiAzcf, Aristotle maintains, 
following common beliefs, that the good is the end of action. That is, the good is 
"that for the sake of which" things are done, relative to the respective case. For 
example, "in medicine this [end or good] is health, in generalship victory, in 
housebuilding a house," etc.^ He argues that the "best good" must be complete and 
self-sufBcient. His criterion of completeness requires that an end be pursued for its 
own sake, rather than only for the sake of something else. Self-sufficiency in an 
end requires that it "all by itself... makes a life choiceworthy and lacking 
nothing. ..."^ The only end that meets the criterion of completeness and self- 
sufEciency is eWuzTMonia. Hence, eut/uzmo/iiu is the ultimate end of human action. 
And that is what we generally agree the best good is, though we often disagree 
about what is.
This argument for euckimonm as fAe final cause of human action is, as 
stated, an argument from common beliefs, although Aristotle does bring in the 
more theoretical notions of completeness and self-sufficiency to back up these 
common beliefs. But Aristotle gives another argument about what constitutes the 
best good, an argument based upon a thing's If we know a thing's function.
^/VE1097a20-22.
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then we can easily figure out what it is for the thing to function well. A thing's 
functioning well is its best good. Thus, if we know what the function of a human 
being gwn human being is, then we can figure out what it is for a human being to 
function well. And this well functioning of a human being is the best good for that 
sort of creature.^
For this section and those immediately after I will translate and understand 
as function. The point of this is threefold. First, I want us to get clear on 
how not to understand Aristotle. Second, I want to point out where Aristotle goes 
wrong in his account of how we determine a thing's function. Third, I want to 
make some progress towards understanding the ideas of function and the 
difference between them, and the role they play in the logic of evaluation 
underwriting NVE.
Certain sorts of things, it is commonly agreed, have functions. For 
example, a carpenter has the function of building things such as houses; the eye 
has the function of seeing; and so on. For such things as have functions, what it 
means for such a thing to be a good example of its kind is for it to perform its 
function well.^ A good carpenter makes houses well, a good eye sees well.^ If, in
A/E 1097b 14-16.
 ̂ In Po//hcs Aristotle offers another sort of ergon argument for the claim that man is 
by nature a political animal (1253a1-18). Everson believes that the argument of 
Po//f/cs is further evidence that Aristotle identifies the human ergon with practical 
reason (Everson 1998b: 94). It seem s in the passage from Po//f/cs, however, that 
Aristotle identifies more than one characteristic property of humans. First is speech, 
whose job "is to set forth the expedient and the inexpedient, and likewise the just 
and the unjust"; the second unique characteristic of humans is that they alone have 
"any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like."
^/VE1097b25.
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addition to its parts and roles, a human being gnu human being has a function, 
then, according to Aristotle, the good for a human being will be to perform that 
function well. Aristotle does not explicitly argue that a human being gnu human 
being has a function. It appears he assumes this is so and then proceeds to utilize a 
particular strategy that is supposed to show us what a thing's function is. The 
strategy Aristotle offers for ascertaining a thing's function is quite simple. We ask 
what function it is that a kind of thing performs that is not also a function of other 
things. If a human being gwu human being has a function, it will be that function 
not shared by other things. Aristotle proceeds to make his case by a disjunctive 
syllogism:
[Ljiving is apparently shared with plants, but what we are looking 
for is the special function of a human being; hence we should set 
aside the life of nutrition and growth. The life next in order is some 
sort of life of sense-perception; but this too is apparently shared, 
with horse, ox, and every animal. The remaining possibility, then, is 
some sort of life of action of the [part of the soul] that has reason.^
The function of a human being, then, either "expresses" or "requires" reason.^
Therefore, to be a good human being gwu human being, one must reason well.
Thus, Aristotle says, "the human good turns out to be the soul's activity that
expresses virtue [arerê]."'° This final conclusion does not directly follow, of
course.
 ̂ It is worth considering whether eyes see  at all. In fact, an eye does not see  
anything, though eyes are for seeing w^h. Nonetheless, we do not really see  with 
the eyes the way we, say, drive nails into wood with a  hammer. Seeing is actually a 
complex process that involves much more than just the eye and its structures.




The relations between the concepts of gooal AwTMa/z t/ze AMmnM gooal, 
and g o o û f a Auman 6emg is complicated. But we have gotten some idea of how 
what is good for j(!s is related to our evaluation of%y as a goodÆ I f ^  has those 
traits that allow it to get those things that are good fbr.%s, thenZy is a good% 
When we speak of the human good we may mean the good of some individual 
human, in which case the human good is what is good for individuals. However, 
we may mean by 'the human good' that which is good for the group, the species, 
"the race," or perhaps the genome. But what is good for some individual and what 
is good for the group may conflict, so these two uses of 'the human good' cannot 
have the same denotation. If we understand Aristotle as trying to link up the 
human good considered as the good of the group and what is good for an 
individual human being, he needs some powerful premises that he does not 
provide.
With the.gTgon argument, then, Aristotle has not quite given us what he 
promised. He promised us another argument for the claim that the "best good" or 
of human action is gWaz/Moniu. But it seems that what he has 
actually given us is an argument for what it is to be a good human being—it is 
using reason well—as well as what is good a human being. Now, if the g/gon 
argument is sound, then it should, in coig unction with the previous argument that 
the ultimate human good is gWaimonia, allow us to conclude that using reason
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well constitutes ewtfa/moMia, since that is what apparently is good for human 
beings.^ ̂  The question, then, is whether the ergo/% argument is sound.
2.2.2. Determining function
The method Aristotle might have had in mind for determining a thing's 
function is that which Plato uses at the end of book There Socrates
claims that the function of a thing is "that which one can do only with it or best 
with it." A few lines later he rephrases this thought, removing it 6om the restricted 
realm of things an agent uses. He claims that the g/go/z of a thing is the work 
"which it only or it better than anything else can perfbrm."^^ He then concludes 
that the function of the soul, since it is the work that it alone does or can do, is 
"management, rule, deliberation, and the like."''* This method of determining a 
thing's function has obvious afhnities with Aristotle's, if we focus on the part of 
the method that says that a thing's function is that which it alone does.
Perhaps tellingly, Socrates begins his argument by asking whether a horse 
has a function, to which his interlocutor answers in the affirmative. But when 
arguing in favor of his theory, that a thing's function is that which it alone does or 
it does better than anything else, he shifts to speaking of parts of animals (eyes.
It should be pointed out that there is some disagreement over whether Aristotle 
held a "dominanP or "inclusive" view of euda/mon/a. On the former view, the there is 
some one good, soph/a, that wholly constitutes euda/mon/a. On the latter, soph/a 
partially, along with the goods of fortune and other nonaccidental goods like 
friendship, constitutes euda/mon/a. To start surveying the literature, see Kenny 
2000: 17-31
/?epub//c 352d-353e; cf. Thayer 1964 for discussion of Plato's account of ergon.
RepuMc 352e5-6, 353a9-10.
28
ears) and artifacts (various sorts of knives). Then, after getting his interlocutors to 
concede his theoretical points, he shifts to speaking of the human soul, and never 
returns to the horse. But, since both he and his interlocutors agree that a horse has 
a function, and therefore, by his theory a corresponding excellence, it will serve us 
to look more critically at how his method would apply to horses.
Is there something that horses alone do or do better than anything else? To 
me it seems there is nothing a horse does that other similar animals do not also do. 
Eat, sleep, run, reproduce—elephants, cows, and camels do these things. Maybe it 
is the case that horses do one or the other of these things better than elephants, 
cows, and camels, though I doubt that very much. And even if they did, it is easy 
to think of animals that can run faster or reproduce more quickly or in greater 
number. However, it is open to debate whether any of these things counts as doing 
it better. We might say that no other animal looks more regal while running than 
the horse, so the function of a horse is to look regal while running. But such a 
move is to perform something of a on Plato's view. He may, of course, be
thinking of a horse as an instrument for human use. This seems likely, in which 
case we might say riding or plow-pulling are a horse's function. But again, there 
are other animals that do these jobs (oxen, camels), and some that may do them 
better. But perhaps the horse is best for riding. However, to make that case, one 
will have to spell out further what counts as a good riding animal. Whatever the
RepuMc 353d5.
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case, that does not seem the function of a horse/^ That is, unless horses are
here for us to ride, just as cows, pigs, et a/, are here for us to eat. I doubt seriously 
whether this latter suggestion is true.
Nevertheless, there may be something that can be said in favor of horses 
having the function of riding. This is because horses have been bred by human 
beings for the sake of riding. Thus, it may be said, horses have been artificially 
selected for those traits that make them good riding animals. Therefore, horses 
exist in their current form because they are good to ride. On one popular account 
of function, then, that is their function, for it is what they were selected to do. 
Loosely speaking, they were designed to be ridden. In such cases, their 
functionality resembles that of artifacts more than that of species that have not 
been intelligently designed. Various plants and animals have been bred to have 
certain traits that we want them to have. Given that they have been selected for or 
designed for such purposes, there is no reason to believe that they do not have the 
biological function oL say, being eaten. However, we must keep in mind that such 
functions are relativized to human needs and desires. Still, I think my point about 
the inadequacy of the Platonic-Aristotelian criterion for function ascription stands. 
For, if the function of̂  say, domesticated pigs is to be eaten, it is not because they 
are the only thing we can eat or because they taste better than anything else. 
Moreover, it does not seem that it is the pig itself that has the function of being 
eaten, but rather the pig's tasty flesh that has this function.
See Bostock 2000: 16.
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Some people think that everything has a fhnction or purpose, not just 
artifacts and organs, but rocks, wind, sunshine, and stars. Plato seems to think 
something like this. In the he has Socrates say that we should "apply the
same principle," that a thing's excellence is relative to its function, "to all 
things."^^ Likewise in the f  Auetfo and perhaps most famously in the Tz/Mueuf 
beliefs in universal teleology are expressed. Aristotle is more cautious, though it is 
true that in De Cue/o he says: "Nature does nothing absurdly or to no purpose."^^ 
However, his discussion of the aptness of teleological explanations in 
shows clearly that he did not think that such explanations are always apt. He 
specifically mentions the case of rainfall as being one of those sorts of natural 
phenomena that should be explained nonteleologically. Aristotle does not seem to 
think that teleology pervades all things, but he does think that teleological 
explanations can he properly utilized in the study of the development and behavior 
of living things and their artifacts. Since human beings are living things, and 
teleological explanations are often apt in the case o f the latter, they may be apt in 
the case of the former.
In ÆiAzcs Aristotle sets the case out hypothetically: .^a
human being has some function, then its characteristic excellence will depend 
upon what that function turns out to be. Yet Aristotle does not aygrze that a human 




audience in an attempt to get us to concede that a human being gwu human bemg
has a function:
Then do the carpenter and the leatherworker have their 
functions and actions, while a human being has none, and is 
by nature idle, without any hinction? Or, just as eye, hand, 
foot, and, in general, every [bodily] part apparently has its 
functions, may we likewise ascribe to a human being some 
function besides all of theirs?'^
We must analyze this passage carefiilly, for it reveals a few things. Most
importantly, it seems Aristotle trades on an ambiguity of 'eygoM' that does not
exist for the word 'function' in English. But if we translate as 'job', we
will perhaps find the argument less compelling. For, certainly, the carpenter and
leatherworker— thing of their respective kinds—have jobs to do, just as the
eye, hand, etc. have their jobs to do. But it seems that we can legitimately say only
of the latter sorts of things that they have functions. In their case it is specifically
biological functions. We might ask, "What is the function of a carpenter?" But it
seems we are then speaking by analogy with artifacts and organs. But I admit that
we may here devolve to mere quibbling, and antagonists might even accuse me of
begging the question. Therefore, I leave this objection aside.
Still, the fact remains that Aristotle's argument is a weak one. It amounts to
saying something like: "Are we to say that certain kinds of human beings—
/VE 1097b29-35; word in brackets is Invin's. Ostwald in his (1962) translation of 
A/E notes that 'argon', the word translated as "Idle, without any function," "is a 
doub/e-enfendre, which means literally "without function' or doing no work' but was 
also used colloquially to denote a 'loafer' " (p. 16n27). I think this further supports my 
claim that Aristotle's argument is noteworthy more for its appeal to paf/ios than to 
/ogos.
'Function' does, of course, have its own ambiguities. See Wright 1973.
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craAsmen at that—^have a job to do, but that human beings themselves do not?" I 
could easily answer: yes, we at least can that. It remains to be seen, or shown, 
that a human being gwu human being has a function. Aristotle's saying it is so does 
not make it so, nor will he shame us into agreeing with him I could just as well 
ask: Are we to say that the liver has a function and that the stars do not, and are by 
nature idle, with nothing to do? Hence, stars must have a function. And, although 
we have already seen that Aristotle's method for determining a thing's function is 
unsound, we could follow things out here. The stars twinkle at night better than 
any other stellar objects; in fact, they are the only objects that do so. Thus, the 
function of the stars is to twinkle at night. I trust the force of this counterargument 
is apparent.
The question persists, however, whether a human being gua human being 
has a function. This question is, of course, a specimen of the more general 
question of whether any organism organism of its kind has a function. 
Aristotle's arguments neither show that gua human being you or I have a function 
nor what that function is.^° Do human beings have functions? How could we tell?
^  An important conclusion that Aristotle draws is that the summum bonum of human 
beings qua human beings is sopb/a, theoretical reasoning or contemplation. Thomas 
Nagel puts Aristotle's main point regarding the human function rather paradoxically: 
"Aristotle believes, in short, that human life is not important enough for humans to 
spend their lives on. A person should seek to transcend not only his individual 
practical concerns but also those of society or humanity as whole. .. [W]ith reason 
man has become the only creature capable of concentrating on what is higher than 
himself and thereby sharing in it [reason] to some extent. His time is, so to speak, 
too valuable to waste on anything so insignificant as human life" (Nagel 1972:12; 
page citation is to Rorty 1980). These quotes give expression to the "intellectualist" 
account of the human ergon that Aristotle puts forth in Book 10 of Mcomacbean 
Etb/cs. On that account sopb/a is that to which a human being should aspire. For 
another advocate of the "intellectualist" view, see  Clark 1972. For more arguments
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Suppose we discovered a mysterious entity the function of which was unknown to 
us. How would we go about determining what, if any, its function is?^'
Readers will probably be familiar with Paley's "watch argument."'^ 
Imagine an aborigine walking through a forest and encountering a mysterious 
object. Unbeknownst to him, the object is a pocketwatch. The native turns the 
object over in his hand, studies its intricate workings, and finally surmises that it 
must have been designed by some intelligent being, since that is the best 
explanation of the thing's properties and perhaps even its being. And, since the 
workings of organisms are far more complex than any watch, we find ourselves 
driven to conclude by parallel reasoning that organisms also must have an 
intelligent designer. As opposed to an a r g u m e n t d e s i g n  to the existence of an 
intelligent designer, we should read Paley's argument as an argument to design.^^ 
Presumably, one must provide the latter before the former, else the former is
on this side as well as references to arguments on both sides of the issue of whether 
Aristotle held a "dominant" (intellectualist) or "inclusive" view, see  Kenny 2000: 17- 
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Thomas Hurka in his Perfectionism (1993) tries to show how we would go about 
determining what human nature is. He criticizes the Aristotelian method on various 
grounds, and then provides his own account. He argues that the measure of what 
counts as human nature is to be discovered by determining what is essential to 
human beings, and that moreover we are obligated to maximize these essential 
properties. His method is interesting, but has not escaped criticism. One obvious 
objection to this view is that there are things essential to human beings that should 
not be maximized because they are not good (cf. Stocker 1995).
^ P a le y  1805.
^  Lately, philosophers have been arguing that nature demonstrates an "irreducible 
complexity," which is evidence of design. If there is design, then there must be a 
designer. Therefore, there is a designer. Or so the argument goes. The question of 
course is whether there indeed is evidence of design. See Behe 1996, Dembski 
1999, and Pennock 2001.
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nothing but schematic. The reason is that we must show that there indeed is design 
before we can use that as evidence for the existence of a designer.
I will not weigh in on the soundness of this argument.^"* Instead, I want to 
focus on an issue that Paley does not consider. This is the question of ascertaining 
the function of a mysterious artifact or organ. Suppose that one finds what is 
apparently an artifact or that one discovers an organ in a plant or animal the 
function of which is unknown. Such a thing must happen to archeologists and 
biologists quite &equently, though probably less &equently as time goes on and 
more discoveries are made. How would one go about determining the function, if 
any, of such objects? Would we use a method similar to that advocated by Plato or 
Aristotle?
An archeologist on a dig finds what looks to be an artifact. She may 
compare the artifact with other known artifacts, from a similar time period, the 
functions of which are pretty well established. If we see that the object in question 
looks very similar in design to these other objects, then it is reasonable to conclude 
that it was made to do a similar job. Of course, it may be that the artifact in 
question resembles no previously known artifacts. In that sort of case the problem 
is tougher. We would then have to see what sort of work the thing can do. We may 
then ask Socrates' question: "What can this thing alone do or do better than 
anything else?" However, this question alone often will not settle the matter, for 
there are many things that can do the same job. Moreover, if the thing is an artifact
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&om a bygone era, we might conclude that we have already made things that can 
do the job better, given the growth of scientiGc knowledge and technology. We 
might also want to see what the mysterious artifact can do best given the 
technology of its era. But I am not sure that that is helphil either. Imagine an 
aborigine stumbling across various items from our contemporary civilization. She 
finds a telephone and a computer hooked to the Internet logged into an email 
account. Let us say she is a savant, so she tries to figure these artifacts out. They 
are both used for communication at long distances, and both can probably do the 
job equally well. (They both can, of course, especially the computer, be used for 
various other things too.) Another thing one might do, that could prove very 
helpful, is to find out what the intentions^ere of the person who made the artifact. 
If such information is available, then even if the artifact is woefully inadequate to 
the task for which it was designed we could still understand what its function is. 
Such information is often hard to get, however.
The biologist studying the organs and behaviors of organisms often faces 
similar problems as those facing the archeologist. But when a biologist sees one of 
these newly discovered organs, she does not first ask what the thing alone can do 
or what it can do better than anything else. First, she will want to see what work it 
does. Second, she will probably compare the thing with other organs of similar 
organisms, the functions of which are well known. If there is no such comparison 
class, she may then want to look further at the role the organ plays in the
See Sober 1993: 30-36. Cf. Hume's 0/a/ogues Concem/ng /Vafura/ /?e//g/on
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containing system, that is, the organism's characteristic form of life. Finally, a 
biologist may look at the organ h"om an evolutionary standpoint. She would then 
see what effects the existence of the organ has on the survival and reproduction of 
the organism, which effects would account for the organ's being there in the first 
place.
To sum up, there are three general strategies one can use to determine the 
function of a mysterious artifact or organ, including behaviors. First, we can do a 
functional analysis. To do this, we must determine what contribution the thing in 
question makes to the system it is a part o f This will involve determining what the 
system is and what counts as "contributing" to it.̂  ̂Second, if the thing is question 
is an artifact, we can try to understand the intentions of the designer. Finally, if the 
thing is biological, we can do the relevant evolutionary research to determine 
which of its causal effects are responsible for its continued presence in the 
organism, or more exactly of its type in the species or subspecies.
Of course, archeologists and biologists are working under the assumption 
that the items they are studying actually have functions. Is this a reasonable 
assumption to make? In the case of artifacts, the answer is a qualified yes. Most 
things people make serve some purpose: they are designed and built to do certain 
jobs. This may seem to leave out things made for purely aesthetic reasons. But 
decoration of the home and adornment of the person or appeasement of the gods 
are also purposes. Perhaps, however, a thing could be made for self-expression,
(1779).
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not to do anything or decorate anything, but solely to make the creator feel a 
certain way. In such a case, it is the actual making or creation of the thing that is 
the reason for its being. It has no further purpose. This is a possibihty, and things 
made for such reasons may be hardest to understand, though they probably 
represent a very small class of artifacts.^^ So, despite the presence of this subclass, 
when it comes to artifacts, the assumption that the thing has a function is generally 
a reasonable one.
Is this assumption reasonable when it comes to organs and behaviors?^^ 
Given that plants and animals have limited stores of energy and time, it is 
reasonable to assume that most of their organs and behaviors serve some purpose. 
Many will conclude that the organ or behavior must relate, however tangentially, 
to survival and reproduction, if not of the individual at least of the "germ line" or 
genotype. We might recall Aristotle's claim: "Nature does nothing absurdly or to 
no purpose. We may read this as an expression of a belief in a universal 
teleology, and the context of the utterance could warrant that reading. But we may 
give it another reading in keeping with Aristotle's writings on teleology 
elsewhere, and moreover with modem biological theory, particularly that part of
^  We must know its good; cf. Bedau 1992a.
^  We may recall the Christian doctrine that God created human beings out of 
agape, a certain kind of love. This doctrine may be understood, I think, as implying 
that God did not create human beings for anything; hence they do not have a 
function. But that reading, I assume, conflicts with another Christian doctrine: that 
we were created to serve God and hence that is our function.
There are debates in the philosophy of biology literature about whether and to 
what degree organisms are adapted to their environments, and also whether the 
assumption that every part of an organism is an adaptation (and therefore—this is
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biology represented by the field known as ecology. In that field an important area 
of study is the "life history" of types of organisms, where researchers examine 
constraints and trade-offs between various processes in light of their contributions 
to survival and reproduction. Given the costs, it is unlikely that a complex organ 
or process will be maintained in a population unless it enhances fitness or at least 
is not detrimental to it. Incurring great cost with no benefit would probably 
eventually result is an organism's demise or even its species' extinction. It would 
at least result, cefens in that particular trait's being selected out of the
population. Thus, given certain plausible assumptions about organisms, it is 
reasonable to assume that many of their parts and processes, especially those that 
are relatively costly, will have a hmction.
We have seen that the methods advocated by Plato and Aristotle for 
determining a thing's function can provide some guidance, but contemporary 
students of such things have other methods as well. The question remains, 
hov^ever, whether a human being gwa human being has a function.
2.2.3. The function of human beings
As Aristotle shows, in seeking a certain kind of explanation we can ask a 
series of similar questions, building upon our answer a teleological structure. What 
is the purpose of a knife? To cut. What is the purpose of cutting? To prepare
controversial—has a function). This latter view is called "adaptationism." See Gould 
and Lewontin 1979, Dawkins 1983, Dennett 1995: 238-251, and Sober 1996.
^  OeCae/o 291 b14.
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vegetables for cooking, for example. Why prepare vegetables for cooking? So we 
may eat. What is the purpose of eating? So that we may go on living. The series 
may stop there, though one could ask what the purpose in living is. In that case we 
may confront what looks to be more of an existential question. Of course, we may 
answer glibly, "That is what we do: living things continue living." But the 
question may be understood not as the general question of why should all of us— 
the entire species—go on living, but as the specific question concerning some 
individual person. Why should /  go on living? Why should j'Ae? Why should yon? 
The question could also be put: Why am I here? For what reojo/z?
Yet, if I have an answer to the question of what the human function is, then 
I am presumably well on my way to determining my own function, and yours and 
hers. If  I know what the human function is, then I know what, gnu human being, I 
am supposed to do. However, the very notion of a human function strikes many as 
absurd. But, if  this is true, is this a counsel of despair, not only for proponents of 
NVE, but for everyone else? Is Aristotle right, that if human beings grwn human 
beings have no function we are idle, with nothing to do? If there is no human 
function, no purpose to the individual life, then it seems not to matter whether I 
devote my life to helping others, to contemplation or to pleasure, or whether I 
commit suicide right this moment. For, if human beings g'wa human beings have 
no purpose, then certainly /  myself have no purpose either, and hence I am useless, 
life has no meaning, all is without value.
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We certainly need not take the question quite so existentially as that, or 
even take it seriously. In fact, we may put on our positivist hats and declare the 
question itself idle or meaningless. It is on a par with asking what is the function 
of the sky or the purpose of gravity. Those questions do not have answers because 
they are ill-formed. The same goes for the questions about what my purpose is or 
what the function of humanity is.
I suggest we not move too quickly in either direction We should take 
seriously the question of whether a human being human being has a purpose 
or function. The question has been important to the philosophical tradition As we 
have already seen, Plato and Aristotle considered a version of it; and through 
Aristotle the method of trying to discern a thing's essence by considering its 
function was a prominent feature of Scholastic philosophy. And it is still, despite 
millennia of questioning, an interesting question So, let us ask, and take seriously, 
the question: Does a human being gwa human being have a function?
One answer is no, we have no function, we are idle. That is, gwa human 
being, there is nothing for any one of us to do. This is not to say that, given our 
roles, relationships, and projects, we have nothing we are supposed to do. Many 
will claim, moreover, that it is impossible to separate a human being &om these 
things, even in the abstract. The position is that we cannot even conceive of a 
human being apart j&om her social roles, apart from her relationships with others, 
apart from her chosen projects. Such a being would be more like a beast or a god
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than a human being.^^ Bnt it does not follow h"om this that life has no meaning or 
that immediate suicide is just as valid an option as a life devoted to helping others. 
For, the rejoinder continues, any one of us is partially constituted by our social 
roles and our chosen projects. That is part of who we are. Relative to those roles 
and projects I have obligations, that is, things I am supposed to do. Not only can I 
not be conceived apart from these roles and projects, but it seems I would not exist 
apart &om them. So, the fact that gua human being I have no purpose is not a 
counsel of despair. It is just a fact about what sort of creatures we are.
Another sort of answer, one that embeds human life in a deeper teleological 
structure, sees human life as itself serving some purpose. We do not strive to 
continue living just to go on living. Our living itself has a purpose. There are 
various ways we can spell out this idea, ways that will differ from one tradition or 
worldview to another. All of us know the general sort of story. It is a theological 
one. A proponent of this view will claim, human beings gua human beings do 
have a function. This function or purpose is to love God, to do His will, to serve 
Him. Of course, Gguring out what these latter two things are may take some work 
on our part, but that will in itself be part of fulfilling our purpose. Part Three, 
Section One of the Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church discusses "man's 
vocation." 'Vocation', derived &om the Latin 'vocare' ('to call'), often means just 
that: a calling, especially to a religious life or religious order. But the word can 
also mean one's job or career—or, in an extended sense of the term, one's
^  See Po//hcs 1253aIff; cf. Nussbaum 1995.
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function. Although even within a certain religious tradition it may be difficult to 
figure out what that entails, nevertheless this does provide an afBrmative answer 
to the question of whether a human being gwu human being has a function. 
Moreover, we can discover that function, if we understand the intentions of the 
designer.
It could also be the case that human beings are heading towards some goal, 
though not specifically a theological one. Many thinkers have believed in a 
historical teleology, to use Michael Ruse's term, of an avowedly nontheistic sort.^ 
We might think here that the function of any individual person is, say, to foment 
the revolution or perfect human nature as such. Some have a notion of progress 
such that we all are playing some role, though there is not much we can do about 
it. To this way of thinking, similar to the Marxist in many respects, the human 
species is evolving towards some goal.
Though many current Darwinians believe in some vague notion of 
progress, many do not. Progress may be what happens, but it is not something 
aimed at. It just is what happens due to the working of the selective pressures of 
changing environments. Roughly speaking, species become more fitted to their 
circumstances. Thus we see how we get design-like features without an intelligent 
designer. Thus a fourth sort of reply we may be tempted to call "Darwinian." To 
the question of whether a human being gwa human being has a function, the 
answer is yes. That function is to make another human being, just as the function
^  Ruse 2002.
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of a horse is to make another horse, a lion another lion, e tc /' No doubt to many 
this will sound like a facile and perhaps even insulting answer. For it would imply, 
among other things, that human beings who do not reproduce, either because they 
cannot or just do not want to, are somehow defective. An organ or artifact that 
cannot perform its designated hmction is not a good example of its kind, at least 
insofar as its function is concerned. And, if the of a thing with a function
lies in the performance of that function, then if a thing cannot perform its function 
we will see it as defective in a profound way.
There is another, more promising reply. Even though I have a deep 
sympathy with the general neo-Darwinian picture of things, I suggest that we do 
not understand the human function in the previous way. It is too limited. We must 
look at a picture that is not just bigger but more complex, taking into account all 
the things that are involved in a human life, in the form of life of human beings as 
such. A woman who reproduces and then immediately abandons her oSspring for 
superGcial reasons is a bad mother, just as a man who does the same is a bad 
father. This is the case even if the child should turn out okay and therefore the 
biological contributors to its existence get their genes into the next generation. 
Almost anyone can reproduce. On the male's part there is actually very little initial 
effort involved. But reproducing and being a good father are not the same thing. It 
is even false that the latter entails the former. We see here how different ends may 
conflict in their demands. But to warrant our evaluations in such cases we need a
Cf. Dawkins 1976.
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more robust theoretical structure than a facile "Darwinism" that sees total genetic 
proliferation as the human function/"
We are not speaking correctly when we say that a human being gnu human 
being has a function, if we take 'function' in this case to mean what the word 
usually means in biology or in engineering. There are two m ^or conq)etiag 
accounts of function.^^ The concern here is with morphological or behavioral traits 
of organisms. On one account, we conceive of a thing's function as that which it 
was selected to do.̂ '* The eye, for example, has allowed its possessors to survive 
and reproduce, a fact that accounts for the presence and continued existence of the 
eye. This is the "selected effects" or "etiological" account. According to the other 
account, a thing's function is the goal-directed role that it plays in some containing 
system.^^ The eye plays such a role in the human system. It allows one to see, 
which allows one to fulfill one's goals of survival and reproduction. This view is 
often called the "systems" or "cybernetic" account of function, f  rimu yZzcie, either 
of these accounts can also explain function-talk when used of artifacts. However, 
with artifacts we may also introduce the notion of design, where the intentions of 
the designer play the crucial part in determining what a thing's function is.̂ ^
^  Some might draw this conclusion from considerations of the theory of kin 
selection, first presented in Hamilton 1964. See also Dawkins 1976.
^  More or less.
^W right 1976.
^  Cummins 1975; cf. Bedau 1992a.
^  Bedau 1992a calls this the mental approach.
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Each of these accounts of function has its merits and demerits.^^ What I 
want to argue here is that, unless human beings are artifacts, it is difficult to see 
how they could have a function in the technical senses of that term. On the 
etiological account, it is diKcult to understand what the effect of an individual 
human being is supposed to be or what exactly it is that was/is selected. Someone 
defending such an account might suggest that it was that was selected
for, because of its contribution to fimess. There are two problems with this idea. 
First, we might ask to whose fitness the trait contributes. The human genome? The 
mammalian genome? We must answer these questions, and until we do it will be 
hard to make sense of this suggestion. Second, if is an evolved trait,
presumably it evolved long before Ti/bmo ever entered on the scene. But it
does not seem that individuality was ever anything that evolved, and was in fact 
part of the initial conditions of things. Obviously here we are treading deep 
metaphysical waters, though it does not then appear that Aw/nan was a trait 
selected for in evolutionary history. Thus, on the etiological account, claiming that 
a human being gwa human being has a function makes no sense.
On the systems account things fare no better. For it is difficult to 
understand just what the containing system is to which human beings are supposed 
to belong and to whose maintenance or equilibrium state they are supposed to be 
contributing. Now, one might say that the containing system is all of humanity and 
that for a human being to perform its function is for it to contribute to the
For more on the philosophy of functions see  Allen ef a/. 1998 and Ariew ef a/.
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continued existence of the human species. A question then is just what the effects 
are of human beings that are supposed to contribute to this goal. I suppose if I 
reproduce I have contributed to this goal. And if I develop a new cancer drug that 
saves lives I have also contributed to it. However, suppose my reproducing and 
my cancer drug eventually result in an overpopulation problem, a problem that 
leads first to a wholesale depletion of food supplies and degradation of the 
environment and finally to famine, disease, and overall "crash" of the human 
population. In that case, we may say that these very same behaviors are a 
malfunction on my part. The general problem here is that in the case of human 
beings there seems to be no principled way to determine what the containing 
system is, nor what counts as maintaining it, nor what the relevant effects are. It 
spears then impossible to make good sense of the function of human beings on 
the systems account.
However, we might think of the terrestrial ecosystem itself as being the 
containing system. We might think that planet earth is at least analogous to a 
living organism. Like a living organism, it "seeks" equilibrium or homeostasis. As 
a part of this system, human beings have a function, which is contributing in their 
way to the maintenance of the system's integrity, that is, its normal state. All of 
this is, of course, quite controversial. For one thing, there is no real reason to 
believe that the terrestrial ecosystem is enough like an organism in the right way, 
that is, in being something that tends toward an equilibrium state.
2002 .
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Finally, even if human beings and other organisms are artifacts, and not 
just essentially similar to artifacts, we encounter problems. Outside a specific 
theological or religious context the intentions of the designer must remain 
inscrutable to us. This is not to say that organisms are not artifacts, or that one or 
another of the religious traditions does not have the right answer about what the 
human function is. But recall that the project at hand here is the development of a 
naturalized virtue ethics. On the preferred understanding, a naturalistic ethical 
theory must be able to stand independently of any particular religious tradition. It 
may, of course, be consistent with many of them or perhaps with all of them, 
though the latter is doubtful. But we must arrive at the facts and theories that 
inform the theory through means other than through personal revelation or sacred 
scripture. So, even if it is the case, for example, that human beings human 
beings have the function of loving and serving God, and even if  we believe it 
implicitly, our theory cannot have that fact underwriting it. If we were to use that 
approach, we could not in good conscience call the resultant theory "naturalistic" 
or "naturalized"—even if it were true.
23. and form of life
Of that &equently misunderstood term of art, Terrence Irwin writes: "The 
best single translation for 'ergon' would be 'work'."^^ Besides function, ergon can 
also refer to the process of production, the outcome of a certain process.
^  Glossary to Aristotle 1985: 404; cf. Sparshott 1994: 41.
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achievement of any sort, activity, and, contrasted with /ogoj as "mere speech," 
what we do as opposed to what we only say. In modem parlance, we might in 
many of the instances use the word 'job' in place of 'ergon'. Of course, we may 
use an artifact, for example, for work or jobs that are not its function, as we may 
use a butter knife to open a door or a brick to prop the door open. The same goes 
as well for parts of animals. For example, the function of the nose is to smell, 
though it also does well in propping up someone's glasses. So, then, how are we to 
distinguish a thing's function, if it has a function, &om mere stuff that it does? 
Aristotle's method is to see what it is that that sort of thing does that nothing else 
does. At least this is his method in regards to human beings. But that cannot be his 
method in general, at least if we wish him to be consistent. For just as humans 
share nutrition and growth with plants, the reverse is also true. Since that is the 
case, we can make a similar argument to the eSect that nutrition and growth is not 
the function of plants. Moreover, presumably the gods or God also use reason, 
probably better than humans. At the least, God would reason better than humans, 
and Aristotle himself says as much.^^ So it is neither the case that reason is unique 
to humans nor that we are the best at it.
At this point I must back off a bit from my prolonged criticism of Aristotle. 
For now it is time to see how he got things importantly right, which will form the 
core of NVE. I demonstrated in the previous section that, if we take 'function' in 
one of the two restricted senses (leaving aside the question of whether humans are
^  See /VE 1177b25-1178a5, 1178b5-30; cf. Nagel 1972.
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artifacts), it is difficult to see how a human being g'wa human being could have a 
function. But, if we do not translate 'ergo»' as 'function', or if we do so but do not 
understand 'function' in one of the two prominent technical senses, then we see 
that there is something important and also tn/e in what Aristotle says. The human 
is what we do, our form of life, the characteristic processes and behaviors 
we exemplify and in which we engage. This interpretation seems closer to 
Aristotle's intentions.''^
In her defense of Aristotle's view, Jennifer Whiting puts the point as 
follows:
Very roughly, [Aristotle's] view is that for each species there is an 
ultimate end such that realizing that end (which Aristotle identifies 
with living a certain kind of life) is categorically or unconditionally 
good for any normal member of that species—that is, good for it 
whatever its actual interests and desires.'"
Not only does this ultimate end determine what is good for a member of a
particular species, we can determine by reference to it whether members of that
species are good. It sets the standard they must meet. It is relative to the eygon or
form of life of a species that members of that species are evaluated as good or bad.
That is the core of NVE. It seems, perhaps, a simple and obvious notion, but its
descriptive adequacy and explanatory power are formidable. Human beings, like
other organisms, have a certain characteristic form of life. This form of life
involves nutrition and growth, sensation and perception, practical and theoretical
^  This reading of Aristotle is also advocated by Kenny 1965, Attfield 1981, 
Nussbaum 1988, and Sparshott 1994.
"  Whiting 1988: 36; cf. Bostock 2000:17.
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reason, and many other things as well. What it means for an instance of this form 
of life to go well is for these processes to be carried ont excellently. A defect in 
any one of these processes may cause an instance of this form of life to go badly.
We can express the partially filled-in structure of the ergoM argument 
schematically as fbllows:"^^
1. For any if the ergon of Fs is cp, then a good 7̂  is one that cps well.
2. The ergon of human beings is cp.
3. Therefore, a good human being is one who (ps well.'*^
Note that I have left it open what the human ergon is. We know what Aristotle's 
answer is: the human ergon is "an activity of soul that expresses reason." There 
are many ways to understand this, though we need not go into them. For now, I 
want to leave it an open question what the human e/^on is, though I will deal with 
that question in Chapter 3.
A question is whether we find premise (1) plausible. I, for one, do 6nd it 
plausible, and moreover trust that I am not in a minority. Perhaps it is not an 
unu/yn'cu/ truth; maybe it is an empirical generalization, in actuality a fact about 
what we—if we were well-informed—would say about a particular individual of a 
species if it were able to actualize its form of life well. That is, if the theory as 
spelled out so far is correct, then we would predict that, if we observed an
My analysis is based on Whiting 1988: 34.
^  A further conclusion that Aristotle draws is: (4) Therefore, a, p  w are good for
a human being.
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organism that was able to actualize its form of life well, we would tend to say that 
that organism is a good specimen of its kind. For it does what Fs do (though in a 
very special sense of 'to do'), and it does it well.'^
Human beings, as well as other living things, have an ergon or form of life 
relative to which we can evaluate individual members of a particular species. That 
is Aristotle's insight, the moral we can take away 6om the ergon argument. We 
need not think that human beings gno human beings have functions in any 
technical sense, nor that we determine functions by determining what is peculiar to 
a kind. But we can see what Aristotle got right: a good F  is one that actualizes the 
ergon o f f s  well. That principle plays a foundational or justificatory role in the 
mode of evaluation central to NVE. For the present I leave as an open question the 
nature of this principle, that is, whether it is normative, logical, psychological, or 
whatever the case may be. We will, however, examine it in Chapter 4.
In NVE, the notion of a ergon plays an important role. We have seen how a 
thing's ergon has been understood as its function, and how this is sometimes 
correct though sometimes not. For, though human beings gnn human beings have 
an ergon, it is not the case that individual human beings have functions in any 
technical sense. Advocates of theories like NVE have used the expressions 'form 
of life' or 'lifefbrm' to express the same idea as ergon. The phrase comes &om the
^  However, even though we can understand Aristotle's thought this way, and even 
though there is great plausibility to the thought, an exegetical point is in order. The 
"good person" referred to in the ergor? argument is not agafhos, the common word 
for good in Greek, but a spouda/os—a serious or excellent person. Such a 
complication may affect our exegesis of Aristotle, though for present purposes is not 
relevant. See Sparshott 1994: 51 ff.
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English translation of Wittgenstein's an expression that occurs Eve
times in f E x e g e s i s  of the idea is a point of 
controversy for Wittgensteinians, though following Philippa Foot I will use the 
term in what I take to be a relatively uncontroversial way. In saying that a certain 
class of organisms has a form of life we are saying that there are species-speciEc 
activities in which those kinds of organisms engage. They, in Hursthouse's phrase, 
have a "characteristic way of going on."^ Thus, nest-building is part of the form 
of life for certain kinds of birds. Importantly, a certain acEvity of organisms makes 
sense only relative to the form of life of the species or, as the case may be, 
subspecies. Language, Wittgenstein thought, is part of the human form of life. 
Properly understood, language is probably unique to humans, at least as far as life 
on planet Earth is concerned. This is not to say that other types of organisms do 
not communicate with one another. But they do not do so with language.^^
A characteristic behavior of human beings is eva/uatmn. Such behavior 
may be of an ethical or a nonethical sort. That is, the subject matter of such 
evaluations may be such things as fall under the rubric of the ethical and some 
may not. A key theme of everything that is to follow is the idea that the logical
^  Wittgenstein mentions /ebensAorm or form of life five times in the /nvesf/gaf/ons: 
"... to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" (§19); "... the term 'language- 
game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speak/ng of a language is 
part of an activity, or of a form of life" (§23); "It is what human beings say that is true 
and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in 
opinions but in form of life" (§241 ); "the phenomena of hope are modes of this 
complicated form of life" (p. 174); "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one 
could say—fbrms of //fe" (226).
^  Hursthouse 1999; cf. Foot 2001.
53
structure of a certain class of our evaluations is common to certain kinds of ethical 
and nonethical evaluations, evaluations that may be of humans or nonhumans. We 
do this without thinking much about it and usually without explicitly considering 
the theoretical underpinnings of our utterances. We tend to say or think or feel that 
certain things are good, some bad, some in-between, and some neither one nor the 
other. To make an utterance, either verbal or nonverbal, that is an assessment of 
the wortA of some entity is to evaluate that entity. We may also call such an act of 
evaluation a va/weyWgmen/. These evaluations may concern the worth of a host of 
different sorts of entities, so that the examples we could provide of things people 
evaluate are practically endless. We might say that John has a bad haircut or that 
CzYizgM Ahne is a good movie or that our day so far has been not too bad or that 
giving to charity is generally a good policy. Only the last of these is explicitly an 
ethical evaluation. Ethical evaluations are a special subclass of evaluations, a 
subclass usually of most interest to moralists and philosophers of morality.
When we do so judge the worth of some entity, there is generally 
underlying our judgment some sort of criterion, which, along with the relevant 
facts, is supposed to warrant or justify or support our use of the evaluative 
expression. Such a criterion, allied with the facts, should tell us a particular 
object is good and another bad and another neither or in-between, given the 
context and intent of the utterance. The criterion at play is not always or even
It would take us far afield to try to develop an account of language. Suffice to say 
that it requires at least symbolic representation and recursion, features lacking in, 
e.g., the bee dance or antelope stotting.
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usually explicit, however, and is oAen possibly unknown to the speaker or thinker 
herself as well as unknown to the audience, supposing there is one. However, we 
could in many cases elicit from someone who has made a value judgment her tacit 
criterion by asking her why she thinks what she has said is true. More colloquially, 
we may ask her: "Why do you say that?" or "What makes you say that?"
I have given an account of the sort of teleology operative in NVE. We will 
see how it works in regards to ethics in the next chapter. I have tried to show how 
commonsensical such a view is, and moreover how it underwrites or grounds a 
certain type of evaluative practice. An important question remains, however. Even 
if we have shown that teleological thought is quite natural to us, this fact does not 
justify its use. Just because we believe, implicitly at least, in the existence of 
teleology, it does not follow that teleology exists. Are there good reasons to 
believe that there is teleology in nature?
2.4. Arguments for teleology
I will begin by asking why Aristotle believed in "the existence of Snal 
causes," or, better put, in the rationality of teleological explanations. Aristotle 
speaks of two different kinds of teleology, which can be divided into two 
subsets.'^ Agency-centered teleology concerns the intended, purposeful actions of 
rational beings. In this class may be distinguished intentional teleology and
Charles 1995; Ariew 2002. The above discussion is especially indebted to Ariew's 
excellent explication and analysis.
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artifactual teleology/^ The former involves actions of rational agents undertaken 
for the sake of something, while the latter involves the production of some artifact 
by rational agents for some purpose. The other large class of teleology concerns 
organisms. Here we may distinguish between formal teleology, which involves the 
development of organisms for the sake of self-preservation or species preservation, 
and functional teleology, which involves those parts of organisms that are present 
for the sake of their possessor.
What is the evidence for teleology? One might say that there are
both sorts of agency-centered teleology, that agents do things and make things for 
the sake of ends. That some actions are intentional in this way is the best 
explanation for whole large classes of activities and individual actions. Likewise 
that certain objects are made to perform certain jobs is often the best explanation 
both for why someone took the trouble to make the object but also the best 
explanation for the existence of the object. All of this will, I hope, be easily 
granted. But it may be contested whether biological, nonintentional teleology is 
the best explanation for parts and processes of organisms. Would a mechanistic 
explanation of these phenomena work better?
There are three arguments for teleology in Aristotle's f  Ayszcs, each of them 
a version of the argument strategy known as inference to the best explanation.^ 
Aristotle conhonts us with a disjunctive syllogism: things in nature arise either
^  Ariew prefers 'behavioral' to 'intentional'. Although his explication makes clear 
what he intends, I think this terminology could be misleading, for there are behaviors 
of both humans and nonhumans that are not intentional though end-directed.
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due to chance or for the sake of some end. One thing to note in the development of
hving things is that things develop in such ways as are useful or beneficial to the
organism possessing them. It seems unlikely that such a state of affairs would arise
by chance. In discussing this argument &om flourishing Aristotle offers a sort of
Darwinian argument:
Wherever then all the parts came about just what they would have 
been if  they had come to be for an end, such things survived, being 
organized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which grew 
otherwise perished and continue to perish, as Empedocles says his 
"man-faced ox-progeny" did.^'
The best explanation for why living things develop in ways that are beneficial or
useful to them is that such development is towards that end. It is a further,
Darwinian conclusion, only hinted at by Aristotle, that such ends are there
they were beneficial in the struggle for existence.
Aristotle's other arguments in favor of teleology follow the same general
scheme. Some natural phenomenon is identified, then it is shown that a
teleological explanation works better than a nonteleological one. In the argument
&om pattern Aristotle notes the way that living things usually tend to grow in the
same ways. "[Tjeeth and all other natural things either invariably or normally
come about in a given way."^^ In the argument from regularity or "hypothetical
necessity" Aristotle argues that the fact that certain kinds of matter regularly come
^  Ariew 2002.
Phys/cs 198b26-34. 
^  Phys/cs 198b35.
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together to produce parts of organisms is better explained teleologically than as the 
result of chance/^
Some believe that neo-Darwinian theory shows that in actuality there is no 
teleology in nature. Others hold that Darwinism has redeemed teleological 
language and explanations. I will not rule on that dispute. But I do think that 
Aristotle's arguments and the ubiquity of teleological talk in the biological 
literature show that teleology ought at least to be taken seriously as an explanatory 
strategy. Moreover, the fact that such explanations appear to work well provides a 
grounding for belief that there actually is teleology in nature. Consider this a sort 
of transcendental argument. If one does not buy this, we may still want to consider 
teleology as a useful fiction, a posit as it were to help explain certain phenomena.^
Before moving on to the further discussion of NVE and the role that the 
virtues play in this theory, it may help to ask with which of the aforementioned 
kinds of teleology are we concerned in NVE. Recall that these are intentional, 
artifactual, formal, and functional teleology. The answer is, perhaps surprisingly, 
all four. In the human case, intentional and unintentional behaviors, artifacts, 
functions, and forms are evaluated insofar as they contribute to the realization of 
the characteristic ends of human beings. We might think that ethics, especially 
perhaps virtue ethics, would deal with intentional teleology, that is, with the 
rational behaviors of human beings. In many sorts of virtue ethics, including NVE, 
individual human beings are evaluated insofar as certain of their traits, certain
^  Phys/cs 11.9, 199b35-200b10.
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dispositions of the will, meet some proper evaluative criteria. We evaluate 
individuals relative to how their cognitive, conative, and aSective states are 
situated in respect to some ie/oa. Also, insofar as laws are a kind of artifact, meant 
to serve the common good, our evaluations of individual laws as well as other 
institutions of justice will be grounded in artifactual teleology.
NVE deals also with the nonintentional teleology in nature, that inherent in 
the parts and processes of life. One thing to recommend the theory is the generahty 
of the logical structure that underlies it. Not only can this logical structure help us 
make sense of a whole class of ethical evaluations, it also helps us make sense of a 
whole class of nonethical evaluations of the formal and functional features of 
living things.
^  See Kent's Cr/t/gue of Judgment, §§62-85, especially §79; cf. Ruse 2002.
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3. GOOD HUMAN BEINGS
3.1. Good specimens of a kind
The tasks facing the proponent of NVE is to give an adequate naturalistic 
account of a good human being. A proper understanding of Aristotle's 
argument paves the way for a theory of evaluative judgment. In §3.21 
demonstrate how the move &om nonethical to ethical evaluations is accomplished 
specifically in relation to those human character traits associated with cooperation. 
In §3.3 I show how this enables us to develop an account of the good human being 
gwa human being. Some further considerations and complications relative to this 
account are explored in §3.4. In §3.5 I show how NVE allows us to derive several 
of the virtues on the standard list, with special attention paid to the virtues 
associated with justice and law.
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Aristotle's ergo/% argument provides us with a deep insight into the 
structure underlying an important class of our evaluations. Philippa Foot further 
develops Aristotle's insight in AhP/rn/ Goocfne.s.s. She calls attention to the 
teleology of life, that is, the end-directed parts, processes, and behaviors of living 
things. Given that living things exemplify teleology (function, purpose), adverting 
to a teleological structure allows us to evaluate organisms relative to their form of 
life. Foot writes: "Judgments of goodness and badness can have, it seems, a 
special "grammar" when the subject belongs to a living thing, whether plants, 
animal, or human being."' The sort of goodness associated with these types of 
judgments Foot calls "natural goodness." Such goodness—or badness, as the case 
may be—"is attributable only to living things themselves, and to their parts, 
characteristics, and operations...."^ This primary sort of goodness contrasts with a 
secondary sort, that predicated of artifacts and other nonliving things. We would 
speak of a good knife or good haircut in this derivative way.
We evaluate living things relative to their species' particular form of life. 
The parts, characteristics, and operations of such beings have functions that 
ideally enable their possessor to live the kind of life its species usually does or 
ought to. That is, these aspects ideally allow organisms to achieve the ends 
characteristic of their species. We may call a living thing a good example of its 
kind if its parts, characteristics, and operations enable it to actualize its form of
' Foot 2001: 26-27. 
 ̂Foot 2001: 26-27.
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life. This sort of explanation or evaluation is primarily—or "naturally"—applied 
to living things, their parts, characteristics, and operations.
Further explicating the view. Foot writes:
[EJvaluation of an individual living thing in its own right, with no 
reference to our interests or desires, is possible where there is 
intersection of two types of propositions: on the one hand,
Aristotelian categoricals (life-fbrm descriptions relating to the 
species), and on the other, propositions about particular individuals 
that are the subject of evaluation."
She contends that in evaluating a living thing relative to its form of life we do
something like the following:'*
1. We describe the life cycle of the species, which includes certain
ends.
2. We specify a set of propositions saying Aow the ends are 
characteristically secured for this species.
3. From these specifications we derive
4. By application of these norms to an individual of the relevant 
species we can evaluate that individual.
Once we have understood the form of life of the species and how it attains the
ends of that form of life, given the derived norms we can "judge [an instance of
the species] to be as it should be or, by contrast, to a lesser or greater degree
defective in a certain respect."^ This is the basic teleological structure that
underlies this sort of evaluation.
 ̂Foot 2001: 33.
*Foot 2001: 33-34. 
^Foot 2001: 33-34.
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Foot's analysis reveals basically a more elaborate form of Aristotle's ergon 
argument. This chain of reasoning shows us how we derive a norm. Once we have 
that norm, we can apply it to living things of the relevant species. We can, as it 
were, hold it up as a sort of standard that members of the kind must meet. It is 
easy to see then how this structure explains our judging a certain tomato plant as 
bad or defective. The form of life of tomato plants essentially involves growth. 
Tomato plants grow by taking in certain nutrients. A good tomato plant, then, is 
one that takes in nutrients well, for which it needs an adequate root system.
I have demonstrated the logical structure of a certain mode of evaluation, 
that which appeals to the form of life of a species in evaluating members of that 
species as good or defective thing of their kind. So far, I have said nothing 
about the virtues. In AafuraZ Foot demonstrates how we make the
transition, as it were, hrom thinking about plants and nonhuman animals, and how 
we evaluate them relative to their respective forms of life, to thinking about 
human beings in the same way. When talking about plants and nonhuman animals, 
these sorts of evaluations seem unproblematic. In addition to being 
uncontroversial, this sort of evaluation is If we know enough about the
form of life of a species, so that we are able to specify the natural ends of such 
beings and how they characteristically achieve those ends, then we can derive 
norms about members of the species. Having done that, we can apply the relevant 
norms to a particular member of the relevant species and thereby evaluate that 
individual, its parts and processes. Such an evaluation is objective in that the
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evaluation is grounded by an appeal to species-specific facts. These are facts of
life history, of biology.
Following Elizabeth Anscombe's "On Promising and Its Justice,"^ Foot
explains that "much human good hangs on the possibility of one person being able
to bind another's will by something in the nature of a promise or other contract."^
Thus, it seems that, given the limits of human powers, cooperation would for the
most part be impossible for us were it not for the fact that we can usually count on
others to keep their promises and others can usually count on us. Foot writes:
The demonstration [that much human good hangs on our keeping 
promises and honoring contracts] depends on an identification of 
elements of human good together with a story of what creatures of 
the human species can and cannot do ... [I]t is "necessary" in many 
circumstances that human beings should be able to bind each 
other's wills.^
This all seems pretty straightforwardly true and provides little room for argument. 
The "necessity" spoken of in the above passage is of a kind that Anscombe calls 
an "Aristotelian necessity": "the necessity," Foot says, "of that on which good 
hangs."^ This gloss serves to distinguish this sort of "necessity" &om logical 
necessity, though not &om a sort of physical necessity. Given the sort of beings 
we are and the way our lives go, it is for much human good that
promises are kept and contracts honored a/zcf that we can generally count on these 
things being so. That is, given our form of life, our nature, our ends, there are 





Foot goes on to say—^realizing that this is the point where things may 
become controversial—that the sort o f derivation that Anscombe goes throngh in 
showing the "necessity'' of onr being able to count on one another in this way is 
We/ihca/ to the sort of derivation we would go throngh, for example, in showing 
that oak trees need a strong root system. First, we specify the involved. At 
this point I do not want to attempt to go so far as to specify what the fw/n/Mu/M
of human action and endeavor might be, that is, the ultimate end of human 
action. But in this case we can easily specify the sub-fe/o.r, a human end that is 
good: it is cooperation. Perhaps the most common way that human beings 
characteristically achieve this end is through the "institutions" of promising and 
contract-making. From these two specifications—the end and the ways those ends 
are realized—we should be able to derive norms. In this case, the norms could be 
of various sorts. They could take the form of rules about making and keeping 
promises, e.g., "You shouldn't break a promise." Or they could take the form of 
norms about which traits are the virtues, e.g., "Trustworthiness is a virtue." Or 
they could be norms about what sorts of people are good or bad, e.g., "People who 
break promises are bad people." We can then ^ p ly  these norms to individual 
human beings as well as to their traits and actions. Someone who always breaks 
promises may have the character trait of being untrustworthy. If that is so, we 
might call such a person "bad" or even "defective." Note, moreover, that in 
addition to norms of evaluation we also can derive norms that may be action- 
guiding, that can tell us what we should and should not do.
 ̂Foot 2001: 46.
65
Below, aAer considering Hnrsthonse's extension of Foot's and Aristotle's 
ideas, I will show how we may evaluate other human dispositions of the will as 
good or bad relative to their role in the form of life of our species.
3.2. The good human being
As I have already noted, human beings have a tendency, seemingly natural 
to us as a species, to make evaluations of people, including ourselves. We think or 
say things like "Jones is a bad mechanic" or "Smith is a good dentist." When we 
think or say such things, we usually understand what we mean by these sorts of 
utterances. Jones doesn't repair cars well; Smith fixes people's teeth well. 
Speaking the way philosophers are used to, we might rephrase our utterances as 
follows: mechanic Jones is bad" or "Jones is a good dentist gwu dentist."
Such 'gua' phrases are tacit, and in most cases it would be otiose to add them. But 
in such cases we are judging whether certain people are good or bad or mediocre 
in relation to what they cfo. That is, we are evaluating them relative to their role or 
their job—or, to return to the Greek, their ergon.
We also make other kinds of evaluations of people. These kinds of 
evaluations are usually called moral or ethical evaluations. For example, we might 
say, "Jones is a bad human being" or "Smith is a good human being." A question 
to ask is whether we understand what we mean by such utterances in the same 
way that we understand those evaluations of̂  e.g., Jones gun mechanic. To justify 
our evaluations of the characters of Jones and Smith, we might say, "Jones steals, 
lies, and cheats" or "Jones gives to the poor, keeps her promises, and tells the
66
truth." Or, we might say, "Jones is dishonest and unjust" or "Smith is kind, 
honest, and beneficent." The former way is to speak in terms of a person's actions; 
the second is to speak in terms of certain traits of character, the so-called virtues 
and vices. As should be apparent to the reader from what has gone before, it is the 
central argument of this dissertation that many—^perhaps most—or our ethical 
evaluations of human beings are of this sort, at least the ones that are justifiable. 
That is, these evaluations rest firmly in a teleological Êamework.
In 0» Ff/fwe Hursthouse proposes a criterion for ascertaining which
character traits are the virtues: the virtues make their possessor a good human 
being gua human being. The gloss Hursthouse provides for this thesis is 
instructive: "Human beings need the virtues in order to live well, to flourish oj 
human beings, to live a characteristically good, eWaimo/z, human life."^° Now, on 
its face, this gloss may not sufficiently distinguish this thesis hrom what I would 
count as another thesis altogether. This other thesis is that the virtues beneht their 
possessor. The confusion between the two claims may result &om our 
commonsense thinking that for some trait to enable a human being to flourish or 
live well is for that trait to benefit the person. As Hursthouse understands it, 
however, the thrust of the primary thesis differs significantly from the claim 
embodied in the subsidiary thesis. She makes the thrust more obvious by what she 
says elsewhere. We are to understand the primary thesis as the claim that "the 
virtues make their possessor good gwa human being."' ̂
Hursthouse 1999: 167. 
Hursthouse 1999: 192.
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What does it mean to say that someone is good gna human being? An 
important point, oAen overlooked, is that 'good' is not a predicative adjective like 
'weighs 900 lbs.% rather it is an attributive adjective like 'small'. A predicative 
ac^ective assigns some property to an object that the object has irrespective of any 
criterion. Thus, an elephant weighing 900 pounds weighs 900 pounds.'^ On the 
other hand, an attributive a(^ective is applied always relative to a specified 
criterion. A small elephant, then, is not small, except when compared to other 
elephants. Compared to mice it would be quite large. Also, gwu elephant it is 
small, but not gwa mammal. The same goes for 'good'. A dull knife is not a good 
knife gwu knife, since the function of knives is to cut, though gwu decoration for 
my mantel it may be a perfectly good knife. In fact, its being dull may make it a 
better knife gna decoration, since then it cannot be used as a weapon. Moreover, 
and more importantly, 'good' does not change its meaning when we move 6om 
talking about a good knife or a good cactus to talking about a good human being, 
even in cases where we are using the terms ethically. So, when we say that 
someone is a good person, we usually mean that they are good gwa person, as 
opposed to gaa mammal or animal. In some, quite rare cases, we could mean 
'good' to be taken in one of these latter ways, though that would be a highly 
unusual context. Of course, perhaps it follows that, if a certain human being is a
Geach 1956. Of course, a 900 lb. elephant would not weigh 900 lbs. on the moon, 
even though its m ass would not change. How much a creature weighs is relative to a 
particular gravitational field. Moreover, Einstein has taught us that time and space 
are relative to inertial frames of reference, hence a person's height, e.g., would be 
relative to how fast she is moving.
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good human being, then he or she is a a good mammal and a good animal,
since human beings are mammals and animals.
Once we have this idea firmly in mind, that 'good' is applied relative to 
some criterion of application or relative to some class of things, the second step is 
to say how it is that we evaluate other types of organisms besides human beings. 
Hursthouse believes this will help us get a better handle on what she is doing here, 
as well as help us to understand how such evaluations of humm beings are 
naturalistic. Hursthouse is intent upon making clear the characteristic ends of 
human beings, as well as other general classes of organism. She thereby avoids a 
charge that is easily leveled at Foot, namely, that what comprises the human good 
is left indeterminate. Hursthouse does, however, face the criticism that she got it 
wrong.
In order to determine whether a cactus, for example, is indeed a good
cactus gwu cactus or whether a wolf is a good wolf guu wolf we follow practices
prominent in other areas of naturalistic enquiry:
In the context of naturalism we focus on evaluations of individual 
living things as or guu specimens of their natural kind, as some 
well-informed gardeners do with respect to plants and ethologists 
do with respect to animals.
The question, then, is how speciScally we are to do this. Hursthouse provides the
details. Since plants provide the simplest sort of case, we begin with them. We
evaluate a plant as either a good or a bad specimen of its kind by looking at how
13 Hursthouse 1999: 197.
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well two aspects, its parts and its operations, serve two ends, individual survival 
and continuance of its species (which includes reproduction).
Things get more complex as we move up the "ladder of nature" to the more 
complex organisms. First, we add a new aspect, which is to be evaluated relative 
to the ends so far set, those of survival and continuance of the species. When we 
move from plants to the so-called lower animals, we begin talking about doing or 
acting. Hursthouse says: "Even fish and birds 'do' things in a way that no plant 
'does' things."'^ They locomote; they are animate beings. Thus, in addition to 
being evaluated with respect to its parts and operations, an animal at this level of 
sophistication may be evaluated as good relative to its kind in respect to its actions 
and how well these actions serve the ends of survival and continuance of the 
species. Animals, generally speaking, obtain nourishment and continue their 
species in ways much different from the ways that plants do. In short, animals 
must act. And their actions are a feature of them by which we evaluate them as 
good or bad specimens of their kind.
We add a third end as we mover further up the "ladder." Beyond survival 
and continuance of the species, there is "characteristic freedom f-om pain and 
characteristic pleasure or enjoyment."'^ Now, as Hursthouse is quick to point out, 
a capacity to feel pain is necessary for survival, and no doubt evolved as a 
mechanism to enable animals to avoid damage to their tissues and thus better their 
chances of survival and continuance of the species. Thus, a complete freedom
Hursthouse 1999: 199. 
Hursthouse 1999: 199.
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from the possibility of pain would not be benehcial to any animal, and would in 
fact make it defective; hence, the use of 'characteristic' in describing the freedom 
from pain. Moreover, animals feel pleasure also in order to make them seek out 
those things that bring about such pleasure. However, taking an inordinate 
pleasure in certain stimuli would also be a defect in an organism.
A fourth aspect of the more sophisticated animals closely relates to the 
ends of characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic pleasure or enjoyment. 
These are the animal's characteristic desires and emotions. Now it should be fairly 
obvious how being constituted a certain way with respect to its desires and 
emotions would serve or thwart an animal's achieving its characteristic ends. An 
animal that did not desire, e.g., sex (at the right time, in the right way) would not 
be able to serve well the end of continuance of the species. Similarly, an animal 
that did not feel fear towards the right sorts of things, e.g., predators, would also 
tend not to do well toward the end of survival. And not only would this animal 
probably not survive for very long, but it would also not be able to enjoy the 
things it would characteristically enjoy. And certainly it would not be well able to 
avoid pain.
When we get to social animals, of which human beings are a variety, we 
add another end, which is "the good functioning of the social group." According
There are enormous complications that enter here, which is why I add the 
parenthetical expression. An animal may forego reproduction at some point in its life 
history /n order to enable the continuance of its species. These are the explanations 
often suggested for why some female primates, for example, continue to live for 
many years after menopause.
Hursthouse 1999: 201. In a footnote (201 n14), Hursthouse does consider the 
social insects as a  "hiccup in this smooth progress," a point well made. She does not
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to Hursthouse, "[t]he function of such a group is to enable its members to live well
(in the way characteristic of their species)."'^ The parenthetical clause is meant to
include those other three ends we have already considered. Since this is the
function of a social group, and if a good is one that performs its ergon well, then
a good social group is one that enables its members to achieve their characteristic
ends, and does this well.
Thus we evaluate individual members of one of the more sophisticated
social species of animal according to how well its four aspects serve its species-
specific ends. It should be readily apparent that the teleological evaluative
structure presented by Hursthouse is the same as that presented by Foot and,
arguably, by Aristotle. The only difference is that of more specificity and detail as
to what is being evaluated relative to what. In examining the form of life of
animals such as ourselves, we see that there are four aspects that we evaluate
relative to four ends. Hursthouse sums things up as follows:
a good social animal (of one of the more sophisticated species) is 
one that is well fitted or endowed with respect to (i) its parts, (ii) its 
operations, (iii) its actions, and (iv) its desires and emotions; 
whether it is thus well Gtted or endowed is determined by whether 
these four aspects well serve (1) its individual survival, (2) the 
continuance of its species, (3) its characteristic &eedom &om pain 
and characteristic enjoyment, and (4) the good functioning of its 
social group—in the way characteristic of the species.'^
point out that, given the nature of these insects and their social organization, it is 





Once we have this criterion in mind, we should be able to evaluate, more or less, 
social animals as either good or not so good or bad specimens of their kind. Thus, 
given that humans are social animals of the relevant sort, an individual's meeting 
this criterion in the appropriate way should enable us to correctly describe him or 
her as a good human being.
Thus, we may understand this structure of evaluation in a couple of ways. 
On the one hand, as just seen, we may understand it as a criterion by which we 
can evaluate individuals, their parts and processes. This, along with the relevant 
facts, will enable us to determine, more or less, with certain qualifications, 
whether an individual is a good human guu human. With this criterion, we are 
provided with a way to assess whether a given human character trait really is a 
virtue. It is a virtue only if it tends to enable its possessor to realize one or another 
of the four ends. Note that this way of putting things may be a little misleading, 
and I want therefore to stress that this criterion leaves open the possibility that the 
virtues are in some sense constitutive of our ends. The best shot at making a case 
for this, given Hursthouse's analysis, is that the exercise of the virtues is one of 
our characteristic enjoyments, fo r now, we should see that here we have a 
criterion for the natural goodness of virtue. The virtues make their possessor a 
good human being gua human being, and this we spell out naturalistically via the 
above analysis.
A second way to understand the structure is as providing a description and 
explanation of the practices in which we engage. It serves to make plain what it is 
that we do when we evaluate organisms gua member of their respective species.
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Whether we make it explicit or not, we appeal to the of the species in making 
our evaluations of members of that species. Of course, as should be obvious, this 
is not the only type of evaluation in which we engage, and thus the structure is not 
the only structure. I may evaluate a particular tree, for example, by how much 
shade it provides in the front yard of my house. Or I may evaluate it in respect to 
certain nonteleological aesthetic qualities. Aesthetic goodness comes closest, I 
think, to an autonomous kind of goodness, though I will not explore this idea 
further.
Hursthouse notes five important things about this structure of evaluation, 
which are worth reviewing.^° First, whether these evaluations are true does not 
depend on the wants, desires, interests, or values of whoever is doing the 
evaluating. This underscores the fact that this sort of ethical theory is cognitivist. 
Moreover, as she says, these sorts of evaluations "are, in the most straightforward 
sense of the term, 'objective'."^' In fact, farmers, animal breeders, botanists, and 
ethologists make such evaluations all the time. But we should be cautious here. I 
am not so sure that what Hursthouse says here holds as well for farmers and 
animal breeders as it does for natural scientists. Certainly, farmers are interested in 
seeing their plants and animals do well, in this objective sense of 'do well', and in 
that sense whether they are doing well or not in no way depends upon what the 
farmer wants, needs, desires, or values. But there are those cases where the farmer 
is interested in cultivating some odd, perhaps detrimental characteristic in the
^  Hursthouse 1999: 202-205. 
Hursthouse 1999: 202.
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organism. Most of ns should be familiar with animal breeders, who in attempting 
to generate "show" animals often breed in traits that are harmful to that animal. 
Given this obvious objection, it is best to think here of the evaluations of those 
students of animals and plants who have no interest in seeing the creatures do or 
become anything other than what they would in their natural state.
Second, these objective evaluations hold only more or less, or "for the 
most part," and are "riddled with imprecision and indeterminacy."^ This is the 
case due to the overall complexity of the natural world and the epistemic problems 
that arise due to this complexity. What may look like a poor specimen of species ^  
may actually be a fine specimen of subspecies 5"]. Moreover, it often is just hard to 
tell how and to what degree an organism is good or defective. For it may be good 
in some ways and not in others. So the overall summing up evaluation will be far 
&om a precise assessment of the organism. In many cases it will be unclear 
whether an organism is a good specimen of its kind. Moreover, it may be that we 
arrive at convicting evaluative judgments about some individual. That is, an 
individual we might judge as, say, a good primate may not make, say, a good 
senator. Now, it may be difficult to imagine how someone could be a good human 
being but not a good mammal, but it is not impossible. However, it could be that 
some class names, like 'mammal', 'vertebrate', or 'animal' are not fine-grained 
enough to allow us to make reasonable evaluations. Of course, a sick human is 
also a sick animal, mammal, and vertebrate.
^ Hursthouse 1999: 203.
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These considerations as well as others implied by the gradualistic character 
of evolution may lead us to think that species do not make up natural kinds. But 
they make up kinds enough to see, for the most part, what their form of life is. 
Those things that are good for oak trees are not the same things that are good for 
anteaters. The traits a human being needs to get on well in life are not the same as 
those a lobster needs. So even though there are no kinds in the organismal world 
the way that many special creationists imagine there are, there are enough species- 
specific characteristic for us to make relatively accurate assessments of what 
would be good for a member of a species. I return to this issue, specifically in 
relation to neo-Darwinism, in Chapter 5.
Third, there may be further distinctions within a species that need to be 
made in evaluating a particular example of a kind. For example, in many species 
males and females have quite different roles to perform and also have 
correspondingly different physical and behavioral characteristics. They must 
therefore be judged according to this "sub-kind." Further, more fine-grained 
distinctions may also be made. An interesting example of this is provided by 
Christopher Boorse. We make determinations of the health of an individual 
relative to her or his stage in life. For example, the standards we use for 
determining the health of infants is not the same as that which we use for 
determining the health of adults. Perhaps the standards we use for the elderly
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should di@er from those we use for middle-aged adults and younger adults,
although curiously and perhaps tellingly we do not often make such distinctions.^^
Making a fourth point, Hursthouse claims that the evaluation of an
individual as a good specimen of its kind
identifies it [the organism] as an % that.is as ordinarily well fitted or 
endowed as an % can be to do or live well, to thrive or flourish (in a 
characteristically X way). What living things is live; quite 
generally, a good living thing lives well—unless prevented by 
something outside itself
This brings the structure bnnly back around into the virtue ethics camp, at least
insofar as it is the case that when we are talking about an organism "doing well"
we mean that it is "living well" or "living a good life characteristic of its species."
The Gfth elaborative point Hursthouse makes about such evaluations of
living things is that "the truth of the overall evaluation depends in part upon the
needs and (as we ascend the ladder of nature) the interests and desires of the %s in
question."^ On its face this fifth point appears to conflict with the Erst one she
made. That point was, in her own words, that "the truth of such evaluations does
not depend in any way on my wants, interests, or values, nor indeed on 'ours.'
As we have seen the first point is relatively straightforward. Important for calling
the theory 'objective' is to show that the overall evaluation does not depend upon
the needs, interests, or desires of whoever is making the evaluation. One of the
strong points of NVE is that it holds out the promise of providing us with some
23 Boorse 1977: 567.
Hursthouse 1999: 205. 
^  Hursthouse 1999: 205.
26 Hursthouse 1999: 202.
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sort of objective foundation for ethics. Doing this distances the theory from the
realm of noncognitivist or subjectivist theories of morality, a point that Foot
rightly stresses at the outset of presenting the theory in iVhfura/
In explication of this fifth point Hursthouse writes:
If "A good human being is one who possesses charity, justice, 
honesty, courage, etc." is true, its truth depends upon facts about 
human needs, interests, and desires, just as "A good elephant is one 
which has good tusks, follows the leader, does not attack other 
elephants, looks after the young, is not lightened of water, etc." 
depends upon facts about elephant needs, interests, and desires.
How could the truth of evaluations of living things with interests 
and desires not depend in part upon such facts?^^
Hursthouse's point is easy enough to understand. We have merely to return to her
analysis of what makes up a good animal of one of the more sophisticated sorts.
Not only must such an organism be well off with respect to its parts and
operations, but also with regard to its actions and its desires and emotions. Thus,
the evaluation of such an animal will depend upon what its desires and emotions
are like, that is, what sorts of things it desires and what sorts of things it
emotionally responds to, and in both cases to what degree it does so. Suppose xs
make up one of the relevant species of sophisticated social animals. That an x is a
good X depends in part upon that x 's being well off in respect to its desires and
emotions: it must desire and be affected by those things that help it to reach its
characteristic ends.
According to NVE, what /  or we desire for or feel about any particular
member of a species has no bearing whatever on the question of whether that
See ch. 1.
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organism is a good or defective specimen of that species. However, if the
organism is a member of one of the more sophisticated species, then for it to be a
good specimen of its kind it must desire the right sorts of things, namely, those
things that serve not to thwart its achieving its characteristic ends. As Hursthouse
says, evaluations of human beings gna human beings
depend on our interests and desires because their subject matter is 
us, namely, animals that Aave interests and desires, just as the true 
judgments about the psychology or practices of human beings do.^^
Given that we have interests, emotions, and desires as fundamental constituents of
our cognitive make-up, it matters for correct evaluations of us as specimens of our
kind that they are a certain way. Moreover, that our interests, emotions, and
desires are a certain way is crucial for our achieving our characteristic ends. As
Hursthouse says:
[0]n the naturalistic virtue ethics account, "we," whoever we may 
be, can no more decide what it is for a human being to be a good 
human being than we can decide what it is for a cactus to be a good 
cactus.
Thus we see underscored an important fact about NVE and the kind of ethical 
naturalism it is, namely, that the theory is objective. exactly it means for a 
theory—any theory for that matter, not just the ethical ones—to be objective is a 
difficult matter to settle. Thus I shall not attempt to settle all matters on 
objectivity, and especially not ethical objectivity.
^  Hursthouse 1999: 230. 
^  Hursthouse 1999: 230. 
^  Hursthouse 1999: 240.
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3.3. Virtues
3.3.1. Courage, charity, honesty, loyalty, and justice
We have seen what it is that, according to NVE, makes a good human
being, or makes a human being good. We evaluate ourselves and one another
along the same lines as we do specimens of any species of living thing. Although
this view has been presented as central to naturalized virtwe I have talked
only briefly so far about where the traits of character known as virtues fit in to this
account. The virtues are those traits—dispositions of emotion, desire, and will—
that lead to or, perhaps, constitute the four characteristic ends of human beings. In
this section I look at four paradigmatic virtues. In §§3.3.2 and 3.3.3,1 further
explore how notions of justice in regard to laws fit into NVE.
As Hursthouse says, our evaluations of plants and animals
are all concerned with good xs as Aen/rAy specimens of their kind.
And one very obvious way in which our ethical evaluations are a bit 
different is that we hive off overall evaluations that supervene on 
our evaluations of our physical aspects—our parts and operations, 
at least—into human biology and/or medicine. The evaluation of 
someone as a good, physically healthy, specimen of humanity is, h)r 
us (as it was not, perhaps, for the ancient Greeks) quite distinct 
6om those evaluations we call 'ethical'.^'
Since plants have only physical aspects, there is but one science, botany,
concerned with them. We can say that gardening also deals with the physical
aspects of plants, though in this practice other concerns often enter in besides
those directly related to the ends characteristic of plants and how they achieve
Hursthouse 1999: 206-207.
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those ends. Animals too have merely physical aspects, bnt they also have
behaviors. Thus there are two sciences that deal with them: animal physiology and
ethology. Veterinarians, concerned as they are with the overall health of animals,
often concern themselves with both of these aspects, though there are increasingly
greater numbers of people devoted primarily to remedying problems in the
psychological functioning of animals.
The "merely" physical processes of human beings are studied in the
science of human biology, with medicine as the practical side concerned with
fixing physical problems. Besides the physical, however, there is also the
psychological side of human beings. In saying this I am not assuming
psychophysical dualism, only describing what is uncontroversially the case."^ In a
footnote to the passage quoted above, Hursthouse writes:
The possibly distinct third sort of evaluation [besides the physical 
and the ethical] occurs in the field of human psychology, but it 
would need a book on its own to discuss the issue of whether the 
evaluation of a human being as a good, mentally healthy, specimen 
can be clearly separated &om ethical evaluations.^^
This issue was actually much discussed in the 1960s and 1970s.^ One major
question concerned the assessment of homosexuality as a mental disorder and the
classification of homosexuals as "sick," "perverted," "abnormal," etc. The fact
We might in this context call to mind various ideas about "supervenience." Some 
philosophers argue that the mental supervenes on the physical, and others maintain 
that the ethical supervenes on the physical (presumably nonethical). I do not find this 
very helpful, and the whole idea may be incoherent (see Kim 1993, essays 4-10). 
Presumably, in some sense the physical supervenes on the physical. For example, 
my hearfs having the function of pumping blood supervenes on various facts about 




that clinical opinion on the mental health of homosexuals has experienced a sea 
change in the past decades should be some evidence that "scientific" 
psychological evaluations of homosexuals and homosexual behavior have been 
deeply influenced by the ethical norms of our society. Moreover, metaethical 
questions having to do with moral responsibility have been discussed in the 
context of the nature of the will. Hard determinists believe we have nothing like a 
free will, and so cannot (or should not) be held morally responsible. Believers in 
this doctrine might tend to assimilate what we call ethically wrong behavior to 
psychologically "sick" behavior.^^ I leave these complications aside.^^
It remains the case that in practice we "hive off" the merely physical 
aspects of human beings and leave their evaluation to biomedical sciences; and 
that we "hive off' the merely psychological aspects and leave them for study by 
psychology.^^ We also add another feature to our evaluative structure, a feature 
that other animals apparently lack: rationality. Human beings can act from 
reasons, something that it appears other animals cannot do. Of course, we might 
ask how we can be so sure that animals, even chimps and dolphins, do not have 
reason. To make this case. Foot discusses "acting from reasons" as, roughly, 
having the capacity to articulate in language why we are doing or have done
^  See, e.g., Szasz 1961,1987.
^  See Morris 1968 (in Murphy 1995: 78) for some interesting quotes by hard 
determinists (Bertrand Russell among them) who advocate viewing moral 
wrongdoing as a species of psychological pathology.
^  It is interesting to note, however, that NVE may be seen as leaning towards a kind 
of view concerning moral responsibility where bad behavior is assimilated with 
unhealthiness, and thus treated accordingly. This further implication of NVE (if it is 
such) will have to be explored elsewhere.
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something/^ Since animals conspicuously lack this ability, we might see it as 
removing them hrom the realm of ethical evaluation.^^ I do not have a theory of 
rationality at hand, and do not at this point feel any pressure to provide one. 
Obviously we do not evaluate animals ethically, unless we are 
anthropomorphizing.'*^
So, in the transition 6om evaluating animals, even of the more 
sophisticated sorts, to the evaluations of human beings, we add on rationality.
Then we have the physical aspects, the emotions and desires, and rationality. But 
the merely physical is taken out of consideration, so that we are leA with 
rationality and emotions and desires. Are these the sorts of things we have in mind 
when we evaluate human beings as e/AmaZ specimens of human beings? 
Hursthouse believes so: 'T o  possess the virtues is ... not only to be well disposed 
with respect to actions from reason but also with respect to emotions and 
desires."^' The point is a little awkwardly put, but it is just this: being a good 
human being in the ethical sense is a matter of being a certain way in respect to 
one's reason, emotions, and desires. One must be rationally, affectively, and 
conatively correct, as it were. Hursthouse concludes:
Which is, for good or ill, in its practical form increasingly on the verge of become 
another branch of biomedicine supplemented by talk therapy.
^ F o o t 2001.
^  Bruce Waller argues that rationality (or "rational reflection") is not necessary for 
ethical behavior, but rather only proper intention is. This entails that any animals 
capable of forming intentions are capable of ethical behavior (Waller 1997).
^  This is not to say that animals do not have moral worth. That is a different 
question. I think they do, but the reasons are complex. Moreover, the reasons I 
would give would entail that plants also have moral worth. But that is another issue. 
Cf. Attfield 1981 and Goodpaster 1978. See also MacIntyre 1999.
Hursthouse 1999: 207-208.
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Hence the concept of a virtue emerges as apparently tailor-made to 
encapsulate a favorable evaluation of just those aspects which, 
according to the naturalism here outlined, are the ethically relevant 
ones. To be a good human being is to be well endowed with respect 
to the aspects listed; to possess the human virtues is to be thus well 
endowed.
Thus we see clearly how the virtues fit into the teleological h-amewoik. Being 
"well endowed" with respect to actions, emotions, and desires means that these 
aspects are so as to well serve the four ends.
However, as Hursthouse is quick to point out, we still have not verified 
that courage, charity, justice, e/ uZ. actually are the virtues. To do so we must 
examine how a certain trait, conceived of in this case as an individual's 
"endowment" in regard to her actions, emotions, and desires, well or ill serves the 
characteristic human ends. Recall that these ends are individual survival, 
continuance of the human species, characteristic &eedom 6om pain and 
characteristic enjoyment, and good functioning of the social group—all of which 
are conceptualized relative to the form of life of the species, namely, human 
beings. To see whether courage, for example, serves these four ends, we must 
critically examine that trait, perform an "observation" of sorts, which should tell 
us whether courage is indeed a virtue. Note that this aspect of the theory has a nice 
naturalistic flavor. We go out and look, as it were, to determine the positive or 
negative relation a particular trait has to the ends of human beings. Thus, whether 
a particular trait is or is not a virtue is an empirical matter, to be settled by 
observational test. In practice, of course, things may not be so simple.
42 Hursthouse 1999: 208.
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I have already discussed Foot's strategy, derived from Anscombe, for 
showing that those traits necessary for cooperation between individuals are indeed 
virtues. Using her more articulated hramework, Hursthouse provides the same sort 
of vindication that Foot provides in the case of the virtues associated with 
cooperation for courage, charity, honesty, and loyalty."^  ̂I will briefly survey these, 
developing my account &om Hursthouse's. I also consider justice, a virtue that 
neither Foot nor Hursthouse consider in much detail.
1. Cowrnge either directly or indirectly serves all four ends. We may 
understand courage as the emotional and volitional disposition to face up to fear, 
especially fear of dangerous things—that is, things that rightly inspire fear. 
Aristotle, of course, thought of it mainly as facing fear in martial combat, but we 
need not limit it to that. Certainly, an individual must oAen show courage in order 
to survive. This is not to say that courageous human beings live longer than timid 
human beings. But the courageous human being no doubt generally outlasts the 
reckless one. Also, parents need to be courageous to protect the wellbeing and 
interests of their children. The good functioning of the social group also oAen 
requires courage, as does the defense of an individual's own and others' ability to 
engage in characteristic enjoyments. Moreover, timidity may preclude one's 
engaging in many enjoyments characteristic of humans. "Faint heart never won 
fair lady.""*̂  We can probably find analogs of many human virtues elsewhere in
^  Hursthouse 1999: 208-210
44 Don Ou/xote, part ii, ch. x. It is clear that this expression was already a platitude in 
Cervantes' time, for it is prefaced by, "Remember the old saying...."
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the nonhuman animal kingdom. Hursthouse suggests that it is plausible that 
courage plays a similar role in human lives as it does in that of wolves."*^
2. Although failing to cite a source, Hursthouse writes that she has read of 
charitable or benevolent acts in both wolves and elephants. We may understand 
cAanYy as a disposition to render aid to those in need. This contributes to the well 
functioning of the social group, for it increases social stability and cohesion. It can 
also contribute to individual survival due to reciprocal altruism. If we help those 
in need, it may be more hkely that we will be rendered help when we are in need 
ourselves. Charity also may extend to children and the infirm elderly, which 
contributes to continuance of the species as well as the good functioning of the 
social group.
3. the disposition to tell the truth, allows us to communicate and 
is in fact a precondition of it. This serves cooperation between individuals and 
groups. It also allows for the attainment and transmission of knowledge, which 
has obvious implications for the well functioning of the social group. Unlike many 
of the other animals, human beings get much of their knowledge not via instinct 
but via education. Education, whether in the sense of the imparting of knowledge 
Aow or knowledge tAat, presupposes truthfulness on the part of the educator.
In his recent Trwi/z aW  Bernard Williams discusses the
"virtues of truth" that he calls sincerity and accuracy.'^ Although his project 
differs somewhat &om that of NVE, it is, importantly, avowedly naturalistic and
^  Hursthouse 1999: 209.
Williams 2002.
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virtue-focused. Williams argues that sincerity, the disposition to tell the truth, and 
accuracy, the disposition of wanting to possess true beliefs, "are useful, indeed 
essential, to such objectives as the pooling of information, and those objectives are 
important to almost eveiy human purpose."'*^ Returning to Foot's way of putting 
things, we might say that much human good hangs on people having those traits. 
Given the material constraints on human life, it seems impossible that a human 
society could even exist without them.
4. Zcya/ty is the disposition to be faithful to others. We might think of it as 
a steadfastness when faced with temptation, since it should be easy to be loyal to a 
friend or family member if there never arose any temptation to betray that person. 
Loyalty serves the end of our characteristic enjoyment of loving human 
relationships. For without loyalty and the trust that follows upon it, we could 
neither develop nor sustain such relationships. We could further contend that 
loving human relationships, besides being a necessary condition of humans 
society, are also among the characteristic ergoyments of human beings. We like 
having friends; we like being on good terms with our family members. So, not 
only are loving human relationships good because they are a necessary condition 
of a human society as such, they are good, as it were, in themselves.
5. Both in itself and considered strictly as a virtue of character,y has 
proven difficult to understand. Following Aristotle, we may understand justice




ask what is just. Aristotle notes the homonymous nature of the term, and then 
continues:
Both the lawless person and the greedy and unfair person seem to 
be uigust; and so, clearly, both the lawful and the fair person will be 
just. Hence what is just will be both what is lawful and what is fair, 
and what is unjust will be both what is lawless and what is unfair.
Justice, then, comprises what is lawful and what is fair. This is a good hrst pass at
what we think of as justice. We tend to use 'jusT and 'fair' as synonyms, when
talking about, for example, a distribution of resources. We also, perhaps
misleadingly, refer to our legal system as the justice system. However, there is an
even more general sense of 'just' which is synonymous with 'right' or 'moral'. It
is the latter usage that allows us to say of a particular legal decision that, even
though it was in conformity to law, it was nevertheless unjust. Such usage also
allows us to say of certain laws that they are unjust and not mean simply that they
are unfair.
Aristotle is aware of this distinction. It is correct laws that compel us to do 
what is in accord with virtue; incorrect laws do this less well.^^ Moreover, the 
laws themselves
aim either at the common benefit of all, or at the benefit of those in 
control, whose control rests on virtue or on some other such basis.
And so in one way what we call just is whatever produces and 
maintains happiness and its parts for a political community.^
/VE 1129b25. Bernard Yack argues persuasively that we should not see in 
Aristotle's brief comments in A/E our contemporary distinction between natural right 
and conventional right. As Yack puts it, "Aristotle ... is n o t... defending the existence 
of natural, inherently correct standards of justice. He is, instead, arguing that the 
need for citizens to make and argue about judgments of the intrinsic justice of their 
actions is something that develops naturally within political communities" (Yack 1990: 
216.)
™/VE1129b15ff.
It seems then that justice virtue is not merely the disposition to obey the law, 
but the disposition to obey those laws that are just, that is, those that promote the 
wellbeing of the polis.
Aristotle calls the virtue associated with obeying just laws general justice. 
The virtue associated with fairness he calls special justice. He does not think an 
account of general justice is necessary, since, he thinks, general justice amounts to 
'th e  whole of virtue."^^ He thinks that special justice, on the other hand, does 
warrant an account. First, I will consider justice as fairness in Aristotle's terms. 
Then, despite Aristotle's claims that we do not need to provide such an account, I 
will consider justice as the disposition to obey just laws and what the nature of 
those laws might be. We shall see that NVE does an admirable job of accounting 
for these virtues and also points us in the direction of a natural justification of 
laws.
On one common construal we can understand justice as the disposition to
give to others what is their due. As Foot says:
Justice ..., as one of the cardinal virtues, covers all those things 
owed to other people: it is under injustice that murder, theft, and 
lying come, as well as withholding of what is owed for instance by 
parents to children and by children to parents, as well as the 
dealings which would be called unjust in everyday speech.
It seems that Foot's understanding of justice, at least as exemplified in this
passage, differs somewhat from what we usually take the term to comprise. To say
that murder and lying are concerned with what is owed to people seems rather
51 /VE1129b25ff.
89
broad. It could be that we owe people the truth, in some sense, or that we owe 
them their life, so to speak. It is thought by many that killing someone is uqust 
because the individual did not get what she deserved. This is the case, perhaps, 
due to common intuition— t̂hough one certainly not held by all—that sometimes 
people deserve to die. We may think also that people deserve the truth, though I 
do not think that we owe everyone the truth. Perhaps we have an obligation to be 
sincere, but this does not seem to be a matter of justice. Of course, there are those 
cases where someone says something like, "I think you owe me an explanation." 
However, in such cases it seems that the people involved are in some special 
relationship, say, a marriage, in which a prior agreement was made. This 
agreement entails certain obligations, like telling the truth about certain important 
matters. Leaving these complications aside, I think it best to restrict special justice 
to fairness in distribution.
Aristotle says:
One species [of special justice] is found in the distribution of honors 
or wealth or anything else that can be divided among members of a 
community who share in a political system; for here it is possible 
for one member to have a share equal or unequal to another's.^"
Aristotle considers justice in rectification as another species of special justice. It is
unclear what Aristotle takes the distinction to be, except that distribution involves
geometrical proportion and rectification numerical proportion.^ I think we can
safely ignore the distinction and focus on justice in distribution.
Foot 1959: in Foot 1978: 125.
^/VE1130b30ff.
^  A/El 131 b25ff.
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There are some problems with Aristotle's account, however. His primary 
mistake is in associating all species of distributive injustice with the vice of 
pZeonexzu, or greed.^^ Quite obviously, there could be cases of distributive 
injustice motivated by a host of other things besides greed. Suppose, for example, 
that a political figure desires to further her career and believes that she can do so 
by advocating a law that favors the interests of certain large corporations over a 
certain group of poverty-stricken citizens. The law, if passed, will have the result 
of unequally distributing the wealth of the society and thus will be unjust. 
However, the politician's motive for her unjust action was not greed; that is, she 
was not motivated by the desire to take an unequal share herself Rather, her 
motive was something else: political ambition. Her vice we might call over­
ambitiousness, if  that is indeed a vice. However, we tend to criticize people we 
regard as "overly" ambitious when their ambition results in some harm, as this one 
does. I suggest we could call her vice callousness. Whatever we call it, though, it 
is not greed.
Aristotle's understanding of justice as fairness also seems mistaken on 
another count. He says that the things that are subject to apportionment are 
"honors or wealth or anything else that can be divided among members of a 
community who share in a political system...." Obviously wealth can be 
apportioned and therefore be unequally distributed. But it is difficult to understand 
how honors could be divided. The idea Aristotle might have in mind is something 
like this. Consider the Academy Awards. Only one person can win the Best
^  Cf. Williams 1980. ,
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Director award. Aristotle might think that if someone who won this award kept 
winning it year after year that she would then be unjust. But that seems a little 
odd. We usually commend people who win honors over and over as being 
exemplary in their field, not as being unjust. Perhaps, though, a director who wins 
more than twice should excuse herself horn further contention. Still, I do not think 
this squares with our contemporary intuitions.
Moreover, upon closer inspection it does not seem that wealth per se quite 
fits this model either. We generally think of wealth, in terms of money or capital, 
as something crente^ ,̂ not as some finite amount of stuff sitting somewhere, of 
which each of us deserves a portion. Of course, there are some things, for example 
land or oil, of which there is a finite amount. It may be more helpful to think of 
fairness in distribution when thinking of such things of which there are finite 
amounts. If someone then takes too large a portion, we might criticize that person 
as having acted unjustly.
How is this idea of justice as the disposition to fairness to fit into NVE? 
Hursthouse notes that it has "long been a commonplace" that justice contributes 
essentially to the well functioning of the social group. As noted above, given the 
kinds of beings humans are—that is, social beings—the other three ends could not 
be well served unless the social group was relatively well functioning. Now, 
people generally tend to get angry and quarrel when they perceive that they have 
gotten an unfair distribution of goods. This can cause social unrest on both small
^  Hursthouse 1999: 210. She mentions "fidelity to promises" as also serving such a 
function. I have already covered that virtue above.
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and large scales. On the small scale, we know that people who have been cheated 
tend to get angry and get even. On the large scale, we conld have riots or other 
mass disturbances if a group of individuals hsels it has been unfairly treated. From 
this fact it may be concluded that the virtue of being distributively just, if 
possessed by enough individuals, would have a salutary effect on keeping the 
social group in good working order.
Of course, this idea is consistent with everyone merely perceiving that 
things are justly distributed, and anyone who is only mildly cynical (or realistic) 
about politics realizes that the dissemination of propaganda that everything is 
fairly distributed can have a palliative effect, even though things are not fairly 
distributed. However, there is a deeper sense in which things actually being fairly 
distributed helps individuals to realize the human goods. For, in order to survive 
individually, to continue as a species, to enjoy life and avoid suffering, and to 
function well as a group individuals need food and other resources. We might 
understand distributive fairness then in the way that Marx did: 'to  each according 
to his need." However, this conflicts with another notion we associate with justice, 
namely, desert. We tend to think, as Aristotle did, that those who work harder or 
are more talented deserve more than those who work less hard or are less talented.
That we have conflicting ideas of what counts as justice in distribution is 
well known. It is part of the fuel for many of the political disputes between so- 
called liberals and conservatives. It could be the case, as Michael Walzer has 
argued, that there is no single principle of distributive j ustice, contrary to what
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theorists such as John Stuart Mill, Robert Nozick, and John Rawls have argued.^^ I 
will not here enter into these disputes. However, I have suggested how the virtue 
of justice, as fairness, could be justihed in NVE. Certainly, a treatise could be 
written spelling out exactly what fairness as a virtue is and how this virtue fits into 
NVE. Instead of mounting that perhaps monumental task, I want instead to turn to 
consideration of Aristotle's general justice, that is, the virtue associated with 
obeying just laws.
Laws are, of course, conventions. They are artifacts devised by human 
beings to compel or persuade human beings to behave in certain ways. For 
Aristotle, means more than merely statutes and common law, but also
includes customs. Aristotle recognized that laws or norms can have "indiSerent" 
things as their subject matter, or they can be about quite important things. They 
are artihces nonetheless. How then are they natural? And how would a naturalized 
virtue ethics deal with such entities? To begin answering this question, we must 
first think about two sorts of natural goodness.
33.2. Primary and secondary goodness
In explaining the difference in the sort of goodness that living things may
have and that similar sort which artifacts may have. Foot writes:
I think that this special category of goodness is easily overlooked; 
perhaps because we make so many evaluations of other kinds, as 
when we assess non-living things in the natural world, such as soil 
or weather, or again assess artifacts either made by humans as are 
houses and bridges, or made by animals as are the nests of birds and
Walzer 1983; Mill 1861, Nozick 1974, Rawls 1971.
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beavers' dams. But the goodness predicated in these latter cases, 
like goodness predicated to living things when they are evaluated in 
a relationship to members of species other than their own, is what I 
should like to call
Secondary goodness is that which we may attribute to soil or to weather, to
animals and plants that we use to satisfy our own purposes, and to artifacts. The
goodness in these latter sorts of cases is derivative because it depends on the
interests of animals, primarily human beings. These things are evaluated as good
or bad because they serve ends set by us, for example, as opposed to their own
ends, set by nature. Foot continues:
By contrast, "/zatwra/" which is attributable only to
living things themselves and to their parts, characteristics, and 
operations, is intrinsic or "autonomous" goodness in that it depends 
directly on the relation of an individual to the "life form" of its
59species.
The disagreement I have with Foot on this distinction is probably at root merely 
terminological. In the remainder of this section I will call attention to the 
terminological dispute and why I think Foot ought to be more generous in her use 
of the a<yective 'natural'. I will also point out the areas where I think she is dead- 
on in her account and the place where I think a casual reader could misunderstand 
her. Understanding the relationship between the teleology of living things and that 
of their artifacts will help us to understand the relation between virtue and law, to 
which I return in the final section.
Such good in these special cases Foot refers to as "natural" goodness. She 
perhaps demonstrates her reluctance to give it this name by her use of scare quotes
58 Foot 2001: 26; emphasis added.
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around the contentious word 'natural'. She should perhaps have used the term 
'primary' to distinguish only those sorts of teleological evaluations that apply to 
living things directly. But even with that use I am a little uncomfortable. The 
reason is as follows. While I agree that there are some kinds of evaluations of 
entities that are dependent on the interests of other living things, usually humans, I 
think it is misleading to call the primary goodness "natural," for that usage 
appears to imply that the other, secondary sort of goodness is somehow unnatural.
Consider the following function statements:
* The function of the human heart is to pump blood.
* A beaver slaps its tail in order to warn other beaveis of danger.
* Beavers build dams for shelter, among other things.
* Birds' wings serve the purpose of allowing most types of birds 
to fly.
* The purpose of nest-building in many species of birds is for the 
laying of their eggs.
* The function of a knife is to cut.
One thing to note is that these sorts of statements can be expressed using different 
locutions, e.g., '% is the function ofy ' or 'a  does 6 for the sake of c-ing' or ^  g  in 
order to A'. I will not dwell at this point on the subtleties that these different 
locutions might bring out. Each of these statements, conjoined with an appropriate 
statement of fact about a particular individual relative to the function, will elicit an 
evaluative judgment. If Sam's heart does not pump blood, then it is a bad or 
defective heart; if  my knife is made of cheese, it cannot cut, and so it is a bad
Foot 2001: 26-27; emphasis added.
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knife; and so on. Thus we can arrive at evaluations such as is a good heart% 
is a good knife% ' 2  is a good bird (of its species)', etc.
Foot is right to stress that some sorts of goodness and defect attributed to 
something relative to its perceived is derivative of the primary usage of that
sort of talk, namely, when it applies to parts and processes of living things. Such 
derivative cases are those where we say things such as "We've been having good 
weather lately" or "That is bad soil." When we make statements about the 
weather's having been good lately, we do not mean that the weather, gwa weather, 
has been serving its function. I would say unequivocally from a scientific 
perspective that the weather does not have a function. It does not have a 
neither is it goal-directed nor were its traits selected because they help its 
ancestors to survive. In short, weather does not have a form of life. Putting things 
that way underscores the absurdity in taking such claims literally. Of course, there 
is a strand in the history of human thought, a strand still very much in existence, 
which insists that the weather (fo&y have a proper function. We may construe that 
function as enabhng plants and animals to live, or as rewarding or punishing 
human beings who do what is against the will of God or some other great 
power(s). Of course, a belief in God or some sort of higher power is not necessary 
to underwrite the belief that the weather has a function, but such belief does help 
keep the latter &om sounding like a rather odd thing to say. I am, of course, not 
ruling out the existence of a feZoj, and hence a teleological explanation, for such 
things as the weather or the soil, that is, that the weather and the soil have 
characteristic ends. At this point I must confess agnosticism on the subject, though
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outside a theological context I find it difhcnlt to understand what the ends of 
weather and soil might be. What is important to keep in mind, though, is that NVE 
does not depend on the existence of such teleology. It was not necessary for 
Aristotle's ethical theory, and it is not necessary for contemporary variants of that 
theory.
This does not mean, however, that we cannot evaluate the weather or the 
soil using the logic of teleological explanations and evaluations. But to make the 
meaning of our utterances explicit, we must say what we think the weather or the 
soil is good for. Weather that is good for tropical plants will not be good for cacti, 
just as weather good for outdoor activities and sports may not be so good for 
growing lush green turf grass. Similarly, soil good for growing one kind of plant 
may not be good for growing another sort. I think there is nothing wrong with 
calling these sorts of evaluations "secondaiy" or "derivative," as long as we do not 
think of them as somehow un-natural. This terminology is warranted, I think, 
because weather and soil do not have characteristic ends toward which they tend, 
at least as far as our science now tells us.
Another important point that Foot brings out has to do with evaluations of 
one species relative to the interests of another. If we say, for example, "Rex is a 
good dog," what we mean by that utterance is equivocal. We may mean that Rex 
is a good dog dog, that is, a good specimen of that subspecies of canine. On 
the other hand, we may mean that Rex is a good watchdog, or that he comes when 
he is called, or that he is gentle around children. In each of those evaluations, Rex
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is being evaluated in terms of ends that are good for some human beings,^ not 
necessarily good for dogs dogs. This is not to say, however, that these ends 
might not coincide. Certainly, given the long-standing and almost symbiotic 
relationship between humans and dogs, it is reasonable to believe that our interests 
and theirs will oAen coincide. The point is that they need not. When we say things 
such as "He's a good dog" or "She's a good horse," to disambiguate our 
utterances we must speci:^ the comparison class relative to which we are 
considering the thing. That is, we must add something like the 'gwa' operator to 
indicate what sort of being we are evaluating the entity in question.^' A good 
horse horse may not be a good horse gwa racehorse nor gwa child's pet. An 
evaluation of something as good or bad relative to its perceived ends could change 
drastically depending on the class of functional entities relative to which we are 
evaluating it. The point Foot stresses, then, is good to keep in mind. Sometimes 
we evaluate plants and animals relative to our interests, that is, relative to the 
human form of life. But I think there is something wrong with calling these sorts 
of evaluations "secondary" or "derivative." Domesticating nonhuman animals is 
quite natural to humans, as is breeding and growing plants for food, clothing, and 
so forth.
Birds make nests, beavers build dams, ants construct vast catacombs, 
humans make knives and computers and nuclear warheads and clothing and on 
and on. Nest-building is natural to certain species of birds, e.g., robins, just as the
^  If Rex is a good watchdog, this fact will not be good for would-be burglars. 
Cf. Geach 1956.
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use of tools is natural to human beings. Moreover, besides tool use, various other 
things are natural to human beings. These include the use of language and abstract 
thought, the development of art and culture, the domestication of nonhuman 
animals, the use of promulgated rules and laws to modify and control behavior. 
One could extend this list greatly. The point I am making is that it becomes 
difficult, if not impossible, to separate off except in the abstract living things from 
what they do and what they make. Certain types of birds build nests. This is an 
important part of their life cycle, which is crucial for their survival and 
reproduction. Birds of the relevant species that do not or cannot build nests we 
may call defective. These nests have a function, a function that is intimately 
connected to the form of life of these types of birds. It seems odd to say that a 
certain bird's heart is defective because it will not do what hearts are supposed to 
do and that this defect is natural, but that its ill-built nest is somehow not naturally 
defective. If we are unwilling to see beavers' dams and birds' nests as in some 
sense not quite "natural" because they are artifacts of a sort, we must reject Foot's 
distinction between primary and secondary goodness. This is not to say that we 
cannot in aW racio separate off the parts and processes of living things &om the 
artifacts they produce. What I am contending is that the goodness or defect of 
artifacts is not quite so secondary or derivative as Foot seems to imply. Human 
beings human beings are tool-using and language-using creatures. The use of 
such artifacts form an integral part of the human life cycle.
Even though the goodness or defects of artifacts made by humans or 
nonhuman animals is in no sense un-natural, Foot's point has its merit, and should
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not be misunderstood. What we need to keep in mind in any particular case is 
what it is that we are evaluating. We can evaluate the nest that a bird has built as 
either good or defective, or we can evaluate that particular bird gwa nestbuilder. 
Certainly the quality of the nest gives us evidence to justify our evaluation of the 
bird. A bird of a nestbuilding species that builds bad nests we can call defective 
because of the bad nests it builds. According to Foot's terminology, our evaluation 
of the bird gwa member of its species exemplifies an instance of "natural" or 
primary goodness, while our evaluation of the nest nest exemplifies secondary 
goodness. Both nests and the nestbuilding behavior, whether learned or 
instinctual, have characteristic functions: they exist for the sake of something. The 
teZos of nests is a safe place for certain kinds of birds to lay their eggs and rear 
their young. The te/of of nestbuilding is nests. Both are natural, though the former 
is an artifact and the latter is not. This is the distinction that Foot wants to make.
The same sort of thing ought to go for human beings as well. Human 
beings make all sorts of things, all of which may reasonably be called "artifacts," 
but which diSer greatly. A law is very different &om a tractor; the stock market 
differs importantly from a tattoo. We can evaluate laws gna laws as we can 
evaluate lawmakers gwa lawmakers, etc. Interestingly, if we know its function, we 
can evaluate an artifact without refisrence to the person who made it, but we 
cannot evaluate the artisan without reference to what they make and have made.
To sum up, we can evaluate living things and the things they make using 
the same logic of evaluation, a logic that is teleological in structure. One mode of 
this sort of evaluation, which has to do with the evaluation of living things, their
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parts and processes, we may think of as primary. Another mode, which has to do 
with artifacts made by living things, we may think of as secondary. In the case of 
secondary normativity, the "good fbi'' aspect of the artifact in question ultimately 
comes to rest in the needs and interests of the creatures that make the artifact.
3.3.3. Laws in nature
We are now in a position to understand how laws, guu regulative
conventions of human behavior, can have a place in NVE. They are artifacts
designed to enable human beings to realize their characteristic ends. We see here a
substantial overlap with the thought of David Hume. In Section III of his
Concemmg tAe fnncÿ /ay  q/"AfbraAy entitled "Of Justice," Hume writes:
Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious 
and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be as natural 
as any thing that proceeds immediately hom original principles, 
without the intervention of thought or reflection. Though the rules 
of justice be they are not arAzfra/y. Nor is the expression
improper to call them q/"Autwe; if by natural we understand
what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean 
what is inseparable 6om the species.^
And in Book III of Tkeunje q/̂ JiAz/Mun Auture, section ii "Of Justice and
Injustice," Hume writes:
[T]he rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular 
state and condition, in which men are placed, and owe their origin 
and existence to that UTILITY, which results from their strict and 
regular observance. Reverse, in any considerable circumstance, the 
condition of men: Produce extreme abundance or extreme 
necessity: Implant in the human breast perfect moderation and 
humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice: By rendering justice
Treat/se, III, ii, I, 484; em phases in original.
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totally you thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend
its obligation upon mankind.^
Thus, the human condition as such has required us to formulate the laws that we
have. And these laws are just because they allow us to be good human beings; that
is, according to the lights of NVE, they provide the circumstances within which
we can realize our characteristic ends.^
Would just set of rules or laws do? In some cases, the answer is yes.
Take, for example, the traffic laws. That we must have laws regarding driving is
beyond question. But, for example, that a stop sign is red rather than blue is of no
real importance. These are those things about which we would be, in Aristotle's
word, indifferent. But once we have established the convention that stop signs will
be red we must stick to it. This point need not be labored. There are, however,
some laws that govern things about which we are not indifferent. Take, for
example, laws regarding the killing of another human being. In most cases, more
or less, we consider the killing of another person to be wrong, something 6om
which one should refrain.
NVE can account for both sorts of laws, the otherwise indifferent and the
intrinsically important. The former involve cases where we must have .yome law,
some regulative norm, though it matters not which we choose, as long as once we
have chosen we promulgate the law and stick to it. We need traffic laws, for
^  Enqu/ry, III. I, 23-24; em phases in original.
^  Hume's account of justice is subtle and requires an understanding of other aspects 
of his thought. Though above I am advocating a "Humean" account of laws, I cannot 
in good faith say it is Hume's account. For commentary on his account of justice, see  
Flew 1976, Cottle 1979, King 1981.
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people have cars and they drive them. Without such laws, driving may not be 
impossible, but it would be exceedingly dangerous. Given that we drive, and that 
we have come to depend upon driving to live our lives—for even in areas that 
have decent mass transportation systems there still must be traffic laws—our 
realizing our ends depends on their being promulgated, consistent traffic laws. 
Less needs to be said about laws regarding the killing of human beings. If anyone 
could kill anyone with impunity, this world would be much different.^^ In such a 
world human beings would have a hard time realizing their ends.
NVE provides us an account of laws and their naturalness and also 
provides us with a means of rationally criticizing those laws. Those laws that do 
not lay the foundations for human beings' realizing their characteristic ends are 
not good laws, just as a bird's nest that does not allow that bird to realize its ends 
is a bad nest. I think it goes without saying that we have yet to see a human 
society on this earth that had nothing but good laws. The source of law is 
multiform, with many of them designed not to enable all those subject to the law 
to realize their characteristic ends, but rather to allow a certain class to achieve 
tAeir ends, which often involve the continued consolidation of political power and 
accumulation of capital. Further, many laws are mere historical baggage, not well- 
serving any human ends, but only hanging around, as it were, and often doing 
more harm than good. There are obstacles to changing laws, obstacles that have 
themselves often been enshrined as laws. But with NVE we at least have a test of
^  We need not complicate matters by considering cases where states kill people, as 
in wars, genocides, or executions.
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law. Take any particular law. Does it, in its primary effect, enable those subject to 
it to realize the human ends or does it hinder that realization? If the latter, then it is 
not a good law and should be abandoned. Of course, in practice, things will be 
more difficult. That does not mean, of course, that the project is not worthwhile. 
To the contrary, as Spinoza says in the ultimate sentence of his ÆtAzcj, "All things 
excellent are as difficult as they are rare."
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4. METAETHICS
4.1 Facts and values
There is an alleged problem for anyone seeking to provide a naturalistic 
ethical theory: the so-called fact/value gap. This problem has loomed large in the 
literature since David Hume first raised the issue in his Treatise q/'JTz/man JVatnrg, 
the idea being further developed by G. E. Moore in fn n c ÿ in  However,
when philosophers refer to the "the fact/value gap," "the is/ought gap," or "the 
naturalistic fallacy," they may be alluding to any of a number of issues, which are 
not always distinguished hrom one another. There are actually at least Sve such 
"gaps" that have been brought up in the literature: the logical, the semantic, the 
epistemological, the motivational, and the ontological. It is perfectly legitimate, 
then, for the ethical naturalist when charged with having illegitimately "bridged"
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the fact/value gap to reply: "Which one?" The antagonist will then be obligated to 
say exactly which gap she has in mind. Once this question has been answered— 
assuming it can be—it will then be up to the ethical naturalist to show either that 
no such error has been committed or that there is no such error to be committed.
I group these hve issues together under the heading of "fact/value gaps" 
primarily for pedagogical reasons. Each of them is not, strictly speaking, some 
sort of gap that needs to be bridged. I could have as well called them "naturalistic 
fallacies," though the supposedly illicit breech involved in each is not strictly 
speaking a fallacy of reasoning. I group them together this way because they are 
usually seen as problems for ethical naturalism pgr f  g. If the ethical naturalist can 
provide no plausible response to these objections, then the naturalist project in 
ethics is stopped before it can even get started.^ This includes, of course, NVE. 
These fact/value gaps may be understood as follows.
1. 7%g /ogicaZ gap: value claims are not deducible &om nonvalue 
claims.
2. 7%g fg/nan/ic gap: value concepts are not definable in terms of 
nonvalue concepts.
 ̂ Hume 1739, III. 1.1, 469-470; Moore 1903, §§6-15.
 ̂In their "Toward a F/n de s/èc/e Ethics," Stephen Darwall, Allen Gibbard, and Peter 
Railton write: "Understanding the commitments of ordinary moral and value 
discourse and practice would appear to involve accounts of at least the following: the 
semantics of the language of morals and values; the apparent metaphysical status of 
moral properties or values; the apparent epistemology of morality or value theory; 
and the relation of morality or values to pmctical reasoning" (Darwall ef a/. 1992).
Any adequate ethical theory, whether a kind of ethical naturalism or not, must 
"bridge" or account for the semantic, the ontological, the epistemological, and the 
motivational "gaps."
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3. gap: value clmms are justiÊed in a way
diSerent &om the way in which nonvalue claims are justiGed.
4. 7%e moh'vatzoMa/ gap: values can motivate someone to act or 
give them reasons to act, while nonvalues cannot.
5. TTze onm/ogfcaZ gap: values are diGerent in kind Gom facts.
It would not be presumptuous to see Hume as subscribing to the logical, 
motivational, and epistemological gaps, and Moore as holding to the semantic, 
ontological, and epistemological, although neither put things quite this way. 
Several philosophers have tried to make the proper distinctions among the various 
issues. William Frankena wrote a seminal paper on the semantic gap—the 
supposedly illicit bridging of which is usually called "committing the naturalistic 
fallacy"—to which Moore first called attention. Frankena provides a tripartite 
taxonomy that includes the logical, the semantic, and the ontological gaps. Javier 
Rodriguez-Alcdzar, though mainly concerned with the epistemological, divides 
the fact/value gaps into four types. David Brink suggests a Gfth, the motivational 
gap, which he calls the "internalist is/ought gap," for perhaps obvious reasons. 
Ken Witkowski points out that the fact/value gap is a matter of̂  as he puts it, 
justiGcation.^ All of these gaps are, in some sense, inferential gaps. In suggesGng 
any such gap, one might say, "You can't get there Gom here," with the 
speciGcation of the iAere and the Aere deterrnining which gap one has in mind. In
 ̂Frankena 1939, Rodriguez-Alcazar 1996, Brink 1989, and Witkowski 1975. William 
Rottschaefer suggests another gap, which he associates with the genetic fallacy 
(Rottschaefer 1997). I think he has identified a variant of the epistemological gap.
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respect of these gaps, it is perfectly legitimate to ask what it is that antinaturalists 
want naturalists to do. Do they want us to bridge the gap in question, or show that 
there is none? Until they specify which gap they have in mind, the answer to that 
question will vary.
The question of an ontological gap the ethical naturalist may safely ignore 
for the time being. First, we need some evidence of such a gap. Then we need 
evidence that it is important in some way, so as to disallow, for example, values 
being motivating or able to Ggure into reasoning of various sorts. But there is no 
good reason to believe in an ontological gap without evidence.^ It just will not do 
to say that oAviowj/y ethical properties are different in kind from other, so-called 
natural properties. It must be shown. One way it might be shown is by showing 
that there is some other, unbridgeable gap. But until that is done, there is no good 
reason to claim that there is an ontological gap. And even if it is shown that there 
is another gap between facts and values, it must be shown how this makes a 
difference of a special sort. Amy naturalist may with a clear conscience assert that 
trees are ontologically different from airplanes, or that electrons are different in 
kind f-om elections, for by this it is meant only that these things are really 
different in important ways relative to the ways we carve things up conceptually, 
that is, ontologically. But none of these kinds is any more, or less, Mofwra/ than the 
others. The naturalist will attempt to give an account of things that is naturalistic, 
of course. Now, it may turn out that Hume was right, and that beliefs and desires 
belong to fundamentally different orders of being, because the latter are
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essentially motivating while the former are not. We may call this difference an 
ontological difference or a di@erence in kind. Bnt beliefs and desires are both 
natural phenomena. Or at least that is what minimal naturalism assumes until 
further evidence should lead us to revise our grounding assumptions. We have no 
a jcrzon reason to believe in an ontological gap. And for any ontological gap to be 
important it must be the case that the difference in kind between facts and values 
is so as to disallow some other desirable feature of an ethical theory.
The proponent of a motivational gap holds that values can motivate 
someone to act or give them reasons to act, while nonvalues cannot. The argument 
between internalists and externalists about reasons for action may be understood 
as a argument about whether there is a motivational gap. The externalist thinks 
there is, but that it can be bridged, for example, by desires. Many have seen this 
evidence in the "normativity" of values, a property that values supposedly possess 
and that nonvalues lack. If it could be shown that there is an important 
motivational gap, then, perhaps this would be evidence for an ontological gap 
between facts and values. After acknowledging that there is a real issue here, I 
have two brief points. First, given the prefect of this dissertation, this is not my 
problem. O f course, when all is said and done, this may be rAg problem of ethics. 
Second, others have dealt with this issue. ̂  These works are interesting and 
important, and I think that many of the insights and theoretical innovations could 
be integrated into NVE.
 ̂Cf. Swoyer 1999.
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In the remainder of this chapter I will deal with metaethical issues of logic, 
meaning and essence, and epistemology, which relate to the three remaining 
fact/value ''gaps." Discussion of the logical gap in §4.2 helps to set the stage and 
allows us to understand what exactly is at stake in the debates about fact/value 
gaps. We see in §4.3 that "bridging" the semantic gap involves providing a 
plausible account or definition of 'good' as used in such locutions as 'a  good 
human being'. Such a definition is possible for NVE, though not required. NVE 
gives a naturalistic account of a certain kind of goodness. It does not commit a 
"naturalistic fallacy," nor is it refuted by open question style arguments.
Confusion between the meaning of words and the essential properties of things is 
a mistake to be avoided. In §4.4 we look at the epistemology ofNVE. Among 
other things, we see that NVE faces no problems with an epistemological gap.
4.2. Logic
The logical fact/value gap proponent says that ethical propositions are not
deducible &om nonethical ones. In what is probably one of the most famous
passages in western philosophy, David Hume reports on an interesting observation
he has made about 'is' and 'ought':
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or 
makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I 
am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, iy, and ü  not, I meet with no proposition that is not
 ̂See, e.g., McDowell 1979, Smith 1994, Zagzebski 1996, Hursthouse 1999, and 
several of the essays in Danvall, Gibbard, and Railton 1997.
111
connected with an ougAf, or an Mot. This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this 
owgAi, or owgAf expresses some new relation or afBrmation, it 
is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the 
same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from 
others, which are entirely different h-om it. But as authors do not 
commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to 
the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would 
subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the 
distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations 
of objects, nor is perceived by reason.^
Philosophers influenced by Hume have assumed or argued for a kind of gap
between ü  and owgAt. There are two common interpretations of Hume's point
about is and owg/zi. The first, which we may call the narrow interpretation, is the
view that Hume is making a point about the difference only between is and owg/zi
and related variants; for example, on the "descriptive" side: are, Aas, in
short, any word or words that ascribe existence to some object or denote that an
object has some natural property; and, on the "normative" side: mztsi, jAonW, is
is in short, words that are supposed to tell us what we should
or should not do. Here the gap is between alleged factual judgments and those that
are alleged to be in some sense normative or action-guiding. What we may call the
broad interpretation takes Hume's point as being about a gap between not only
descriptive language and action-guiding language or concepts, but between fact
and value concepts construed more generally, or between all normative-evaluative
language and all factual language, for example, between if and goW or between is
and vi/mg. Commenting on the passage above, William Frankena suggests the
= Hume 1739, 111.1.1,469-470.
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broad interpretation: "Hume's point is that ethical conclusions cannot be drawn 
validly &om premises which are non-ethical."^ Many others have agreed with 
Frankena and understood Hume this way. I am not here particularly concerned 
with getting Hume exactly right, however, rather with whether what it is generally 
thought Hume meant is really true.
Consider the following argument:
(A) PI. a isF'.
C. Therefore, one ought to do something (e.g., about a).
An ethical naturalist may want to understand PI construed something like "a has 
natural property F". The proponent of the logical fact/value gap would say—or, 
hopefully, argue—that inference of this sort is aZwayj a mistake. There is
some sort of mistake, of course, but not an outright logical error. For, in terms of 
explicitly displayed logical validity, something is certainly wrong with arguments 
like (A). Yet it is not strictly speaking an error of logic; nor does it, as Frankena 
points out, have anything strictly speaking to do with the fact/value gap as 
discussed by Moore.^ The problem, such as it is, is that such arguments are 
enthymemes: in each case there is at least one missing or suppressed premise. 
Thus an argument like (A) could be corrected, and the violation of Hume's law 
avoided, merely by inserting, for example, the following premise:^
 ̂Frankena 1939: 467.
 ̂Or the naturalistic fallacy. Frankena 1939: 468.
 ̂The expression "Hume's law" originates with Hare 1952: 29; cf. Dodd and Stem- 
Gillett1995: 741-742, n8.
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P2. For any x, if  x is F, then one ought to do something.
Once this is done, arguments of type (A) are explicitly logically valid, and thus
involve no fallacy of logic. As Frankena says:
Thus [for example] the Epicurean inference from psychological to 
ethical hedonism is valid when the suppressed premise is added to 
the effect that what is sought by all men is good. Then the only 
question left is whether the premises are true.'°
Although Frankena considers as his example a move &om iy to gootf rather than
&om iy to the point is the same. What we have in the case of violations of
Hume's law is not a logical fallacy at all. One could avoid violating it just by
providing the suppressed premise(s) of one's argument. With such a schema we
can move 6om claims about what is the case to what is right or what is good, as
the case m aybe.''
I am not denying that there is a logical gap. I believe that the naturalist and 
the antinaturalist may agree on this point. They will disagree over the prospect of 
providing the appropriate bridge premises. The antinaturalist will say that they are 
not available; the naturalist will disagree. The way to bridge the logical fact/value 
gap and thereby avoid violating Hume's law is to provide the intervening premise 
or premises in an argument that moves from premises with only^ct-type
Frankena 1939: 468.
"  John Seade provides an example of this schema, which goes as follows. Suppose 
Jones verbally promised to pay Smith $5. By so doing, Jones placed himself under 
an obligation to pay Smith. If one is under an obligation to do something, then one 
ought to do it. Therefore, Jones ought to pay Smith the $5. Here we have descriptive 
premises leading from /s to duty to ought—that is, from purely descriptive premises 
to an evaluative conclusion. The example illustrates that the fact/value gap is neither
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vocabulary to a conclusion that is of the va/ne-type. A colorful example from 
Charles Pigden helps to drive home the main point here, which is actually about 
what he calls "the conservativeness of lo g ic ."Ju s t as one cannot validly deduce 
an 'ought' &om an 'is% one cannot validly deduce a conclusion about hedgehogs 
&om premises that make no mention of hedgehogs. This point is uncontroversial, 
or at least should be. Moreover, and more importantly, it does not automatically 
compel one to posit an is/hedgehog gap to explain this deductive impossibility. A 
question to ask now, then, is this: Why, if the alleged logical gulf separating i; and 
oMgAr is more or less the same as that between ÂF and has there been
such heated philosophical debate about the fact/value gap? What is the whole 
debate about? It would seem odd that so much ink would be spilt in philosophical 
ethics about the conservative nature of deductive logic. If the fact/value gap really 
is so trivial a thing, a good question to ask is why ethical philosophers have taken 
it so seriously. One answer is that there is more than one kind of fact/value gap.
We should note, moreover, that not all ethical reasoning is deductive. 
Perhaps all reasoning about what one ought to do is pretty much deductive in 
character, fallowing the rules of the practical syllogism. But there is no good 
reason, absent some evidence and argument, to believe that all reasoning about, 
say, what is good or what is virtuous is strictly deductive.'^ Concluding that x is 
good or that v is a virtue could be thought of as resulting &om inductive or
unbridgeable in principle nor, if Searle's argument is more or less correct, 
unbridgeable in fact. (Searle 1964).
Pigden 1991: 423-424. See Karmo 1988 for arguments that the logical fact/value 
gap may be bridged but only trivially; Maitzen 1998 offers a response to Karmo.
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abdüctive reasoning. I am not prepared to further develop this point here in detail, 
except to point out that it sounds reasonable given certain plausible naturalistic 
assumptions about method and ontology.''^ Most of the interesting things we know 
about nature we have gathered through a kind of method appropriate to the subject 
matter. Many, perhaps most, of our generalizations in this area, about the natural 
world, have been arrived at ultimately through some kind of ampliative inference, 
that is, an inference that adds something more to that with which we started. Once 
we have arrived at certain generalizations about nature, we may then deduce 
consequences &om them that admit of some kind of test, usually conceived of as 
"empirical" in some sense of that word. The test will involve some sort of direct 
or indirect observation. But we usually arrive at our hypotheses themselves 
differently than through deduction.
The sort of ethical naturalism represented by NVE is not in an 
underprivileged position with respect to the logical gap. It is a problem, as it were, 
for any ethical theory, whether naturalistic or not. Indeed, it is a problem that 
vexes all forms of reasoning. But paying careful attention to the logical gap shows 
us where the work needs to be done for bridging another important fact/value gap. 
The logical gap is the one case where the bridging metaphor is most apt. For, if we
Cf. Brink 1989: 169-170.
I say that these assumptions are "plausible," but that is probably true only if one is 
already committed to a certain form of naturalism. Such a naturalism actually entails 
these two assumptions, since in effect such a naturalism is composed of these 
principles. These ontological and epistemological principles would need some 
defending, however, even w^h/n a naturalistic framework. A certain kind of Quinean, 
fallibilist naturalism would maintain that no hypothesis is immune from revision, and 
this would include even our "first" principles. For, while these principles may guide
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are thinking in terms of an enthymeme, we may understand the suppressed or 
missing premise as a bridge premise connecting the hrst premise to the 
conclusion. The question facing the ethical naturalist, then, is what kind of 
premises to provide, and whether they are plausible. The naturalist, moreover, 
must provide premises that are in an important sense naturalistic.
What is the sort of enthymeme at issue in NVE?
(B) P 1. The of a human being is (p.
C. Therefore, a good human being is one who cps well.
This schema, as stated, leaves it open what cp is. However, I have already argued, 
following Hursthouse, that the of human beings comprises at least those 
four ends of social animals like ourselves. Though we have an idea what those 
ends are generally, what exactly constitutes them is an empirical question. That is, 
we discover by observation what the grgon or form of life for human beings is. 
Thus, PI is, though schematic, a paradigm factual claim. The premise that shall 
make (B) formally valid is, of course:
P2. For any F, if the g/^o/z of f s  is (p, then a good F  is one that cps well.
This is how, in NVE, we bridge one version of the logical gap. The inference 6om 
PI to C is made explicitly valid by adding in P2. But what sort of claim is P2 
supposed to be? That could be the deepest metaethical question specific to NVE.
our inquiry into what there is and why we ought to believe it, they may eventually 
have to be jettisoned given new evidence.
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Is it a definition? A factual claim? A value judgment? I am not right now prepared 
to say what sort of claim P2 is, except to note that it does the bridge work needed 
for the logical gap, so we have not violated Hume's law, if one wants to call it 
that. The main point to note is how little the existence of a logical gap shows in 
respect to the supposed impossibility o f naturalistic ethics. Due to the 
conservativeness of deductive logic, one cannot get out in a conclusion a concept 
that does not appear somewhere in a premise. Thus, there is as much an ü/bugAt 
gap as there is an gap. The logical gap can be bridged, though to do
so is trivial. The important question is whether the premises of the argument are 
true.
4.3. Meaning and essence
4.3.1. The naturalistic fallacy and the open question
Some have thought, and continue to think, that claims like P2, which 
explicitly contain value concepts, are themselves v^ue judgments of a special 
sort. In this special sort of value judgment, we are or giving the /MeuMzng
of value terms like 'good'. However, it is claimed, such dehnitions are illicit. To 
deGne an ethical term in terms of something nonethical is to commit the 
naturalistic fallacy.
To understand the so-called naturalistic fallacy and whether NVE runs into 
problems with it, we must first look at G. E. Moore's arguments for this semantic 
gap. The proponent of a semantic fact/value gap maintains that ethical concepts 
are not deSnable in terms of nonethical ones. Some think that the existence of
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such a gap precludes the availability of the right kinds of naturalistic bridge 
premise that would span the logical &ct/value gap. Thus, by ostensibly arguing for 
such a gap in jPnncÿia Æt/zzca, Moore delivered what many have considered the 
refutation of ethical naturalism. We will see that Moore's arguments are not a 
refutation of ethical naturalism. At the most, his discussion of the naturalistic 
fallacy and the open question expose mistakes that should be avoided, the most 
egregious of which Moore himself makes: the confusion of meaning and essence. 
In the remainder of this section I explicate Moore's views and briefly present the 
standard criticisms. In §4.3.2 I discuss the relevance of the issues raised by Moore 
to NVE.
Remarking on the question "What is good?" Moore writes: "this question, 
how 'good' is to be defined, is the most hmdamental question in all Ethics. That 
which is meant by 'good' is, in fact, except for its converse 'bad', the only simple 
object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics" (§5).'^ Moore is quick to point out 
that he is not concerned merely with how the word 'good' is commonly used, or 
how it is defined in the dictionary, but rather with what the word 'good' meu/is in 
a quite important sense: "What I want to discover is the nature of that object or 
idea" (§6). He notes that his answer to the motivating question "What is good?" 
may be a bit of a disappointment: "If I am asked 'What is good?' my answer is 
that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good 
to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined...." (§6). Moore maintains
References to P/Vnc/p/a Efh/ca are to section number rather than to page number, 
as numerous editions exist with different paginations.
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that 'good' is a simple notion like 'yellow': "jnst as you cannot, by any manner of 
means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you 
cannot explain what good is" (§7). This is the case because only complex notions 
can be defined, whereas simple ones cannot: "They are simply something which 
you think of or perceive" (§7), and thus cannot be explained— t̂heir nature 
conveyed in a definition— t̂o someone who cannot think of or perceive them. The 
notions referred to by the words 'good' and 'yellow' are "notions of that simple 
kind, out of which dehnitions are composed and with which the power of further 
defining ceases" (§7).
Again, Moore is not concerned with denying that there exists a merely 
verbal definition of 'good'. In fact, 'good' is not indefinable in this way (§8). The 
way in which 'good' is indefinable is in the sense of deGnition in terms of 
composition. In giving a definition, "[w]e may mean that a certain object, which 
we all of us know, is composed in a certain manner" (§8). We may be able to 
define 'horse' or 'donkey' in terms of their parts, "but there is nothing whatsoever 
which we could so substitute for good" (§8).^^ And, according to Moore, this is 
the most important kind of definition (§10). Moore sums up the point this way: 
'Good' is one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves 
incapable of deGnition, because they are the ultimate terms by reference to which 
whatever ü  capable of deGnition must be deGned (§10). Yellow cannot be deGned
There are no quote marks around this use of 'good', although there should be. 
Moore has a habit of ignoring use-mention distinctions, which perhaps leads him into 
or at least enables his primary error, that of confusing meaning and essence. See 
below.
120
by its "physical equivalent," i.e., the "light vibrations" that "stimulate the normal
eye" (§10), for that is not what we mean by 'yellow': "The most we are entitled to
say of those vibrations is that they are what corresponds in space to the yellow
which we actually perceive"(§ 10).
Yet, Moore contends, just such a mistake has been made about good. It
may be the case that there are other properties that correspond to good, properties
that all things good aüo have, just as certain vibrations of light correspond to
instances of yellow. One commits the /zatwa/ish'c/h/faey, says Moore, when one
identifies those properties that correspond to good with good itself (§10). What
makes the naturalistic fallacy "naturalistic" is that it involves confusing a natural
object with a nonnatural one:
If [the ethical naturalist] confuses 'good', which is not in the same 
sense a natural object, with any natural object whatever, then there 
is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its being made with 
regard to 'good' marks it as something quite specific, and this 
specihc mistake deserves a name because it is so common" (§12).
However, as Moore points out, it does not really matter what we call the mistake,
as long as we recognize it when we see it.
As a sort of test for exposing the naturalistic fallacy, Moore makes use of
what has come to be called the ppe/i argimienr: "whatever definition [of
'good'] be offered, it may be always asked, with significance, of the complex so
defined, whether it is itself good" (§13). Thus if someone says that pleasure is
good, it still may be meaningfully asked, "Is pleasure really good?" But with any
proposed definition of 'good' the question remains open whether the definiens
really ü  good. Thus, says Moore: "The mere fact that we understand very well
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what is meant by doubting it [e.g., that pleasure is good], shews clearly that we 
have two different notions before our minds" (§13). So, be concludes, 'good' 
cannot denote a complex, else the open question would not even be intelligible in 
such cases. Moreover, similar considerations lead us to reject that 'good' has no 
meaning at all. For then to ask "Is pleasure really good?" would be tantamount to 
asking "Is pleasure really pleasure?" (§ 13). But in such cases where one asks 
whether pleasure really is good, one is not asking whether pleasure is pleasure, or 
even whether it is pleasant. So, the open question here shows that 'good' is not 
meaningless.
Moore thinks he has shown that 'good' does not denote a complex nor is 
the word meaningless: "Our first conclusion as to the subject-matter of Ethics is, 
then, that there is a simple, indefinable, unanalyzable object of thought by 
reference to which it must be defined" (§15). Therefore, attempt to deSne 
'good' as some other, natural property is a mistake: the naturalistic fallacy. Moore 
believes that this fallacy is the primary reason why many naturalistic ethical 
theories have been accepted, as well as the reason—properly understood—for 
why they should be rejected.
Has Moore posed a serious threat to naturalistic projects in ethics? Many 
philosophers have thought not. Remarking on the naturalistic fallacy, Bernard 
Williams writes:
It is hard to think of any other widely used phrase in the history of 
philosophy that is such a spectacular misnomer. In the Grst place, it 
is not clear why those criticized were committing a fallacy (which is
122
a mistake in inference) as opposed to making what in Moore's view 
was an error, or else simply redefining a word/^
It is hard not to agree with Williams' assessment of the matter. The proponent of
naturalistic ethics could reject Moore's argument on several points. As Nicholas
Sturgeon notes, Moore makes two assumptions. First, given such an identity
statement as 'good = pleasure', the terms on each side of the identity statement
must be synonyms in order for the statement to be true.'^ Second, one may
demonstrate that any two terms are «of equivalent by utilizing the "open question"
strategy, the mere fact that we can doubt the statement showing that the terms are
not synonymous. Both of these assumptions are dubious.
First, there is the fact—important especially for certain kinds of
naturalist—that the analytic-synthetic distinction, which arguably includes
synonymy, has been called into doubt. For many it now carries much less weight
in argument than it did for Moore.^° This view is controversial. However, even if
we grant that some sort of synonymy is philosophically respectable, it appears that
Moore's criterion for synonymy is so strict as to rule out defining anything, and
further leads to the notorious "paradox of analysis."^^ His argument depends, as
Williams 1985:121. 
Sturgeon 1998.
Scheffler notes this problem as the second of Moore's "dubious assumptions," 
which is "that synonymy or intensional identity is a s/ne qua non of adequate 
definition" (Scheffler 1953: 464-465).
^  The literature on the analytic/synthetic distinction is voluminous. Quine 1951 is the 
/ocus c/ass/cus. Scheffler 1953 was the first, as  far as I know, to apply this objection 
to Moore's \4ews.
Frankena charges that the naturalistic fallacy as characterized by Moore is actually 
an instance of another sort of fallacy that Frankena calls the deW sf /a//acy, which is 
"the process of confusing or identifying two properties, of defining one property by 
another, or of substituting one property for another" (Frankena 1939: 471). As to the
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Gilbert Harman says, on an "arbitrarily narrowed conception of philosophical or 
scientific dehnition."^^ Such a concept of definition is so strict as to rule out 
definition. Given Moore's criterion of a successful conceptual analysis, either no 
such analysis at all is possible, or if an analysis is possible, and it is correct, then it 
amounts to a trivial tautology.^
Moreover, Moore characterizes naturalistic ethics as a very restricted, 
analytic-reductionistic kind of theory that no one has ever held. Such an ethical 
theory opts for some sort of property identification, for example, 'good = 
pleasure', as its m ^or explanatory But such is not the only
available option for naturalistic ethics. Moreover, contrary to what Moore thinks, 
nobody has ever thought that 'good' means 'pleasure' or even that pleasure is 
identical to good. What philosophers have thought, both naturalists and 
nonnaturalists, is that something important can be said about the nature or essence 
of goodness. Moore confuses meaning and essence, and sometimes takes meaning 
to be denotation or reference, both of which are mistakes that should be clear to all 
of us by now. Moore's confusion of meaning and essence, his primary mistake, is 
exemplified by his nonchalance about use-mention. Finally, it is unlikely that 
mere reflection on "open questions" could provide the sort of doubt that Moore 
thinks is readily available. Perhaps it could make us doubt that one word means
supposed "naturalistic" quality of the fallacy, Frankena contends that "the fallacy is 
always simply that two properties are being treated as one, and it is irrelevant, if it be 
the case, that one of them is naturai or non-ethical and the other non-natural or 
ethical" (Frankena 1939: 471).
^  Harman 1977: 19-20; cf. Darwall eta/. 1992: 115-116.
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the same as another, but could it make us doubt that water is H2O? It seems 
unlikely.
Given all the problems of Moore's analysis, a question to ask is why his 
open question argument and supposed naturalistic fallacy have been taken so 
seriously by philosophers. Some have argued that the influence of the open 
question argument lies in its bringing to light the curious nature of 
"normatiyity."^^ Another answer allows us to be more forgiving towards Moore. 
Many philosophers confused these issues of meaning, essence, and denotation 
around Moore's time. It is a clear sign of the progress philosophy of language has 
made since then that we find his mistakes rather obvious today. Philosophy of 
language has advanced so far since Moore's day that he seems rather absurd now. 
Moore, along with many esteemed others, thought that all necessary truths are 
analytic.^^ One of the morals of 20^ century philosophy of language is that there 
can be necessary truths that are not analytic.
43.2. The essence of goodness in NYE
Proponents ofNVE are not trying to give a dehnition of 'good' or any 
other evaluative or normative words. What is being proposed is an account of one 
mode of ethical discourse, which has as a part an account of what makes a living 
thing a good one of its kind. It is not the case that "a good F  is one that performs
^  For more on the paradox of analysis see  Black 1944, Fumerton 1983, and Sosa 
1983.
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 1995.
^  Putnam 2002.
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its well" is analytic. Nothing in what I have said depends upon giving this 
sort of definition of 'good'. The semantic gap is not our primary concern. That 
said, I think that if there exist thick concepts of the right sort, NVE can bridge the 
semantic g ^ .  Consider the possible nature of the bridge premises, that is, those 
premises that allow us to fill out the enthymemes in ethical arguments. There are a 
few possibilities here. The bridge premises could be:
1. IfTzoZ/y None of the bridge premises contain any
evaluative concepts whatsoever.
2. The bridge premises contain "thick"
concepts, which are special "hybrid" concepts.
3. cfaycnphvg, jome evu/uahvg. The bridge premises contain a 
mixture of descriptive and evaluative concepts.
I think option 3 may be closed to the ethical naturalist. It certainly is closed to one 
who wished to be a sort of semantic purist. Option 1 has been tried, though I do 
not believe it has fared well in the debates. It still seems to leave us stranded, not 
being able to get there &om here. This leaves us with 2 as a live option. Let us 
consider these thick concepts.
John Searle infamously "deduced" 6om zs through the use of the 
concept of a promise.^^ One ol^ection he considers to his "deduction" is that 
'promise' denotes not a descriptive but an evaluative concept. So, in effect, he has 
"smuggled" an evaluative concept into his superficially descriptive premises.
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"But," he says, "this objection ... begs the question and in the end will prove
disastrous to the original distinction between descriptive and ev a lu a t iv e ." I f  you
like, then," he concludes, "we have shown that 'promise' is an evaluative word,
but since it is also purely descriptive, we have really shown that the whole
distinction needs to be re-examined."^^
Searle's suggestion sounds more provocative than where he eventually
takes it. A related and more provocative statement comes 6om Bernard Williams.
In a discussion of the fact/value gap and the naturalistic fallacy, he says:
What has happened is that the theorists have brought the fact-value 
distinction to language rather than finding it revealed there. What 
they have found are a lot of those "thicker" or more specific ethical 
notions . . ., such as rreacAe/y a n d a n d  and
courage, which seem to express a union of fact and value. The way 
these notions are applied is determined by what the world is like 
(for instance, by how someone has behaved), and yet, at the same 
time, their application usually involves a certain valuation of the 
situation, of persons or actions. Moreover, they usually (though not 
necessarily directly) provide reasons for action.^^
Such thick concepts have usually been explained, Williams notes, by claiming that
these concepts are a complex of an evaluative concept and a descriptive concept.
Williams rejects this account. Recently, Hilary Pumam has further explored the
issue and come to similar conclusions, leading him to reject what he calls "the
fact/value dichotomy."^ I think that the concept of gygon may also be a thick
concept, as may the concepts of function and form of life. If  this is so, and if such
26Searle 1964.
Searle 1964: 49. 
^  Searle 1964: 58.
^  Putnam 2002
^  Williams 1985:129-130.
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concepts can be legitimately used in rational discourse, then NVE has no problem 
with a semantic gap. Nevertheless, the really important issue is not with meaning 
but with essence.
What is the essence of goodness in NVE? Among other things, naturalism 
in ethics involves adopting a certain sort of method, a way of proceeding in our 
investigation of the phenomena of ethics that is in some sense "natural." This 
method will involve, at least in part, the giving of definitions. But that will not be 
oZZ that it is, nor is it certain that the giving of definitions will be the most 
important part. Moore claims that how we define 'good' "is the most fundamental 
question in all Ethics" (§5). This is Moore's major mistake in method, and 
provides more evidence of his confusion between meaning and essence. We see 
from noting this confusion, Moore's primary mistake, that the issues surrounding 
a possible semantic gap are twofold. The antinaturalist may be claiming that one 
cannot give a definition of 'good'. To that we respond that we never said we were, 
though the possibility of how this could be done is shown above. On the other 
hand, the antinaturalist may be claiming that a naturalistic account of goodness 
cannot be given.
At the outset of Vzcomac/tean Aristotle provides what may be 
thought of as a naturalistic account of the good: "that at which everything aims."^^ 
If we think that the good is that at which things aim, we could say that the ends of 
organisms, set by nature, constitute their good. Moreover, one who actualizes
See, e.g., Sayre-McCord 1988a (Sayre-McCord 1988b: 288). 
^^/VE1094a2.
128
those ends, which make up the good for that sort of creature, is a good specimen 
of its kind/'' The proponent of NVE may contend that there is a necessary a 
posterior! identity between being-a-good-F and performing-the-ergon-of-Fs-well. 
The claim here, then, is that the identity involved is like that between water and 
Ĥ O or between genes and DNA strands rather than that between 'bachelor' and 
'unmarried male human'. The claim "water is H2O" is not properly called analytic, 
though it is necessarily true. Still, however, there may be a suspicion that I have 
provided an account of a kind of goodness not in factual terms, but in evaluative 
terms. This suspicion will arise because of the word 'well'. The question is 
whether when we say that some F  performs its ergon well we have thereby 
expressed an evaluative judgment. There is a sense in which claims like "That 
robin builds nests well" are evaluative. We could rephrase any such claim in the 
form of "That F  is good at (p-ing". But to say such a thing, even if it is a value 
judgment, is to state a /ac t about some entity. These claims are empirically 
verifiable; they are testable.
Certainly, Moore's open question could still be asked about this account: 
"If the e/gon of Fs is (p, is aii F  that (ps well a good F?" Let us fill in this form and 
see what sorts of answers we would give. Is a knife that cuts well a good knife? Is 
a robin that builds nests well a good robin? Is a heart that pumps blood well a
^  Note that it does not appear that we are speaking of the sam e sort of goodness in 
both cases. For the ends are, relative to each species, good because they are aimed 
at, while a good specimen of the kind is good because it has the attributes that 
enable actualization of the ends. It is with the latter sort of goodness, as it figures in 
individual evaluations of the traits of organisms, that NVE is primarily concerned.
How justify the ends themselves? How indeed!
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good heart? Is a human being who makes promises and keeps them a good human 
being? The answer to all these questions is yes/^ It would even seem quite odd to 
claim agnosticism about the proper replies to these questions. Sometimes 
questions are open only until they are answered. We may, with significance, ask 
whether someone who keeps his promises is a good human being, just as we may 
ask, with significance, whether water really is H2O. The answer we give to the 
former question depends upon our having investigated the human form of life to 
see what it requires, as the answer to the latter question requires a rudimentary 
knowledge of chemistry.
At this point, I remain agnostic about whether the concept of good in 'a 
good is reducible in any way, either definitionally or physically. I do think that 
an organism's performing the of its kind well is, as it were, physicalistic, 
though 1 do not know whether a m i c r o p h y s i c a l  reduction of perfbrming- 
its-gygoM-well in terms of other observable entities can be provided. It seems 
reduced enough as it is, at least for present purposes. However, proponents of 
NVE are not in any special difSculty here. For such a strong request for reduction 
in terms of microphysical properties endangers not just ethics but psychology as 
well. Scientists have so far been unable to give a reductive account of thought. If 
that is the case, and if the general principle holds, then there is an isAAougAr gap.
^  Of course, a person may make promises about things that are bad in other ways. 
Suppose Jones promised to kill an innocent person and kept his promise. We might 
say that he's a good promise-keeper but, all things considered, not a good human 
being. As Aristotle said, in only a slightly different context, "one swallow does not 
make a spring" (/VE 1098a20).
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But that does not seem right/^ The argument may be extended as well, I think, to 
biology and the other special sciences. Bmst Mayr provides a convincing case for 
the "autonomy" of biology.^^ His case rests primarily on the fact that biology 
deals with types of entity, namely organisms, which have special properties that 
inert matter does not have. However, biology deserves the right to be considered a 
science, despite the impossibility of its theoretical "reduction" to physics. 
Similarly, the lack of a reductive account of natural goodness is no reason to 
dismiss NVE as not naturalistic enough.
4.4. Epistemology
4.4.1. Justifying values generally
The important question here is not "How can we deduce an owgAr &om an 
iy?" or even the more general "How can we deduce values &om facts?" The 
question rather is "Is it possible to justify evaluative or normative claims without 
assuming anything normative or evaluative?"^^ A naturalist will here be faced 
with a problem only if  he assumes that all "ground level" concepts are non- 
normative/non-evaluative nwf there is no possible way to justify the latter with 
only the former. If such a justification cannot be accomplished, then such a 
naturalist will have a serious problem constructing an ethical theory. Proponents 
of an epistemological fact/value gap claim that there is an important difference 
between the way in which we justify our normative/evaluative claims and the way
^  This argument is provided by Sayre-McCord 1988a (Sayre-McCord 1988b: 258). 
^  Mayr 1998.
131
in which we justify our non-normative/non-evaluative claims. This leads to some 
further questions, such as: How do we justify our normative claims? How do we 
justify our non-normative claims? In the remainder of this section we will look at 
how we might generally go about justifying value claims. I show that there is no 
appreciable diSerence between the modes of reasoning in the ethical and 
nonethical cases, at least in the examples considered. In §4.4.2 I show specifically 
how NVE avoids any sort of epistemological gap.
Consider some examples and how we might justify certain sorts of claim. I 
say, "The cat is on the mat." You ask me to justify this claim. I respond by saying, 
"I just saw her there asleep." My justification comes Eom my having seen the cat 
and the background knowledge I have about the sleeping habits of felines. But 
what if you ask me at a later date, "Where's the cat?" And I respond, "She ought 
to be on the mat." This claim has the appearance of a normative claim.^^ But I 
would justify it exactly as I would ju s ti^  the previous claim, by appeal to what I 
had just seen and my background knowledge about felines. But it may be objected 
that this predictive or theoretical sense of 'ought' is not normative, as that 
category is usually understood. So what we have done is only shown that two 
descriptive claims are justified in more or less the same way.
Suppose you say to me, "I want to go to graduate school," and I say, "You 
ought to take the ORE." How do I justify my claim? I might say that if you don't 
take the GRE, then you cannot possibly go to graduate school, since the GRE is
Witkowski 1975, Allen 1972.
^  Allen 1972.
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required for admission. That is, taking the GRE is a necessary condition for 
getting into graduate school. I have justified the normative claim by appeal to 
what it takes to get into graduate school, that is, by appeal to the facts. Again, 
someone might object that such means-end types of claims are hot the usual sort 
of normative claim. For they merely give, in our example, necessary conditions 
that must be fulfilled to achieve some end. In other cases, they might prescribe the 
most efficient way to achieve some end, for example, "If you want to avoid heavy 
traffic, do not drive during rush hour." These types o f 'ought' claims are often 
called practical or prudential.^^ They are also often called hypothetical, for they 
depend on some prior condition's being met, and can be expressed in the form of 
iF-then statements.
What of other, less controversially morn/ normative claims, for example, 
"You ought not lie" or "You ought to be kind"? It is often said that such claims 
are categorical, as opposed to hypothetical. Of course, such claims could be 
expressed as the consequent of hypothetical claims: "If you don't want a bad 
reputation, then you ought not lie"; "If you want people to like you, then you 
ought to be kind." If  one proceeds in this fashion, then one reduces all moral 
claims to hypothetical claims.'^ If this is the case, then these claims will be 
justiGed the way other hypothetical claims are justiGed: by appeal to the facts. If 
moral claims are aU hypotheGcal claims, then the way they are jusGGed is the
^  Allen 1972.
^  Cf. Foot 1972, and the addendum added in Foot 1978.
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same as the way other hypothetical claims are justified. The question, then, is 
whether moral claims are actually all hypothetical claims.
How would we ju sti^  this claim: "If you don't want a bad reputation, then 
you ought not lie"? We would have to show that lying leads to a bad reputation. 
Does it? Well, only if one gets caught lying your getting caught becomes 
public knowledge. If that is the case, then the hypothetical is better expressed as 
"If you don't want a bad reputation, then you ought not get caught lying; and if 
you do get caught you ought to make sure it doesn't become public knowledge." 
But that does not sound like a moral claim; in fact, such a claim seems to be
to a moral outlook. Yet, it may be countered that the best way to avoid 
being caught in a he is not to lie. So, the original hypothetical claim stands. But, 
of course, if the person does not care about whether he has a bad reputation, then 
the antecedent is not satisfied, and so the consequent does not follow. Of course, 
people do care about their reputations, too much sometimes. And it seems 
reasonable that, if someone did not care at all about her reputation, she would 
have trouble getting on well in life.^^
It may be a psychological fact about human beings that each normal person 
desires to flourish, to be happy and to do well in life. In this sort of case morality 
is neither categorical nor hypothetical. Since everyone desires happiness, the
There are many subtleties I have glossed over here. There are people, e.g., rock 
and hip-hop artists, who cultivate a "bad" reputation in order to be successful. Others 
disregard their reputation in order to pursue some ideal of justice. To be virtuous one 
must be concerned with one's reputation, but not with honor for its own sake. The 
good human being will desire to be honored by the right people for the right reasons. 
The righteous might expect a bad reputation amongst the wicked.
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moral norms turn out to be hypothetical in form. However, the norms are not 
hypothetical in Kant's sense, because it is not up to you to want happiness or not. 
By nature we all want happiness.''^ You cannot opt out; thus the antecedent of the 
"hypothetical" is always satisfied. An ethical naturalist can say, then, that there is 
some "naturalistic" way that we can use to justify our normative/evaluative claims 
and that this method is more or less the same method we use to justify our non- 
normative/non-evaluative claims. Thus, there is no epistemological gap. A certain 
sort of naturalist virtue theorist will say that the way this process of justihcation is 
carried out is by appealing to certain facts about human nature and human 
flourishing.'*^ These facts may be discovered through the usual methods by which 
facts are discovered. As I have been developing the theory, NVE is not such a 
welfare-based ethical theory, though the teleological structure is parallel.
4.4.2. Justifying values in NVE
Although they do not say so explicitly, given their ethical views both 
Hume and Moore may be seen as subscribing to the existence of an 
epistemological gap. For, if the "derivation" of values from facts requires the 
addition of some affective state, as Hume maintains; or if values and facts are 
radically different in kind, the apprehension of the former requiring some special
Thomas Aquinas explicitly expresses such a view (Summa l-ll, Q. 5, Art. 8). I think 
it arguable whether Aristotle does.
^  Important issues are whether it is possible to specify what counts as human nature 
and human flourishing /ndependent/y of constructing a virtue ethical theoiy, or 
whether the facts discovered will themselves be non-normative or non-evaluative. Cf. 
Annas 1993: 136.
135
faculty of intuition, as Moore seems to think; then it stands to reason that the way 
in which we justify factual claims should differ hrom the way in which we 
"justify evaluative claims. The epistemological gap may come in stronger and 
weaker forms. The stronger form is the position that value claims are justified in a 
way different &om the way in which nonvalue, merely factual, claims are 
justified. I call this a type 1 epistemological gap. The weaker form, on the other 
hand, restricts the scope to the realm of values. The proponent of the type 2 
epistemological gap maintains that ethical value claims are justified in a way 
different from the way in which nonethical value claims are justified. In this 
section I argue that, in at least the general sort of case operative in NVE, there is 
no epistemological gap of type 2. Showing this also throws into question whether 
there is, in this general sort of case at least, a type 1 gap.
The crucial idea is that there is an identity between the logical structure 
underlying a certain class of nonethical evaluations of living organisms, human 
and nonhuman, and the logical structure underlying a certain class of ethical 
evaluations of human beings. As we have seen, a certain way of evaluating living 
things is consistent across domains—whether the organisms being evaluated are 
human or nonhuman and whether the evaluations are ethical or nonethical. By 
showing this we also show that, in this particular case, there is no epistemological 
gap.
Oak trees have the ends of development, survival, and reproduction. In 
order to actualize these ends, an oak tree needs a strong root system. From these 
specifications of the ends and the ways in which those ends are characteristically
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realized, which together partially make up the oak tree ergoM, we can derive the 
following norm: "A good oak tree is one with a strong root system." We can then 
apply this norm to individual oak trees and evaluate them gun oak tree. Such 
evaluations properly belong to the naturalistic discipline of botany. Similarly, the 
wolf form of life involves getting adequate nutrition, which requires hunting in 
packs. Specifying these aspects of the wolf gy^o/i, we can infer that a good wolf is 
one that hunts with the pack. A lone wolf, then, is a defective wolf Depending 
upon the source of the w olfs defect, this evaluation may belong to the naturalistic 
disciplines of animal physiology or ethology. We can apply the same sort of 
structure of evaluation to nonethical attributes of human beings, which include the 
merely physical functioning of each individual's body, its parts and processes. 
Thus, for example, we can evaluate an individual's heart as good or bad relative to 
how well it performs its function of circulating nutrients in the individual's body. 
We may also wish to evaluate the psychological aspects of human beings. If we 
are speaking of the merely physical aspects of human beings, the judgment 
belongs to physiology and medicine. If  we are speaking of the psychological 
aspects, it belongs to psychiatry.
In chapter 3 I showed how ethical evaluations fit into NVE. The sort of 
derivation we may go through in showing the necessity of our being able to count 
on one another in this way is identical to the sort of derivation we go through, for
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example, in showing that oak trees need a strong root system or that wolves need 
to hunt in packs.^
I have explicated the logical structure of a way in which we justify certain 
kinds of nonethical evaluations of nonhuman organisms. I have smuggled nothing 
normative or evaluative into the basic structure. That is, the evaluations are not 
there as but rather come out as Someone may, however,
contend that there is an evaluative claim smuggled into the argument. This is the 
claim: "For any kind of thing F  that has an if the ergo» of Fs is (p, then a 
good F  is one that cps well." Although this claim contains an evaluative element, 
the overall claim is not itself evaluative. It is, though, a certain kind of bridge 
principle.'*^ We may summarize the argument against the existence of a type 2 
epistemological fact/value gap as follows:
1. If there is a type 2 epistemological gap, then the way we justify ethical 
claims is different from the way we justify nonethical value claims.
2. But the logical structure underlying a certain class of ethical evaluations of 
human beings relative to their form of life is identical to the logical 
structure underlying a certain class of nonethical evaluations of human and 
nonhuman organisms relative to their forms of life.
3. Therefore, there is no type 2 epistemological gap.
44 Or that bees need stings; cf. Geach 1956. Note, moreover, that in addition to 
norms of evaluation we also can derive norms that may be action-guiding. This is a 
controversial and complex topic. Foot and Hursthouse, two of the most prominent 
advocates of naturalized virtue ethics, appear to differ on this issue; see Foot 2001 : 
52-65 and Hursthouse 1999: 194, 236-237.
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I have not tried to show that there is no difference between the way we come to 
factual judgments and the way we come to evaluative judgments, although I did 
call that into question above. I have shown, rather, that the logical structure 
underlying a certain kind of ethical value judgment is identical to the logical 
structure underlying a certain kind of nonethical value judgment. Underlying—or 
growMüfmg—both sorts of evaluations is a natural teleological structure. Recall the 
definition of ethical naturalism offered in chapter 1. It is the view that ethics is, 
somehow, grounded in natural facts, that is, in the rest of nature. NVE provides an 
account of that 'somehow'.
There are a few options available to the antinaturalist. Someone trying to 
defend the existence of an epistemological gap may suggest weakening the 
principle underlying belief in such a gap. The principle is, put bluntly, that m a/Z 
caggj the way in which we justify ethical claims is (fundamentally, radically) 
different horn the way in which we justify nonethical claims. The antinaturalist 
might suggest replacing the italicized words by 'in most cases' or 'in some cases' 
or perhaps 'in all but one sort of case'. The virtue ethical naturalist, however, 
should have no problem with this suggestion. For it does not touch anything so far 
said, as long as we are clear that the sort of teleological structure of evaluation just 
demonstrated is one case that the weakened principle of the epistemological gap 
leaves alone. This response, then, may be ignored.
Cf. Scott 1980.
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To consider a second reply the antinaturalist might attempt, let us return to 
oak trees for a moment. This will call attention to an interesting implication of the 
preceding demonstration and also allow me to challenge the antinaturahst's 
possible reply by confronting her with a dilemma. Say we have judged that a 
particular oak tree is a healthy oak tree, an evaluation arrived at by means of the 
logical structure discussed above along with certain facts about oak trees and 
about this particular oak tree. One way to think of this judgment is as a value 
judgment based upon certain factual judgments. If we think of our judgment in 
this way, given what has already been shown, there is no epistemological gap of 
type 2: certain ethical and nonethical value claims are justihed in the same way. 
But another way to think of this judgment is as a factual judgment based upon 
certain other factual judgments. If we think of our judgment in this second way, 
given what has already been shown, there is no epistemological gap of type 1 : 
certain value and nonvalue claims are justified in the same way.
A dilemma now con&onts the antinaturalist. In defending the 
antinaturalistic position against the onslaught just waged, the antinaturalist may 
decide upon one of a pair of argument strategies. It may be claimed that the 
evaluations of the parts and processes of plants and npnhuman animals and those 
of human dispositions of the will are either (a) all ethical or (b) all nonethical. If 
option (a) is taken, it must be shown, for example, that "x is a good tomato plant" 
is an ethical evaluation. That is a difBcult position to maintain, however. On the 
other hand, if option (b) is taken, it must be shown, for example, that "John is a 
good human being" is a nonethical evaluation. That position, however, is equally
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problematic. The claim "John is a good human being," where 'good' is understood 
as describing or attributing a property to some aspect of John's character, looks 
like a paradigmatic ethical claim. If the antinaturalist wishes to stand Grm in this 
way, it must be claimed either that our evaluations of plants and animals are 
ethical evaluations or that our evaluations of human beings' characters are 
nonethical evaluations.
We do not have to make such a choice, and I think to do so would be a 
mistake. But let us suppose that we have to take one or the other of the 
antinaturalist's proposed options. If is a good tomato plant" is a judgment we 
arrive at by analyzing certain biological facts about tomato plants and facts about 
a particular tomato plant it is an ethical evaluation, then we have arrived at an 
ethical evaluation through consideration of facts. In that case, there is no 
epistemological gap. And, if "John is a good human being" is a judgment we 
arrive at by analyzing certain facts about human beings and facts about John uncf it 
is not an ethical evaluation, then we have arrived at a nonethical evaluation 
through consideration of facts. In this case, it seems we just must have been 
mistaken when we called our evaluation of, say, John's ability to keep his word an 
gtAzoo/ evaluation. Again, as in the former case, there is no epistemological gap.
The proponent of an epistemological fact/value gap maintains that value 
claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. The existence of 
such a gap is supposed to spell the death of ethical naturalism. I have shown that 
NVE does not fall prey to this gap. There is a class of ethical judgments 
concerning human beings that are justified in a way logically identical to the way
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in which we justify a certain class of nonethical judgments about human and 
nonhuman organisms. This demonstration serves three important ends. First, it 
further lends plausibility to NVE. Second, it calls into question the very notion of 
an epistemological gap. Third, it con&onts antinaturalists with a difficult dilemma. 
NVE more than adequately deals with the epistemological issues. Its inferences 
about good human beings are justified in the same way as its inferences about 
good oak trees and good wolves.
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5. NATURE
In the preceding chapters I laid the groundwork for a naturalistic, neo- 
Aristotelian, teleological virtue ethics. According to this theory, naturalized virtue 
ethics or NVE, a good human being is one who possesses those character traits 
that either lead to or constitute the characteristic ends of human beings. This way 
of evaluating human beings is identical to the way we evaluate nonhuman 
organisms. I also answered some objections and, I hope, allayed some fears that 
one might have about certain metaethical issues surrounding the theory.
In this final chapter I will map a bit of the ethical-theoretic terrain, showing 
where NVE should be placed amongst other virtue theories. I also compare and 
contrast NVE with two other theories with which it might be confused: welfare- 
based virtue ethics (a kind of eudaimonism) and evolutionary ethics. Although 
NVE shares similarities with these theories, it is not identical to either.
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I will also consider NVE in relation to a well-established nonethical theoiy, 
the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. Some believe that the facts of evolution 
entail problems far ethical naturalism in general and in particular for teleological 
human nature theories like NVE. NVE assumes a continuity between human 
beings and the rest of nature. To say that is to say, among other things, that human 
beings are an evolved species. Some might think that the facts of evolution imply 
that aU humans are suboptimal or, worse, that there is no human nature. For most 
of the second half of this chapter I consider these issues and show that NVE is not 
threatened by the facts of evolution. Naturalized virtue ethics is consistent with 
biological science. In the 6nal section I make brief suggestions for further 
research.
5.1. Classifying NVE
5.1.1. Virtue ethics and virtue theory
What is virtue ethics? Some think that we can provide no simple answer to
that question. However, such a condition also conhonts deontology and
utilitarianism, virtue ethics' alleged theoretical rivals. Thus critics make an
untoward demand on proponents of virtue ethics. Hursthouse writes:
The demand that virtue ethics, unlike the two other approaches, 
should be able to state its position succinctly, in terms both 
sufficiently broad (or di^unctive?) to get all virtue ethicists in and 
sufficiently tight to keep all deontologists and utilitarians out, seems 




However, this inability to say exactly what virtues ethics is may be the case 
because, as Daniel Statman says, "The expression 'virtue theory' and 'virtue 
ethics' have been used in a rather broad and undefined sense."^ However, since 
the 1980s there has developed a growing consensus.
It is now something of a commonplace to list virtue ethics as an alternative 
to the two other predominant approaches to philosophical ethics, the utilitarian- 
consequentialist and the Kantian-deontological.^ It is said that, contrary to 
utilitarianism, which emphasizes the consequences of actions, and deontology, 
which emphasizes duties or rules, virtue ethics emphasizes the virtues, or human 
character.'^ Saying that a particular approach "emphasizes" a certain feature may 
be misleading, or as best less than informative. Depending upon the issues with 
which the utilitarian or deontologist Gnds herself concerned at a particular time, 
she may emphasize the virtues. For example, both Kant and Mill have quite a bit 
to say about the virtues.^ The important difference between these three views lies 
in the different reasons a proponent would provide to explain why the virtues are 
good to have, or why one ought to have them. The main difference, then, lies in
 ̂Statman 1997: 7.
 ̂Crisp 1996a, Hursthouse 1999.
 ̂" "Virtue ethics' is a term of art, initially introduced to distinguish an approach to 
normative ethics which emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to an 
approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or one which emphasizes 
the consequences of actions (utilitarianism)' (Hursthouse 1999:1).
 ̂Mill, Dfy/^anan/sm chs. 2, 4, and 5, pass/m. In §2.1.7 of the second Cnf/que, Kant 
writes: "This holiness of will is, however, a practical idea, which must necessarily 
serve as a type to which finite rational beings can only approximate indefinitely, and 
which the pure moral law, which is itself on this account called holy, constantly and 
rightly holds before their eyes. The utmost that finite practical reason can effect is to 
be certain of this indefinite progress of one's maxims and of their steady disposition
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how the virtues are justified, or as we may also put it, how their goodness is
explained. Deontologists will understand virtues as those traits that tend to cause
their possessor to produce right actions, with what counts as a right action left to
be determined by the particular theory. A Kantian, for example, would say that a
virtue is a trait that predisposes its possessor to perform those acts the maxim of
which may be universalized. That is why virtues are good. Utilitarians will
understand virtues as those traits that tend to cause their possessor to maximize
the good, with what counts as the good left to be determined by the particular
theory. For example, a certain sort of utilitarian desire theorist will say that a
virtue is a trait that predisposes its possessor to perform those acts that maximize
the satisfaction of her and everyone else's desires.^ That is the explanation for the
goodness of those traits and the reason we call them virtues.
In contrast to deontology and utilitarianism, in virtue ethics the virtues are
not justified in terms of right acts or outcomes of acts. The question, then, is how
they are justiGed. Statman writes:
The prevalent answer is that according to [virtue ethics] the virtues 
are justiGed in terms of their essential role in the wellbeing of the 
agent. Virtues are viewed as necessary conditions for, or as 
constituGve elements of, human Gourishing and wellbeing.
Understood in this manner, the primary concept in ethics would be 
that of human Gourishing, Gom which we could somehow derive 
the virtues, and then proceed to infer judgments about acGons.^
to advance. This is virtue.. ." I am, of course, ignoring subtleties in both Mill's and 
Kanfs thought. There are meant to illustrate a type of justification of the virtues.
 ̂Cf. Sumner 1996: ch. 5.
 ̂Statman 1997: 8.
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However, a dependence npon a teleological structure is not essential to virtue 
ethics. "What is essential," Statman says, "is the idea that aretaic judgments, i.e., 
judgments about character, are prior to deontic judgments, i.e., judgments about 
the rightness or wrongness of actions."^ The primary distinction is that between 
the direction of justification, which may be expressed in the form of a question: 
Are the virtues justified in terms of right action, or are right actions justified in 
terms of the virtues? Or, put another way: Which have evaluative priority, actions 
or character?
A virtue theory may be understood as a theory in which, as Statman puts it, 
"the basic judgments in ethics are judgments about character."^ However, this may 
rule out many theories that have been called virtue theories. To preserve a broader 
category, we may say that the priority of virtue is not a necessary condition of a 
theory's being called a virtue theory. Virtue theories may be classified in degrees 
of strength. The weakest form, according to Linda Zagzebski, "focuses on virtue, 
not because it maintains that the concept of virtue is more fundamental than the 
concept of right act, but because it contends that the concept of virtue offers the 
most useful cnYerioM for the rightness of an act."^° Michael Slote calls such 
theories Obviously, such a theory would be yhcze
consistent with either utilitarianism or deontology.
 ̂Statman 1997: 8.




As we move on to stronger versions of virtue ethics, we Gnd a
terminological dispute. This dispute concerns what counts as a "pure" virtue
theory. Roger Crisp understands a pure virtue theory as one in which "the only
reasons we ever have for acting or living in any way are grounded in the
virtues. Crisp cites Aristotle as one of the few such pure virtue ethicists. This
may seem odd to some, who are used to understanding Aristotle as having
grounded the goodness of the virtues in their contribution to ewffaz/Monm or the
good life for a human being. However, as Crisp and Slote point out:
Aristotle ... argued that the best life for a human being— 
eWazTMonm—consists in the exercise of the virtues (or the 
'excellences'). Indeed his is perhaps one of the most radical virtue 
ethics ever, since he can be understood to be saying that there is 
Mot/zmg worth having in life except the exercise of the virtues. This 
is the view which was taken up and developed by the Stoics.
According to the account offered by Crisp and Slote, Aristotle is a pure virWe
theorist as well as a quite radical one, perhaps the most radical ever. Statman
categorizes a pure or radical virtue ethics in more or less the same way.'^ Such
theories Slote calls "This type of theory," Zagzebski writes, "makes
the virtue, motivation, or other internal states of the agent ethically
Crisp 1996a: 7. He continues: "The fact that some way of life instantiates the 
virtues of justice, honesty, generosity, and so on constitutes the sole reason for 
pursuing it; and there is no reason to pursue any other kind of life." Although these 
may constitutes reasons for pursuing a certain kind of life, it is unclear that such 
considerations would appear in a kind of practical syllogism explaining or justifying a 
person's actions.
Crisp and Slote 1997: 2.
^''Statman 1997: 7n32.
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fundamental."'^ Included in this category would be the views of Martineau, Slote, 
and Zagzebski.'^
Zagzebski, however, has a din"erent, more inclusive notion of what counts 
as a pure virtue theory. She writes: "By a pure virtue theory I mean a theory that 
makes the concept of a right act derivative from the concept of a virtue or some 
inner state of a person that is a component of virtue."'^ According to Zagzebski, 
there are two kinds of pure virtue theory. First, there are good-based virtue ethics, 
in which the goodness of the virtues derives &om their relation to some other 
good. Slote calls such views ugent-pno/-. Zagzebski contends that Aristotle's 
theory is most "naturally interpreted" as this kind of virtue theory.'^ Also in this 
group would fall the theories of Hursthouse and Foot, as well as the neo- 
Aristotehan view advocated by Alasdair M acIntyre.Good-based theories would 
fall somewhere on the spectrum between merely agent-focused virtue ethics and 
agent-based virtue ethics.
A further distinction that may be made is between extreme and moderate 
virtue theories. In moderate virtue theories, all judgments of character are 
independent of judgments of acts, although at least some judgments of acts are
Zagzebski 1996: 80.
Martineau 1885, Slote 1995 and 2001, and Zagzebski 1996.
Zagzebski 1996: 79.
Slote 1995.
19 Zagzebski 1996: 80. The above foray into ways of classifying virtue theories leads 
us to a strange impasse concerning Aristotle's view, and by extension any theory 
that would call itself Aristotelian or perhaps even neo-Aristotelian. There important 
interpretive questions about how "radical" or "pure" Aristotle is in his virtue theory. It 
has been argued further that he is not really a virtue ethicist at all, the evidence being 
his remarks about some acts being, a s  it were, beyond the pale, e.g., adultery (see 
Santas 1993).
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independent of judgments of character. In extreme virtue theories, no judgment of 
an act is independent of judgments of character. If we subscribe to an extreme 
theory we have a pair of options when it comes to deontic concepts or language. 
Either we can use the language of acts ('obligatory', 'right', 'duty', and so on) but 
keep in mind that this language can be reduced to aretaic language, or we can get 
rid of the deontic language altogether.^^
Given the foregoing distinctions, we would classify NVE as a good-based 
ethical theory. NVE does not make the virtues t/zeoretica/fy fundamental, although 
for the purpose of evaluating individual human beings as good specimens of their 
kind the virtues are the marks for which we look. In NVE, then, the virtues are, in 
an important sense, etAzca/fy fundamental. It appears also that NVE is a moderate 
virtue ethics, for I am not claiming that no act can be ethically evaluated 
independent of considerations of the agent's character. Of course, we cannot 
evaluate a human being gwa human being without considering her character, since 
an individual's character, that suite of traits that we may call virtues or vices, is as 
it were the currency of evaluation in such cases. However, NVE would allow us to 
evaluate some act without knowing anything about the human being who 
performed it.^
^  Hursthouse 1999, Foot 2001, MacIntyre 1999; cf. MacIntyre 1981.
Statman 1997: 8-9.
^  This understanding of virtue ethics may appear to leave us with a problem. It 
seem s that we can bypass the virtues in making evaluative judgments and evaluate 
acts insofar as they contribute to the agent's species-specific ends. To avoid this 
problem, we need only show that the virtues are at least partially constitutive of our 
ends. See Hurka 1999; Oakley 1996 makes a similar point.
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I would like to note also that the mere fact that I call the theory naturalized 
virtue ethics is not meant to beg any questions. There are other versions of virtue 
ethics that warrant being called naturalistic but that are dissimilar in important 
ways &om NVE. For example, there are some other naturalistic virtue ethics that 
do not involve a theory of ethics.^^ And there are theories in which the of 
human beings is taken to be or happiness. I discuss this theory in the
next section.
Finally, rather than using the terms synonymously, however, we may make 
a distinction between virtue etAics and virtue iAeo/y. Roger Crisp suggests:
"Virtue theory is the area of enquiry concerned with the virtues in general; virtue 
ethics is narrower and prescriptive, and consists primarily in the advocacy of the 
virtues." '̂^ So, one may have a virtue theory without being a virtue ethicist. That 
is, one may have a theory of the virtues without advocating a thoroughgoing virtue 
approach to ethics. For example, Mih and Kant have theories of virtue, and more 
recently Julia Driver presents a consequentialist justification of the virtues.^^ 
Moreover, there are those like Bernard Williams, who advocates a virtue approach 
to evaluation but rejects the possibility of normative ethical theory.^^ Crisp's 
distinction has not become the norm for writers in philosophical ethics, however. 
Most philosophers, whether virtue ethicists or not, use the terms interchangeably.
^  Bernard Williams's view may be described as a naturaiized virtue ethics, but 
although he advocates a virtue approach he does not provide a theory of ethics. In 
fact, he does not seem to think such a thing possible (Williams 1985). However, cf. 




And although it may sometimes be a useful distinction, I have tended to use them 
interchangeably. I should stress, however, that NVE is a virtue etAzcj, for the 
virtues are advocated, insofar as being a good human being gun human being is 
advocated. If I were asked, "Should I be a good human being?" I would answer, 
"Yes, of course, and that requires that one have certain traits of character." NVE is 
also a virtue fAeo/y, in that it is an attempt to explain why certain traits are virtues, 
that is, which traits are the ones the possession of which make one a good human 
being.̂ ^
5.1.2. Eudaimonism
Some may mistake NVE for a kind of eudaimonism. William Prior defines 
such a view as follows:
Eudaimonism is the view that the fundamental intrinsic value in
ethics is the human good. In particular, eudaimonism is the view
^Williams 1985.
^  Martha Nussbaum contends that virtue ethics is a misleading category (Nussbaum 
1999). She argues that virtue ethics is not an alternative to utilitarianism and 
Kantianism, since the latter contain theories of virtue. As she sees it, the real 
difference amongst philosophers who are generally lumped together as "virtue 
ethicists” is the importance that they assign to reason. One group assigns great 
importance to reason. Nussbaum thinks it best to characterize the members of this 
group as anti-utilitarians. This group comprises Marcia Homiak, John McDowell, Iris 
Murdoch, Henry Richardson, Nancy Sherman, David Wiggins, and Nussbaum 
herself. Another group downplays the importance of reason. In this group Nussbaum 
includes Annette Baler, Simon Blackburn, Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, and 
Bernard Williams (Nussbaum 1999: 169). The members of this group, as one might 
expect, Nussbaum calls anti-Kantians. She concludes "that it is not helpful to speak 
of 'virtue ethics.' " We should, rather, try to understand "the substantive views of 
each thinker" (Nussbaum 1999: 163). I agree with Nussbaum that we should try to 
understand the thought of each thinker. We certainly should not call anyone a 'virtue 
ethicist" and believe that we have thereby understood their ethics. I still think the term 
useful, for the sorts of reasons provided above. For another brief yet interesting 
piece on problems in classifying theories see Korsgaard 1996b: footnote 20, 232- 
234.
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taken in some attempts to justify ethical conduct in terms of its 
contribution to an agent's own good/^
Eudaimonism is a kind of good-based theory in which the ultimate good is
Zagzebski calls such a theory a happiness-based virtue theory and
cites Hursthouse's view as an example.
We may conceive of a rather simple form of eudaimonism based upon a
list theory of w ellbeing .In  such a theory, what counts as a human being's
can be expressed in a list of certain kinds of goods, e.g., health,
achievement, social relationships, and pleasure. Those traits that tend to foster the
having of the goods on the list we may call virtues. This simple picture shows us a
clear case of a instrumentalist eudaimonism: there are goods that we should
realize and the means to those goods themselves count as good they are
means to the goods. This view is both teleological and consequentialist. On a
slightly more complicated picture, the virtues themselves would appear on the list
of goods. This would make certain traits not only instrumental to errckr/Mo/zm but
also constitutive of it. On this latter account, however, it becomes increasingly
difficult to call the theory consequentialist. Moreover, it may be the case that we
will want to count as consequences only states of affairs or outcomes. It may be
^  Prior 2001: 325, italics removed; cf. Crisp and Slote 1997: 8.
^  On one plausible understanding, we may call Mill's account of the virtues a 
happiness-based theory of the virtues, for his utilitarianism grounds the goodness of 
certain traits of character in the amount of happiness (utility) they tend to provide for 
the aggregate of those a#ected, a view Gary Watson calls character utilitarianism 
(Watson 1990). Cf. Mill 1861: ch. 4.
^  Zagzebski 1996: 79.
Hooker 1996.
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said that is not strictly speaking a state of affairs or outcome; rather it
is more of a process or activity. If we make that move, then strictly speaking this 
kind of eudaimonism is not a form of consequentiahsm. It is, nevertheless, a 
teleological theory. For there is a namely eWaimonzh, 6om which the 
virtues in some sense derive their goodness. Even if the virtues constitute
their goodness still derives hom their connection to that ultimate
good.
It would be a mistake to think that NVE is this kind of theory. This is not 
to say, however, that some proponents of theories like NVE are also eudaimonists. 
On Foot's view, it seems, 'eMcfazmo/ua' turns out to be the name that we give to 
the the set of ends of creatures hke us, while Hursthouse claims explicitly 
that the goodness of the virtues derives from their relation to 
Hursthouse's explanation of the goodness of those traits we call virtues is actually 
twofold. The Erst part o f her criterion of virtue states that the virtues make their 
possessor a good human being gwg human being. The second states that the 
virtues enable their possessor to be eud'az/Mon, to live a happy, Eourishing life. 
When Hursthouse speaks of the ends characteristic of human beings she speaks of 
them as ends. But when she discusses the claim that the virtues beneht their 
possessor, she quite naturally shifts to talking about ezzz&zz/Monzh as the end. This 
shift is easy for an Aristotelian to rnake. We End the same conEation in Aristotle.
But if that is so, then K/lill's theory cannot count as consequentialism, for he sees 
having certain traits of character as possibly constitutive of happiness (Mill 1861: ch. 
5). Again, we find a tension building in our taxonomy of ethical theories.
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I cannot in good faith maintain, however, that the ends of our form of life, 
those ends set by nature, whatever those might turn out to be, are identical to that 
good or set of goods we call ewAfoiTMOMza, wellbeing, or happiness. The ends of the 
human form of life include at least individual survival and continuance of the 
species, ends Hursthouse herself posits. Although the former would seem 
necessarily to be part of ewcfaiTMonza, and if not a part then a necessary 
precondition, there is no reason to believe absent some argument that the latter is 
part of eWaz/noMfa. Moreover, it may turn out to be the case that gWaz/no/zza is 
only one among several ends set by nature, ends towards which human beings 
naturally strive. It could be the case that a certain kind of psycho-physiological 
harmony is one of our ends, perhaps as a "characteristic ergoyment." Or it could 
be a necessary precondition, more or less, of an individual's consistently 
actualizing the other ends. These possibilities are certainly worth exploring. My 
point is simply that the ends set by nature for humans and our ezztfazmoMza or 
happiness are not necessarily identical. This is one of the reasons for my refusal to 
classify NVE as a kind of eudaimonism.
A further reason to reject the classification of NVE as a kind of 
eudaimonism is the generality of NVE, which to me is a crucial and interesting 
mark of its rightful claim to being called naturalistic. If we follow Aristotle, only 
human beings are capable of gWazmonza. As he says:
^  Foot 2001: 44. 81-98; Hursthouse 1999: 9-10, 167, 259-260, 264-265; cf. 
Hursthouse 1991, 1996.
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It is not surprising ... that we regard neither ox nor horse nor any 
other kind of animal as happy [eWai/nd/z], since none of them can 
share in this sort of activity [rational or virtuous activity]/'*
On Aristotle's account, since animals are incapable of a life of virtue, because it
necessarily involves reason, they are incapable of eWazmonw. If this is so, then
there can be no eudaimonist theory of other living beings besides human beings,
or other rational beings similarly situated. Some may call this a quibble. Fair
enough, but it is a quibble about philosophical terminology, and without precise
terminology we often will not understand our own thought. To say that other
creatures cannot be eWazmdn is not to say that nonhuman living beings are not
capable of their characteristic flourishing or that nothing counts as their wellbeing
or wel&re or doing well. But in keeping with my understanding of the tradition I
believe it best to reserve usage of and its adjectival variants for
human happiness, though saying what that is has not proven so simple. Thus, the
expression 'human eWai/nonia' wiU be redundant and 'nonhuman eWnzmonm'
oxymoronic, except for those yet undiscovered species (perhaps extraterrestrial)
whose members might be similarly situated as we are. We can still talk about the
"wellbeing" of nonhuman living things, though we shall not call it
Before ending the discussion, I must say a bit more about terminology.
Elizabeth Anscombe was probably the first to use the tem 'flourishing', and it has
been adopted by many working in virtue e th ic s . 'T o  flourish' originally meant
^  A/E 1199b32. Also, at /VE1178b24ff Aristotle argues that nonhuman animals 
cannot be happy (euda/mor?) because they cannot engage in the life of study; 
presumably such a life for nonanimals would also be so precluded.
^  Anscombe 1958; see  Hurka 1999.
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'to  Êower," and now may mean "to grow linmriantiy and "to thrive." It may also 
mean "to achieve success" or "to prosper."^^ The notion of growth and 
development is operative here, but also doing so well. We may also take 
'flourishing' here to mean achieving one's ends or goals. Many also use 
'flourishing' as a noun, synonymous with, mfer a/m, 'welfare', 'wellbeing', 
'living a/the good life', and 'eudb/moMm'. I think that the term should not be used 
to mean the same as for the reasons cited above. Plants may
flourish, but they cannot be eWa/môn. Moreover, flourishing, in the sense of 
growing and developing well, is an end of all living beings. It is not, however, 
identical to the set of ends, nor should we use the word to mean that.
5.2. NVE and neo-Darwinism
5.2.1. Our place
NVE is, to an important extent, biological. It is biological not in a strict 
scientific sense, but in the sense that we appeal to the form of life of a species in 
grounding our norms about that species. It is thus 6/o-logical. It partakes 
essentially of the /ogof of life.
Human beings are a kind of animal that lives on a small planet in the 
comer of a medium-sized galaxy in the midst of a veiy large universe. Human 
beings live on this planet called Earth in various terrestrial environments. "Man" 
does not just have a place in nature: we are nature. Not only are we creatures 
susceptible to the vicissitudes of the environments in which we make our way, but
^  OEO.
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we are also ourselves environments and parts of environments for other creatures. 
The continuity of human beings and nature is a fundamental assumption of 
naturalism.^^ The distinction between the "artihcial" creations of humans and the 
"natural" creations of other plants and animals has its roots in a collective illusion 
under which almost all of us dwell, except perhaps when at our most reflective. 
This collective illusion is that humans are different hom nature—and not just 
different in degree hrom the "lesser" animals, but different in in some way 
that, for lack of a better term, we might call met^hysical. That said, there is 
perhaps a basis of truth in niany illusions. Human beings have some phenotypic 
traits that, as far as we know, are not shared by the other animals. One of our 
special traits allows us to reflect and to theorize.
The overwhelming m^ority of scientists who work in the relevant fields 
accept the following account, at least in broad outline. This is not to say that there 
are not details about which scientists can and do argue. There will always be room 
for further discovery of facts about human beings until our science and our 
philosophy are at an end.^  ̂The fhcts, as we know them, are provided by fossils, 
archeological finds (tools, etc.), and DNA of contemporary humans.^^ The 
theories, as we have them, are based on those data and are attempts to explain
See Chapter 1 of this work; cf. Romanell 1958.
^  As of my writing this an important fossil find may significantly push back the 
supposed date for the divergence of the hominid line from the other primates, a 
divergence which eventually resulted in the evolution of H. s. sap/ens. Another recent 
find further underscores the "bushiness" of the human family tree. Since the theory 
here is so greatly underdetermined by the data, it seem s reasonable (absent some 
sort of divine revelation) that the who/e story will never be known to us.
^  Poirier and McKee 1999 is my source for information here, though any current 
textbook on evolutionary anthropology would do as well.
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them. In the nsual Lirmaean taxonomic scheme, human beings are of the kingdom 
animalia, the phylum chordata, the class mammalia, the order piimata, the family 
hominidae, the genus and the species To diSerentiate modem
humans from our more immediate ancestors, our subspecies is indicated by adding 
another 'sapiens' to the binomial nomenclature, making us 
Apparently, Æ j. .sopignj has been here for some time, at least by human historical 
standards. The oldest discovered evidence dates to approximately the Late 
Pleistocene of 120,000 years ago. Presumably, we got here—/zere in the sense of 
"this place and time" as well as Aere in the sense of "the way we are"—in more or 
less the very way in which all the other organisms did. We evoZvec/. The 'we' here 
becomes a bit slippery, however, for as currently understood the evolutionary 
process is a very slow and gradual process.'*^ It is then at least difficult and 
probably impossible to say when we became us. The breakdown of the language 
here calls attention to this difficulty. Importantly, we are related not only by 
common descent to the plants, animals, fungi, et a/., but also by common design. I 
use the term 'design' guardedly, mainly because I do not want to beg any 
questions as to the source of the teleology that living things exemplify. However, 
our best naturalistic explanation of the diversity and functionality of living things 
is provided by Darwin's theory of natural selection.
Modem evolutionary theory provides us with the &amework for 
understanding natural teleology. The neo-Darwinian theory of evolution by
^  Even if we accept some version of "punctuated equilibrium" theory, we are still 
talking about geologic time frames: hundreds of thousands to millions of years.
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natural selection is the best scientiGc account we have of the origins of functional 
complexity and biodiversity in living things.'*  ̂Natural selection is the m ^or force 
in evolution and, as far as we know, the only force than can account for 
adaptation. Basically, all that is needed for the process of natural selection to take 
place is for there to be genetic variation in a population, variation that leads to 
differential reproduction of the variants. It is that simple. Crucial to evolution by 
natural selection, and hence the evolution of sophisticated goal-directed living 
systems, is this notion of differential reproduction of genotypes. Even though 
survival is also important to an extent, it is really survival in the service of 
reproduction that really counts. That is why summing up Darwin's theory as 
"survival of the fittest" is misleading, and not just because the phase seems 
tautological.^^
A question then is how a naturalistic ethical theory like NVE fits in with 
the neo-Darwinian theory. In the next section I consider some possible relations. 
First, in §5.2.2 I examine and answer in the negative the question whether NVE 
ought to be considered a kind of evolutionary ethics. In §§5.2.3 and 5.2.4 I look at 
two sorts of objections based on considerations inspired by evolutionary biology 
that might be leveled at NVE. I show that these are no real objections.
It may be false, of course, and a true naturalist will admit as much. But for now it is 
our best explanation. Moreover, it may not be true and still be a good scientific 
theory. If that is the case, we can accept it without believing in it. This is a view 
advocated by van Fraassen 2002.
The expression 'survival of the fittest', which originated not with Darwin but with 
Herbert Spencer, is in effect a kind of tautology. However, the theory of evolution by
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5.2.2. Evolutionary ethics
Given the explanatory power and success of neo-Darwinian theory, we 
might think that evolutionary biology could contribute significantly to our 
understanding of ethics. There are at least three possible contributions that 
evolutionary biology might make.'*  ̂First, it could play a descriptive or 
explanatory role. For example, facts and theories of evolutionary biology might 
help us to explain why human beings make the kinds of ethical judgments that 
they do.'^ Second, it could help us to answer important metaethical questions. For 
example, considerations of evolutionary biology might tell us whether ethics has 
an objective fbundation.^^ Finally, it could settle important normative questions, or 
even be the source of norms. That is, evolutionary biology might tell us, for 
example, what sort of human being one ought to be. It is the last, normative sort of 
view that is generally meant by 'evolutionary ethics'.'*^ This project may involve 
first giving an account of goodness that has some sort of essential re&rence to the
natural selection is not. See Mills and Beatty 1979 for an influential and 
nontautological account of biological fitness.
^  Philip Kitcher presents a similar taxonomy but that also includes a fourth possible 
contribution of evolutionary biology to ethics, that evolutionary biology can teach us 
facts about human beings that in conjunction with accepted moral principles can be 
used to derive norms not appreciated previously (Kitcher 1985: 417-418). Although 
worth thinking about, this does not seem  to be a special contribution that 
evolutionary biology could make to philosophical ethics that would warrant calling the 
results an evolutionary ethics.
See, e.g., Wilson 1978, Cosmides 1989, Cosmides and Tooby 1992.
'^Cf. Ruse 1986, 1991.
For more on the possible contributions of evolutionary biology to our 
understanding of ethics, pro and con, see, e.g.. Darwin 1874, Huxley 1893, Ruse 
1986 and 1991, Bowler 1989, Gewirth 1993, Farber 1994, Ayala 1995, Rottschaefer 
1997, Petrinovich 1998, Lemos 1999 and 2001, Richards 1999, van der Steen 1999, 
Woolcock 1999.
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findings and theories of evolutionary biology, for example, that biological htness 
is good or rAe good. The evolutionary ethicist must then explain why human 
beings ought to be good, somehow in evolutionary, neo-Darwinian terms, perhaps 
in terms of what human beings naturally desire. This popular way of 
understanding evolutionary ethics should demonstrate the structural similarities to 
NVE. This sort of evolutionary ethics is obviously a teleological theory. An 
evolutionary ethicist would understand genetic proliferation, or biological htness, 
as the My primary criticism of normative evolutionary ethical theories, and 
where they tend to diverge from NVE most importantly, is that they too narrowly 
circumscribe the tg/oj of humans beings.
A proper understanding of biological evolution is required for a proper 
understanding of human nature. It follows that a proper understanding of 
evolution is necessary for a proper understanding of NVE, since NVE depends on 
there being a naturalistic account of human nature. However, I do not think, unlike 
the "narrow'' evolutionary ethicist just sketched, that understanding how we got to 
be the way we are and why has eve/yf/zmg to do with understanding our nature. 
Although individual survival and continuance of the species are natural ends of 
creatures like us, they are not the only ends. Thus, despite structural similarities, 
NVE should not be confused with evolutionary ethics.
Returning to the tripartite taxonomy of possible contributions of 
evolutionary biology to ethics sketched above, I think that evolutionary biology 
can shed light on the scientific question of why we think that a human being with 
certain traits is a good human being. That is, evolutionary biology might be able to
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tell us why NVE is the logic of our evaluations. Evolutionary biology may also be 
the key to metaethics, though about such questions I am less sure. Nonetheless, it 
could be the case that, even though there are many proximate ends, there is in fact 
only one ultimate end, which is, in Dawkins's term, "total genetic proliferation.""*^ 
The ultimate end may be that vanishing point where the normative and the 
descriptive collapse into each other, about which nothing further can be said as far 
as evaluation is concerned. Even given the possibility that biological fitness is, 
alas, the final end, I will not concede that NVE is an evolutionary ethics of the 
prescriptive sort. Biological fimess, like eWoimonm, is one of the possible ends of 
creatures like us, but not the only by which we will be evaluated in NVE.
5.2.4. Happiness and optimality
Some hold that neo-Darwinism raises insurmountable challenges to 
theories like NVE. Bernard Williams, for example, argues that considerations 
inspired by neo-Darwinism pose significant problems for or are at least "largely 
discouraging" to such projects. The first reason is "at the more particular and 
factual level":
"[Tjhe most plausible stories now available about [human] 
evolution, including its very recent date and also certain 
considerations about the physical characteristics of the species, 
suggests that human beings are to some degree a mess, and that the 
rapid and immense development of symbolic and cultural capacities 
has left humans as beings for which no form of life is likely to 




Evolutionary biology implies that humans are an evolved "mess" for whom no life 
will be "satisfactory." Williams provides three considerations in support of this 
claim. First, there is the recent date of our evolution. Second, there are certain 
considerations about our physical characteristics. Finally, there is the speed and 
greatness of our symbolic and cultural development. Let us examine the possible 
evidence for these claims and whether if true they could pose a threat to NVE.
Although he cites none of the evolutionary biology literature to support the 
idea that the recent date of our evolution makes us a mess and incapable of a 
satisfactory life, Williams may be understood as appealing to a claim made by 
some evolutionary psychologists, which amounts roughly to the following. 
fopze/zf spent most of their evolutionary history in a hunter-gatherer type 
environment, so they are best adapted to environments similar to those. However, 
we have reshaped our environment so quickly that we have not had enough time 
to sufficiently adapt to the new conditions. "Our modem skulls house a Stone Age 
mind," is a saying often invokerL*^ So, we are ill-fitted for modem life. The 
development of language and other means of non-genetic learning would perhaps 
further the difficulties, as would the development of various technologies and 
different ways of living together.
What about the physical characteristics of human beings, from an 
evolutionary perspective, that would render our lives less than "satisfactory"? The
^  "The environment that humans—and, therefore, human m/nds—evolved in was 
very different from our modem environment. Our ancestors spent well over 99% of 
our species' evolutionary history iiving in hunter-gatherer societies" (Cosmides and 
Tooby, no date). Cf. the introduction and essays in Barkow ef a/. 1992.
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primary process by which evolution occurs is by means of natural selection of 
variants in a population. Initially such variants come to be present due to more or 
less random processes, usually genetic drift and random mutation, and more 
determinate ones like the crossing over of chromosomes during reproduction. 
Natural selection is a nonrandom process acting on the above randomness, and is 
the only known mechanism by which complex functionality of some sort can 
come to characterize a species. It is well to think of natural selection not as an 
"optimizer" but, in Francois Jacob's apt phrase, as a "tinkerer."^ It works with 
what it has, but never looks ahead. Moreover, there are always more or less 
chance events that happen, events which could wipe out the "fittest" and leave 
standing those "less 6t" in the population to carry on the species. Given that this is 
the way evolution works, it may be fitting to call humans, as Williams does in 
another essay, "an ill-assorted Wco/uge of powers and instincts. And there are 
other reasons to think this. For example, there is what is called gene linkage, 
where some phenotypic traits "tag along" with others simply because of the 
closeness on the chromosomes of the genes that cause the traits. One of the traits 
in such a pair may be very good for survival and reproduction, whereas the other 
may be neutral or even bad in some way. Yet the neutral or bad trait persists in the 
population, as long as the "badness" of the trait does not reduce an organism's 
fitness too much, that is, more than the compensating gain hom the good trait. 
There is also pleiotropy, where a gene causes more than one trait, one of which
^  Jacob 1977.
Williams 1995a, cited in Hursthouse 1999: 256.
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may enhance fitness, while the other is neutral or has negative fitness 
consequences/^ So, there is some evidence that humans might be cobbled together 
and also have inherent conflicts built into their nature.
Is there a response to this charge? We could begin by asking what is meant 
by a "satisfactory^' life. We could have a subjective or an objective reading of 
'satisfactory'. One way to understand the claim that no life will ever prove 
satisfactory is that we have no chance, individually or socially, of being happy. 
This is, of course, not a problem for NVE, since the theory makes no assumptions 
about the possibility of human happiness. But the claim may be that optimality is 
impossible for creatures like us, because of how we evolved. If NVE is 
understood as requiring a sort of optimality and optimality is impossible for us, 
then NVE has a problem. Yet NVE does not require optimahty. But on another 
sort of objective reading of 'satisfactory', there may be a problem for NVE. We 
may take the claim that no one can have a satisfactory life to mean that, because 
of how we evolved, no human being can be a good specimen of the kind.
However, that claim sounds close to ludicrous.
Many evolutionary psychologists make the Stone Age mind claim, but it 
can be questioned whether the claim is justified. There was a long history of 
evolution we got to the hunter-gatherer stage. There is also some evidence 
that we have evolved s'lnce the Pleistocene era.^  ̂The Stone Age mind hypothesis
^  See, e.g., Futuyma 1998.
^  For example, there is evidence of a relatively recent evolution of lactose tolerance 
(Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza 1989) and of different "racial" characteristics (Nitecki 
and Nitecki 1994).
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is to some a dogma, to some a shibboleth. Some seem to understand the claim as a 
ù f e methodological assumption that a suggests certain kinds of 
hypotheses and rules out others. The claim itself is not tested directly, nor can it 
be. However, it is, in effect, an empirical question just how much of our present 
brains and nervous systems are Stone Age and also what difference it makes in the 
current environment of̂  say, Manhattan, Sioux City, Baghdad, or Nairobi. A more 
general way to understand the claim is as a consequence of the claim that there is 
a sort of "time lag" in evolution. Roughly, species are always adapted to the 
environment that came before the current one. This poses no problem if 
environments remain stable for long periods of time, so that the species can catch 
up, so to speak. However, if the environment changes dramatically, then a whole 
species may be maladapted.
There may be good reason to think that .yopien.; ' particular version 
of the time lag is very important for us. Our Stone Age mind encounters many 
strange adaptive challenges that its forbears did not. And given how evolution 
works, we may have sufficient warrant for describing humans as "an ill-assorted 
of powers and instincts." And we certainly are subject to constraints.
For example, our spines are notoriously ill-suited for upright posture. And there 
are no doubt pleiotropic and other genetic effects that might render us suboptimal. 
That is the human condition. But it is no more true of us than of any other species 
that has evolved on the planet. Certainly, given our relative complexity and our 
capacities for rational deliberation and imagination, there may be more ways for 
us to go wrong. Surely no other species besides us has yet been on the brink of
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nuclear holocaust. However, it does not follow &om the fact that all living things 
evolved through certain processes or have certain historical and mechanical 
constraints that there is no characteristic way for animals and plants to go on, that 
is, that there is no form of life for different species. In fact, those characteristic 
ways of going on are the cüru of much of biological science, phenomena that 
evolutionary biology can help to explain.^ And we can, once we have identified 
the ends of a species and its ways, evaluate a member of that species.
5.2.4. Teleology revisited
Williams notes a second, "more general" reason for teleological ethical
naturalists to be discouraged by Darwinism:
The idea of a naturalistic ethics was bom of a deeply teleological 
outlook, and its best expression, in many ways, is still to be found 
in Aristotle's philosophy, a philosophy according to which there is 
inherent in each natural kind of thing an appropriate way for things 
of that kind to behave.... [T]he first and hardest lesson of 
Darwinism, that there is no such teleology at all, and that there is no 
orchestral score provided from anywhere according to which human 
beings have a special part to play, still has to find its way fully into 
ethical thought.
^  Hursthouse provides her own objection to Williams's view. She writes: "The belief 
that harmony /s possible for human beings, that we have the virtues neither by nor 
contrary to nature, but are fitted by (our) nature to receive them, is, I think, an 
essential part of the ethical outlook even of the minimally virtuous—any of us who 
think that being right about ethics matters" (Hursthouse 1999: 262). To understand 
Hursthouse's objection to Williams's view (conceived of as moral nihilism), we must 
understand a crucial component of her conception of a naturalistic approach to 
ethics. She assum es without argument that we cannot understand morality from a 
neutral point of view and that we always begin our ethical inquiries from within an 
acquired ethical outlook (Hursthouse 1999:164ff., especially 164-167). As the above 
shows I have followed a different tact in addressing the concerns raised by Williams. 
^  Williams 1995b: 109-110.
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If we have evolved by Darwinian natural selection, then we have no essential 
nature. This is the case because neo-Darwinism rules out teleology and 
essentialism requires teleology. But neo-Aristotelian ethics requires a certain kind 
of essentialism. Thus, one cannot be a neo-Darwinian and a neo-Aristotelian.^^
A danger exists here for NVE only if one misunderstands neo-Darwinism 
and neo-Aristotelian ethical theory. Darwinism may actually be seen as 
underwriting teleological explanations in biology, that is, as playing a crucial 
theoretical role in explaining certain kinds of telic phenomena. In other words, 
Darwinism can explain how a species gets a trait that has a particularyh/iciioM. 
The mechanism of natural selection is differential selection of more favorable, 
randomly generated variants, in respect to certain determinate environmental 
factors. This mechanism can explain—with reference only to efhcient causes— 
how it has come to be that certain kinds of things, for example, living organisms, 
come to exhibit telic phenom ena.The Erst and hardest lesson of Darwinism is 
not that there is no global teleology. Scientists had already begun getting rid of 
that notion long before Darwin developed his theory. The task Darwin set himself 
was to develop a theory that could explain diversity ("the origin of species") and 
functionality (adaptations) in living organisms without recourse to global 
teleology. And that is what he did. Global teleology was, of course, an alternative 
hypothesis to be considered. But the fact that such an hypothesis is empirically
^C f. MacIntyre 1981.
We may want to be more cautious here and say that the Darwin's proposed 
mechanism has always held out the prom/se of explaining how living things have 
come to exhibit telic phenomena.
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iintestable and in most forms requires supernatural processes in order to operate 
made it suspect as a theory long before Darwin. But one of Darwin's
major accomplishments was to provide a theoretical explanation of "local" telic 
phenomena without recourse to any sort of global teleology. If Darwinism has 
something to teach us about teleology, it is not that there is no such thing. It is that 
such a thing can be given a naturalistic explanation.^^
NVE does not commit one to there being an "orchestral score" according 
to which we should play our "special part." Such a characterization of teleological 
ethics is a caricature. I assume, along with many other people—and I do not think 
this is really a tendentious assumption—that there are many paths I could take in 
this life, many possible lives I could actualize. Some of those lives I would rather 
live than others. Objectively speaking, some lives just are better than others. NVE 
maintains that the ^cts concerning which lives are good ones and which ones are 
not is a matter of how those lives square with what human nature is. My own 
nature is a more or less direct product of my history, both the evolutionary and 
cultural history of humanity and the history of the life I have lived so far. Not just 
any life will prove satisfactory; not just any life will exemplify that representative 
of a good human being. This is because of the way I am. But this does not imply 
some sort of orchestral score I have to follow in order to be a good human being.
Human nature is a set of adaptations shared by all races and ethnic groups. 
It is an important prediction of evolutionary theory that humans wiU show 
universal characteristics that exist cross-culturally. This is because all humans are
^  See, e.g., Mayr 1992, Fitzpatrick 2000, and Ruse 2002.
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closely related genetically and because our ancestors faced the same adaptive 
problems. Evolved strategies should be common therefore to all peoples. For 
example, as Chomsky first pointed out, children do not have to be taught 
grammar. The "deep structure" of language is innate. However, languages can 
vary radically in their "surface structure." Here is a place we see cultural 
variation. From an evolutionary point of view, in fact, we would expect to see 
cultural variation. This is where those who argue "nature vs. nurture" go sadly 
wrong. From the gene's point of view, culture is just more environment and thus 
provides different adaptive problems to solve. We might expect some 
"epiphenomenal" cultural variation, variation more or less neutral in respect of 
fitness. But we should also expect some cultural variations to reflect selection 
pressures and only vary within a range. For example, we see examples of 
monogamous mating systems and polygynous ones. We would not expect, 
however, to see mating systems of polyandry. And indeed we do not 6nd them.
Consider food and nutrition. Because of the kind of animals that we are, 
there are some foods that are good for us and some that are not. To be a good 
specimen human being, one needs to meet certain minimal nutritional 
requirements. Humans who do not do so usually end up leading less that desirable 
lives. But &bm the fact that humans must eat the right kinds of foods in order to 
be healthy, it does not follow that there is one kind of diet that all must follow. 
There are a near endless variety of good foods we can eat. There is room for 
improvisation in one's diet. However, if that diet is to be a healthful diet, it must
^  Chomsky 1957.
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be constrained by certain facts about human nature, that is, that individuals of our 
species require certain kinds of nutrients. But there is no diet that all of us must 
adhere to in order to be healthy.
A better analogy than an orchestral score, then, might be with 
improvisatory jazz. There is a melody, of course. Yet some deviation from the 
melody is permitted, even desired—within reason. There is a structure to the song, 
but all the notes and rhythms are not transcribed in advance. Of course, if there is 
too much deviation &om the score, the melody may begin to suSer, the song 
become unrecognizable to the performers and the audience, in which case it may 
be necessary for the other musicians to try to rein in the one who has pushed the 
limits too far. But this is not to say that there is no teleology to the song being 
played, although the is not the last note. There is a characteristic way of 
going on when the band plays "Melancholy Baby," though within that way of 
going on the space for improvisation is great. Even though human beings are 
evolved animals, it is not the case that there is no human nature. There is. But that 
nature is sufficiently plastic to allow for much variation in the species and choices 
of ways to be.
53. What remains
NVE is a naturalistic ethical theory that grounds ethics in considerations of 
human nature. It is rightly called a virtue theory because the locus of evaluation is 
the individual human being and its traits. NVE is unobjectionably teleological and 
does not have any devastating metaethical problems. Still, as it stands the theory is
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incomplete. There is much work to be done, though it is hoped that the foundation 
laid here will be sound enough to withstand the necessary additions and, perhaps, 
modifications. There are at least three sets of mostly philosophical questions that 
need further exploration in light of NVE, as well as a set of empirical questions 
that, when answered, will allow us to further understand what makes a human 
being good.
One project that must be undertaken is an examination of the virtues 
individually to show how they fit, or do not fit, with NVE. In chapter 3 I showed 
briefly how this would be done with courage, honesty, and loyalty, and in more 
detail with justice. However, much more work needs to be done to flesh out the 
treatment given, as well as to deal with those potential virtues not considered. 
Another promising avenue of research would involve an examination of those 
traits thought to be virtues by Aristotle, for example, proper pride, and how we 
square his intuitions about those traits with our current intuitions about others, for 
example, humility. Also, an exploration of vice from the NVE perspective could 
shed much light on why certain individuals and types are bad, or not so good, 
people.
Another project to undertake would be to develop a full-blown theory of 
justice by the lights of NVE. I began laying the groundwork for this theory in 
§§3.3.1-3.3.3. There I presented a neo-Humean consequentialist theory, which 
seems to me the best fit with NVE. This is the case because NVE tells us what 
makes up the human good and the good human. If we adopt a consequentialist 
view of politics and law, the question of justice for NVE then becomes the
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question of how we are to promote, maximize, encourage, or otherwise realize 
both the human good for individuals and a society of good humans. I understand, 
of course, that there are other, nonconsequentialist perspectives on legal and 
distributive justice. It would be interesting to see whether NVE is compatible with 
some deontological theory, for example Nozick's or Rawls's, or with game 
theoretic accounts of justice, or whether there is available a plausible virtue 
theoretic account of distributive and legal justice.
A final set of mostly philosophical questions surrounds the issue of ethical 
motivation, or the "normativity" of ethics. I noted my awareness of these issues 
above in §4.1, then dismissed them as not currently being my problem. That said, 
these issues still are a problem for NVE and for ethical philosophy more 
generally. I also noted that others have dealt with these issues, admirably and at 
length.^ What these others have not done, at least to my satisfaction, is integrate 
their findings into a theory like NVE. Furthermore, not enough of what we now 
know about our social and psychological nature has been integrated into our 
philosophical understanding of ethical motivation. Thus, to be thorough, more 
interdisciplinary work is needed.
For NVE to be sound, and for us using it to be able to draw reasonable 
ethical judgments about individuals and types of individuals, we must begin with 
true propositions about human nature. Certainly, reflection and introspection, 
personal and shared experiences, and the arts provide other, nonscientific ways to
60 See references above, p. 107n5.
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arrive at the truth about human nature. But, generally speaking, anecdotal 
evidence is not a reliable way to derive inductive generalizations.
The philosophical questions facing us are difficult. The empirical questions 
are also difGcult, though many of them have been answered. It is interesting and 
instructive to consider how changes in our concept of human nature, changes in 
perspective motivated by findings in the sciences, affect our ethical assessments of 
human beings. In considering the case below it would be presumptuous of me to 
contend that NVE was the operative ethical theory. However, a possible rational 
reconstruction of our thought shows that NVE cowZff Aove the operative 
theory that, along with the relevant scientific facts, caused us to change our 
collective minds, as it were, about what constitutes a good human being.
In the 1950s it was the conventional wisdom of psychologists, under the 
sway of Freud and the behaviorists, that human infants were attracted to their 
mothers only as a source of milk and that too much affection would harm them. 
Groundbreaking and controversial research by Harry Harlow effectively 
demonstrated that mothers were much more than merely a source of nourishment. 
Social beings like ourselves cannot long survive isolation and remain functionally 
intact.^' Once Harlow's findings had been accepted, the conventional wisdom 
about how infants should be treated dramatically changed. Empirical research 
demonstrated what is necessary to nurture well-functioning human beings, and 
consequently our concept of a good mother changed as well.
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Having some idea of what makes a good mother enables us to give sound 
advice to mothers and other infant care-givers. The natural end of a good mother 
is to raise good offspring. Without Harlow's research we would not know what 
constitutes a good mother. Continued empirical research and integration should 
help us to apply NVE to many other cases. As Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, and 
various others realized, ethical philosophy must begin with a proper understanding 
of human nature. Empirical research is the foundation of this understanding. We 
have learned much, though it often seems as if we have only scratched the surface. 
Thus, much work remains, but a basic faith in humanity, belief in the intrinsic 
value of nature, and hope that we can make the world a better place are enough to 
persuade me that this work is worth doing.
Cf. Blum 2002 for a joumalisfs account of Harlow's life and work. Paradoxically, 
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Dembski, William A. 1999. Fẑ g/FggMt Dayign. 7%e Fnd^g 6gnvgg/z FczeMce o/id 
7%eo/ogy. Intervarsity Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1984. F/6ow Foom. 7%g Pdngda; q/^Frgg JPzF IPbrrA PPdwtiMg.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995. Dorwi/i f Donggrozo fdea." Fvo/zztzon o/zd tAg Afgo/zzngs q/̂  
Fz/g. New York, NY: Simon and Shuster.
Dennett, Daniel C. 2001. "In Darwin's Wake, Where Am I?" Frocggdmgf o/zd 
v4ddrgs.ygf q/"t/zgyf/zzgnco/z F/zz/osqpAzco/v4.îsocza/zozz 75 (2): 13-30.
Descartes, René. 1641 (1993). Medztotzozzs on FzM/ F/zz/o.̂ qpAy. Trans, by Donald 
Cress. 3rd ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Dodd, Julian, and Stem-Gillet, Suzanne. 1995. "The Is/Ought Gap, the Fact/Value 
Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy." DzoZogug 34: 727-745.
Downing, F. Gerald. 1972. "Ways of Deriving 'Ought' from Ts'." FAz/ojqpAzca/ 
^zzarigfJy 22: 234-247.
Driver, Julia. 2001. U/zgosy PzrAzg. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Edel, Abraham. 1944. "Naturalism and Ethical Theory." In Krikorian 1944: 65-95. 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenaus, and Kramer, Sol. 1958. "Ethology, the Comparative Study of 
Animal Behavior." gwor^grJy Fgvzgw q/"Fzo/ogy 33: 181-211.
Engstrom, Stephen, and Whiting, Jennifer (eds.). 1996. ^rütof/g, Kd/zt, o/zfj rAe 
Ftoz'gf. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Epictetus, c. 89 (1983). FfdzzdAooA q/^Fpzctgpzs. Trans, by Nicholas White.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Everson, Stephen (ed.). 1998a. Comyo/zzozzj to yfzzczg/zt FAougAt 4. FtAzcy.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Everson, Stephen. 1998b. "Aristotle on Nature and Value." In Everson 1998a: 77- 
106.
Farber, Paul Lawrence. 1994. TAg Tgzz t̂otzozzs q/̂ Fvo/zztzoTzozy FtAzc.r. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.
Feldman Marcus W. (ed.) 1989. MdtAg/zzotzcoJ Fvo/zztzozzozy TAgozy. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
180
Feldman, M. W., and Cavalli-Sfbrza, L. L .1989. "On the Theory of Evolution under 
Genetic and Cultural Transmission with Application to the Lactose 
Absorption Problem." In Feldman 1989.
Fieser, James. 1993. "Moore, Spencer, and the Naturalistic Fallacy." F&ro/y 
fAi/ojopAy guarfgr/y 10: 271-276.
FitzPatrick, William J. 2000. Tg/go/ngy awf fAg q/^Aafnrg. New York, NY:
Garland.
Flew, Anthony. 1976. "Three Questions about Justice in Hume's TFgahjg." 
fAfZo^opAfca/ ^wa/7gr(y 26: 1-13.
Foot, Philippa. 1959. "Moral Beliefs." Reprinted in Foot 1978: 110-131.
Foot, Philippa. 1972. "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives." 
RAi7o.ïopAfcaZ Rgvz'gw 81: 305-316. Reprinted in Foot 1978.
Foot, Phihppa. 1978. l r̂A^gf ancf Ffggj OrAgrEgf^j in Mora/ fA//ogppAy.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Reprinted 2002 by Oxford 
University Press.)
Foot, Philippa. 2001. /Vafwra/ Goo^/ngfj. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Frankena, William K. 1939. "The Naturalistic Fallacy." MzW 48: 464-477.
Frankena, William K. 1957. "Ethical Naturalism Renovated." Rgvz'gw q/"Mgf^yAy /̂c; 
10: 457-73. Reprinted in Frankena 1976: 37-48.
Frankena, William K. 1976. /"gr r̂pgchve  ̂on Mbra/z/y.- JFi/Z/a/m K.
FranAg/za. Kenneth E. Goodpaster, ed. Notre Dame: IN: University ofNotre 
Dame Press.
Fumerton, Richard A. 1983. "The Paradox of Analysis." fAf/ogqpAy an /̂ 
PAgMomgMo/og/ca/ RgagarcA 43: 477-497.
Futuyma, D. J. 1998. E'vo/whona/y R/o/ogy. 3"̂  edition. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer.
Geach, Peter. 1956. "Good and Evil." y4na/yf w 17: 33-42.
Geiger, George R. 1949. "A Note on the Naturalistic Fallacy." JPAz/ogqpAy q/' '̂c/gncg 
16: 336-342.
Gewirth, Alan. 1993. "How Ethical is Evolutionary Ethics?" In Nitecki and Nitecki 
1993: 241-256.
Gibbard, Allan. 1990. IFüg CAaicga, yfpf Fgg/mg:;. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
University Press, 1990.
Gibbard, Allan. 2001. "Living with Meanings: A Human Ecology." frogggz/znga a/zz/ 
y4zMrg.yjg; /Ag v4z»grzcazz f  Az/ofqpAzca/ .̂ .yaoczafzozz 75 (2): 59-77.
Glassen, P. 1957. "A Fallacy in Aristotle's Argument about the Good." fAz/o.yqpAzca/ 
gzzarfgr/y 7: 319-322.
Gotthelf Allan. 1987. "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality." In Gotthelf and 
Lennox 1987: 204-242.
Gotthelf  ̂Allan, and Lennox, James G. (eds.) 1987. fAz/osqpAzca/ Jsswgs zzz .^nj/of/g's 
Rzo/agy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Goodpaster, Kenneth E. 1978. "On Being Morally Considerable." Jbzzma/ q/" 
PAz/ofqpAy 75: 308-325.
Gould, Stephen J., and Lewontin, Richard C. 1979. "The Spandrels of San Marco and 
the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme." 
Procggz/mg.y q/̂ /Ag Rqyzz/ ^ocz'g/y q/̂ LoWon R 205: 581-598.
181
Grene, Marjorie. 1972. "Aristotle and Modem Biology." Jbur/ia/ tAe TAütoAy q/ 
Tic/eay 33: 395-424.
Hamilton, W. D. 1964. "The Genetical Theory of Social Behavior, I and II. q/"
TAeoreticaZ .Bzo/ogy 7: 1-52. Reprinted in Hamilton 1996.
Hamilton, W. D. 1996. q/^Ge/ig 7%e Co//ectayfqper.y q/̂ iy] D.
j%7M(7toM. 143/. 7." Æ'vo/wt/on q/^ '̂ocfo/ .geAavzor. Oxford, UK: W. H. Freeman.
Hancock, Roger. 1960. "The Refutation of Naturalism in Moore and Hare." Vowmo/ 
q/'RAz/o.yqpAy 57: 326-334.
Hanidnson, R. J. 1995. "Philosophy of Science." In Barnes 1995: 109-139.
Harcourt, Edward (ed.). 2000. MoroA/y, Re/Z6cAo/i, a/iA Meo/ogy. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Hare, Richard M. 1952. TAeZangwage q/^Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hare, Richard M. 1993. "Objective Prescriptions." RAz / o . s q p Az c a / 4."
TVotwroAa/M anATVbnMaAvzYy: 15-32.
Harman, Gilbert. 1977. TAe TVatwre q/"AfbraAYy.- yf/z TAtroAwcAon to EtAz'cï. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Hecter, M., Nadel, L., & Michod, R. R. (eds.). 1993. TAe Ongzn q/̂ Pa/w&y. New 
York: Gruyter.
Hinde, Robert A. 2002. IFAy Good A GooA. TAe ^ource.s q/"MoroAty. London, UK: 
Routledge.
Hooker, Brad. 1996. "Does Moral Virtue Constitute a BeneSt to the Agent?" In Crisp 
1996b:141-156.
Hull, David L., and Ruse, Michael (eds.). 1998. TAe f  AAosqpAy q/"Rzo/ogy. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.
Hume, David. 1739-40 (1978). TreoAse q/^Hw/nan AAzAzre. Ed. by L. A. Selby- 
Bigge. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.
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